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A  hearing  was  held  in  Brussels  on  21  and  22  June  1990  on  the  subject of  'Tax 
and  fiscal  incentives to promote environmental policy objectives'. 
This  hearing,  organized  jointly  by  the  Committee  on  the  Environment,  Public 
Health  and  Consumer  Protection and  STOA  ('Scientific and  Technological Options 
Assessment'  of  the  European  Parliament)  and  the  Institute  for  European 
Environmental  Policy  in  Bonn,  was  intended  as  preparation  for  a  report  on  the 
subject. 
In  the  run-up  to  the  hearing,  the  Institute  for  European  Environmental  Policy 
was  given the task of drawing  up  a  study as  a  basis for discussion.  The  study 
was  then  revised  in  the  light  of  the  hearing  and  is  now  part  of  the  current 
documentation. 
The  papers  handed  in  by  the  experts  do  not  necessarily  contain  the  texts  of 
the  spoken  contributions,  but  are,  broadly  speaking,  a  record  of  what  was 
said. 
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- 5  -WELCOME  SPEECH  BY  MR  KEN  COLLINS, 
CHAIRMAN  OF  THE  COMMITTEE  ON  THE  ENVIRONMENT,  PUBLIC  HEALTH 
AND  CONSUMER  PROTECTION 
I  would like to  welcome  everybody to this meeting today. 
There  is  no  question,  and  I  think  everyone  might  know,  that 
environment  is  one  of  the  crucial  issues  of  the  European 
Community  and  beyond.  I  think  the  days  when  environment  was 
the  concern  of  a  few  people  in  the  fringes  of politics  have 
gone  and  it is  now  very  much  at  a  safer  stage  here  in  the 
community  and  elsewhere  in  the  world.  I  think  it  is  true 
probably to say that  there is no political leader in the whole 
western  world  who  has  not  made  a  major  speech  about 
environment  policy.  Ten  years  ago  that  could  not  have  been 
the case;  five years  ago it still wasn't  the  case,  but it most 
certainly  is  now.  I  think  that  this  Parliament  and  this 
committee  has  done  more  than  its  fair  share  too  to make  this 
possible. 
we  are  meeting  today,  one  week  before  the Ministers  will  make 
a  pronouncement  on  the  environment  next  week  and  some  of you 
may  well  be  aware,  and  some  of you  may  not,  that  there  has 
passed into the hands of the Parliament  in very recent  hours  a 
copy of the declaration  that  will be proposed  to the Ministers 
next  week  on  the  25  and  26  June.  It  makes  fascinating 
reading.  Because  in  that  declaration  that  the  Ministers  are 
expected  to  make  next  week  there  are  one  or  two  interesting 
commitments  which  five  years  ago  would  have  been  quite 
incredible.  It is now  clear  that  the Ministers  will  be asked 
to agree  a  thirteen point Charter of Rights  on  environment  and 
these rights are clearly quite  far-reaching  and  I  hope  that  we 
see  them  implemented.  The  principle is that  every citizen of 
the  Community  should  have basic rights  which  will benefit  the 
community  and  its  Member  States  in  the  enactment  of 
legislation  and  in  administrative  action  relating  to  the 
environment  and  there  are  several  points  about  environmental 
quality,  environmental  information  and  environmental 
participation.  In  making  this  declaration  of  course  the 
Ministers  are  not  doing  anything new  as  far  as  this  committee 
is  concerned,  or  anything  revolutionary  as  far  as  this 
Committee  is  concerned,  but it is  clear  to  see  that  they  are 
gradually  beginning  to  follow  us  and  that  is very  good.  One 
of  the  things  that  we  are  being  asked  to  agree  next  week  is 
that in the council of Ministers  there will be majority voting 
on  environmental  issues and  those of you  who  have  followed  the 
activities of this Committee  over the last  few years will  know 
that  this  has  been  a  recurrent  theme  of primary  concern.  The 
democrati~ deficit  that exists in the community must  be  filled 
and  as  far  as  we  are  concerned  that  means  not  just majority 
voting  in  the  council  but  it  means  an  enlargement  of 
cooperation  procedure  and  a  move  towards  eventual  co-
decision making.  we  hope  therefore that  when  the Ministers  do 
- 7  -meet  next  week  that  none  of them  will  retreat  from  this  very 
progressive  declaration,  but  that  they will  accept  it and if 
they  do  then  they  can  be  sure  that  they will  have  the support 
of the  European  Parliament. 
So  far  as  today is concerned, if we  are going to have all this 
action  on  environment,  if we  are  going  to  try  and  achieve 
environmental  ends,  clearly  we  must  turn  our  minds  to  the 
means  by which  these  ends  are  going  to be  achieved.  And that 
is  the  purpose  of  this  hearing.  It is not  of course  a  self 
examination  by  the  Parliament,  it  is  not  a  question  of  us 
preaching  to  anybody,  it is  just  generally  bringing  into  the 
open,  into  public  the  question  of  how  we  are  to  achieve 
environmental  ends  and  to  that  extent  therefore  I  am  very 
happy  that  we  have  had  the  cooperation of so many  experts and 
we  have  the  cooperation  of our  rapporteur  today  in  bringing 
together this group. 
Now  what  I  would  like  to  do  is  to  repeat  my  welcome  to 
everybody  and  I  hope  that  this will  be  a  very successful  two 
days  and  I'm  going  to  hand  over now  to  Dr  Vohrer  to introduce 
the hearing itself.  Thank  you  very much. 
- 8  -Introduction to the subject  by  Mr  Manfred  Vohrer,  rapporteur. 
Ladies  and  Gentlemen,  Colleagues, 
First  of  all,  as  the  rapporteur,  I  would  like to  say  how  pleased  I  am  that  a 
topic  on  which  the  European  Parliament  has  taken  the  initiative has  met  with 
so  much  interest.  It  is  not  always  the  case  that  the  European  Parliament 
takes  the  initiative  and  all  too  often  we  are  constrained  merely  to  react. 
However,  the  discussion  on  economic  and  fiscal  instruments  within 
environmental  policy  is  our  own  initiative  and  we  are  extremely  optimistic 
that this  time  a  reversal  of  the  usual  process  will  prove  successful,  that is 
that the Commission will respond to this initiative. 
This  hearing  has  to  be  seen  in  the  context  of  the  inadequacy  of  the  legal 
instruments  in  EC  environmental  policy  to  date.  The  experts'  contributions 
will  indeed  back  up  the  view  that  the  state  of  the  environment  in  many 
respects  is  worse  now  than  before  the  First  Action  Programme  in  1973.  The 
implementation of measures  to protect the environment  is inadequate throughout 
the  EC  and  especially  in  countries  with  less  effective  administrative 
structures.  The  integration  of  environmental  policy  into other policy  areas, 
as  required  by  Article  130  r  of  the  EEC  Treaty,  is still totally  inadequate. 
We  are  still  a  long  way  from  our  primary  environmental  objective  of 
'sustainability',  i.e.  the  transition  to  sustainable  economic  practices,  and 
the  legal  instruments  are  static,  expensive  and  cumbersome.  Legal 
instruments,  limit  values,  rules  and  bans,  as  well  as  flexibility  are  all 
lacking.  The  existing instruments are not  responsive to new  technological  and 
economic  developments.  The  introduction of the Single Market  is an  example  of 
an  economic  development  to which  we  need to find  an environmental  response. 
In  view  of  the  prospects  described  in  the  report  by  Mr  Ceccini1 ,  it was  not 
surprising that there is a  growing  fear of the consequences of  economic  growth 
in  Europe.  The  report  describes  scenarios  linking  economic  growth  with  a 
considerable  increase  of  environmental  degradation  and  for  this  reason  it is 
necessary to put  forward  an  alternative strategy. 
The  Task  Force  Report  was  the  Commission's  first  tentative  response  to  the 
report  by  Mr  Ceccini.  It  shows  that  responding  with  economic  and  fiscal 
measures  is  the  right  approach  in  the  environmental  sector.  In this respect 
it  is  important  that  in  Parliament  today  we  are  holding  a  discussion  with 
experts  on  how  to  go  about  forming  a  more  effective  environmental  policy  by 
introducing  economic  and  fiscal  instruments.  There  is  no  intention  to  put 
forward  pipe  dreams  or  to  hold  an  academic  seminar.  Practical  action  must 
result  from  this  discussion  and  in  this  sense it is  a  question  of  our  giving 
pointers  on  how  to  reverse  the  present trend.  When  we  read that the price of 
oil  has  fallen to  below  $15  a  barrel,  the market  is giving the wrong  signals. 
It  is  the  task  of  economic  and  fiscal  policy  to  make  energy  more  expensive, 
thus  providing  incentives  for  energy  saving  and  making  renewable  energy 
sources  competitive.  A transport  system should be created which  takes  account 
of  the  environment  and  includes  environmental  costs  alongside the  traditional 
transportation  costs  to  the  individual  carrier.  A  European  transportation 
cost  system  should  be  established which  leads to  more  goods  being transported 
by  rail  rather  than  by  road  and  the  costs  of  environmental  damage  should  be 
charged to the individual carrier throughout  Europe. 
1  The  Challenge of  1992,  ~ay 1988 
- 9  -I  have  picked  out  a  f  ~  instruments  as  examples;  I  consider it vital that the 
amount  of  time  for  discussion  of  instruments  should  not  be  cut  short.  Tho 
hearing  today  ia  dealing  specifically  with  er:onomic  and  fiscal  instruments 
because  it is  not  just taxes,  contributions,  duties  and  tariffs which  need  to 
be  discussed  but  also  a  broad  range  of  measures,  including  licences  for 
emissions,  liability  laws,  deposits  and  the  labelling  of  environmentally 
friendly products.  We  should make  use of the opportunities and  the creativity 
of  our  market  economy  and  incorporate  them  i~to environmental  policy.  It is 
therefore  impor~ant that  Parliament  is  sending  this particular  signal  to  the 
Commission,  i.e.  that  the  Fifth  Environmental  Action  Programme  should  be 
characteri-cd  to  a  considerable  degree  by  the  use  of  economic  and  fiscal 
instruments. 
Finally,  may  I  explain  as  a  Liberal  that  in  my  view the market  economy  is the 
economic  system with the most  freedom  of choice.  However,  it has  become  clear 
that  the  market  is  not  capable  of  sorting  everything  out.  For  a  century  we 
have  been  trying  to  incorporate  more  social  justice  into  the market  economy. 
This  led  to  us  calling  our  system  'Social  market  economy'  in  order  to  make 
clear that  this was  our  field  of  political  action  and  our political priority. 
If  I  am  supporting  an  ecological  market  economy  today,  it  is  because  the 
political priority of  the coming  decades  is to transform the market  economy  so 
as  ~o  provide  a  response  to  the  ecological  challenge.  If  we  take 
'sus~ainability'  as  our  aim,  that  is  an  economy  which  no  longer relies on the 
exploitation  of  non-renewable  resources,  but  which  limits  itself to  renewable 
resources,  then  we  need  to  practise  more  environmental  protection  within  the 
market  economy  as  well  as  on  the  other  hand,  practising  more  market  economy 
within  environmental  protection.  In  other  words  we  should  adapt  all  these 
options,  initiatives  and  entrepreneurial  efforts  to  find  the  best  possible 
solution  for  the  environment.  Economic  and  fiscal  instruments  should  be  the 
driving  force  behind  such  a  policy.  This  should  not  just be  an  abstract  idea 
-it is too easy to agree that the  'external costs need to be  internalized'. 
If  such  demands  are  set out  in  abstract  terms,  they  are more  likely to  find  a 
consensus.  Where  they  go  into practical detail,  they  become  more difficult to 
implement. 
The  Dutch  government  is split  over  t11'"'  <;tuestion  of  kilometre  tax  allowances, 
in other  words  whether  the tax  system  shoul~ provide benefits  for car drivers 
or  whether  we  should  change  the  tax  system  to give  preferential  treatment  to 
environmentally  friendly means  of transport. 
I  am  therefore concerned that this hearing should contribute to the discussion 
of  how  fiscal  and  economic  instruments  can  be  used  in  practice  in  various 
policy  areas,  especially  in  energy  policy,  transport,  agriculture  and  waste 
management,  so  that  we  can  go  beyond  general  statements  and  tackle  such 
questions  as  where  action  needs  to  be  taken,  what  has  to  be  done  at  European 
level,  or  indeed  what  can  be  achieved  at  national  level,  where  national  laws 
would  damage  Europe  and  where  not,  and  where  Europe  needs  to  take  action  to 
make  use of the  advantages created by  the Single Market.  I  was  thus extremely 
pleased  that  the  committee  considered  this  topic  to  be  important  enough  to 
make  it the subject of  a  hearing. 
I  would  like  to  thank  everybody  who  helped  with  the preparations  and  all the 
colleagues  who  work  as  co-rapporteurs  in  the  other  committees  making  a 
broadly-based  contribution  so  that  the  new  environmental  policy  instruments 
meet  with  a  consensus  from  Members  of the European  Parliament. 
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- 14  -INTRODUCTION 
The  market  economy  has  never  enjoyed  unlimited  freedom  in  the  sense  that  only 
the  economic  interests  of  individuals  have  shaped  events  within  them.  So-
called  Manchester  liberalism  was  only  ever  a  theoretical  concept  or  rallying 
cry  in  the  battle against  the  market  economy. 
State  intervention  in  and  regulation  of,  for  example,  commercial,  economic  and 
fi sea  1  1 aw  as  we 11  as  standards  of  emp 1  oyment  protection  date  from  a  very 
early  period,  albeit  in  very  rudimentary  form  in  today's  terms.  The 
establishment  of  the  infrastructure  essential  to  the  economy,  such  as  road 
construction  and  the  provision  of  education,  is  another  aspect  of  that 
intervention.  An  addition  a 1  factor,  which  deve  1 oped  towards  the  end  of  the 
last century,  has  been  the  concept  of social  policy  as  a  responsibility of the 
modern  State. 
Within  that  framework,  which  has  had  constantly  to  adapt  to  meet  its 
requirements,  the  economic  process  proved  highly  efficient  but  efficiency 
brought  new  problems,  in  particular  serious  pollution  of  the  environment. 
There  is  therefore  an  urgent  and  unavoidable  need  to  provide  the  market 
economy  with  an  ecological  basis.  The  main  factors  which  have  to  be  taken 
into  account  in establishing that  basis  form  the  subject of this  paper. 
I.  ENVIRONMENTAL  POLICY  AND  ECONOMIC  DEVELOPMENT 
1.  The  environment  as  a  public asset 
Basic  facts  of the market  economy 
The  coordination  of  private  sector  planning  and  decisions  relating  to  markets 
and  prices  has  proved  efficient  in  a  way  that  had  not  been  anticipated.  Not 
least  on  that  account,  the  European  Community's  policy  is  guided  by 
fundamental  principles  of  the  market  economy.  It  is  based  on  the 
liberalization of markets,  i.e.,  the  free  movement  of persons,  goods,  services 
and  capital  between  the  Member  States,  the  basis  for  which  should  be 
established  by  the  end  of  1992. 
- 15  -Markets  are  not  omnipotent.  However,  they  only  regulate  goods  which  may  be 
acquired  privately.  The  economic  interests of all  operators  on  the  market  are 
Lh,·n~forA  dir·,.ctNi  almost  exclusively  towards  overcoming  shortaqes  of  privatA 
goods.  Where  social  and  regional  injustices  and  public  assets  are  concerned, 
the  market  is  blind1 • 
Central  fsrJes  of environmental  policy 
The  quality  of  the  environment  is  largely  a  public  asset.  Markets  cannot 
respond  to  the  increasing  shortage  of  this  asset.  In  fact,  they  are 
respo~sible  for  it.  Establishing  the  conditions  which  will  enable  a 
I 
proportion  of  productive  capacity  to  be  used  to  rna i nta  in  the  environment  as 
an  asset  is  therefore  a  po 1 it  i cal  res  pons i bi l i ty,  and  one  which  cannot  be 
dele~ated
2 •  If  these  conditions  lead  to  more  efficient  use  of  scarce 
resources,  this  will  also  increase  long-term  economic  performance  {as  well  as 
the  quality of the  environment}. 
Four  central  questions  arise  here  for  environmental  policy: 
2 
what  environmental  quality  standards  should  be  sought  {defining  the 
objective}? 
what  instruments  should  be  used  to  achieve  the  quality  objective  {choice 
of methods}? 
The  Commission's  Task  Force  has  been  set  up  partly  in  response  to  this. 
Cf  Task  Force  Report  on  the  Environment  and  the  Internal  Market,  Brussels 
1989. 
This  was  clearly  expressed  as  1  ong  ago  as  1848  by  the  economist  John 
Stuart Mill.  In  his  'Principles  of  Political  Economy',  he  writes:  'But  is 
there  nothing  recognized  as  property  except  what  has  been  produced?  Is 
there  not  the  earth  i tse  1 f,  its  forests  and  waters,  and  a 11  other  natura  1 
riches,  above  and  below  the  surface?  These  are  all  the  inheritance of the 
human  race  and  there  must  be  regulations  for  the  common  enjoyment  of  it. 
What  rights,  and  under  what  conditions,  a  person  shall  be  allowed  to 
exercise control  over  any  portion of this  common  inheritance cannot  be  left 
undecided.  No  function  of  government  is  less  optional  than  the  regulation 
of  these  things,  or  more  completely  involved  in  the  idea  of  civilized 
society'. 
- 16  -how  powerful  must  the  inducement  be  to  achieve  the  objective  (extent  of 
intervention  or  incentives)? 
what  are  the  likely  effects,  on  the  economy  as  a  whole  and  on  social 
distribution  (conflicting objectives)? 
Sustainable  development 
The  ultimate  objective  of  the  environmental  policy  is:  'sustainable 
development',  i . e.  a  form  of  prosperity  and  economic  activity  which  in  the 
long  term  is  in  harmony  with  what  planet  earth  has  to  'offer'  ecologically3 • 
To  achieve  this will  require  a  new  economic  approach  and  structure. 
To  do  this  properly,  environmental  policy  must  have  some  concept  of  the 
inherent  dynamics  of  market  economies  which  are  not  regula  ted  by  eco  l ogi cal 
concerns.  On  that  basis,  it  must  establish  its  role  vis-a-vis  the  private 
sector,  select  its  instruments  and  decide  how  far  it is  going  to  apply  them. 
Basing  en  vi ronmenta  l  policy  on  the  market  economy  therefore  means  learning 
from  the  process  of  economic  development  and  then  specifying  the  conditions 
for  future  development. 
3  As  proposed  by  the  Brundl and  Report  of  the  World  Commission  for  the 
Environment  and  Development:  'Our  Common  Future',  Greven  1987 
W.  Beckerman  has  rightly  pointed  out  in  his  paper  that this  concept  poses 
'numerous  difficult  philosophical  problems'.  During  the  hearing  it  was 
stressed  by  F.  Dorow  in  particular  that  a  precise definition  is  not  the 
necessary  condition  for  recognizing  the  need  for  political  action.  In 
many  areas  the  non-sustainability  of  current  economic  activity  is 
self-evident. 
- 17  -2.  CRITERIA  FOR  ESTABLISHING  ENVIRONMENTAL  POLICY  OBJECTIVES 
The  avoidance  technique 
. 
One  of  the  least  demanding  methods  of  determining  the  qualitative  objectives 
of  environmental  policy  is  to  use  known  techniques  for  limiting  emissi.ons 
(generally  accepted  rules  of  technology,  state  of  the  art,  'best  available 
technology').  Such  methods  are  widely  used.  But  it  is  hard  to  see  how 
nature's  tolerance  threshold  relates  to  emissions  deemed  to  be  technically 
unavailable.  Technical  methods  can  therefore  be  viewed  only  as  intermediate 
objectives  of environmental  policy.  (This  will  be  discussed  in  greater detail 
below  in  connection with  the  policy of setting  standards). 
Estimating external  costs 
Another  method  of  determining  environmental  policy  objectives  is 
'internalizing  external  effects':  calculating  the  cost  of  all  damage  to  the 
environment  and  charging  it to  those  causing  the  damage.  The  assumption  today 
is  that  if  the  polluter  has  to  bear  all  the  costs  directly,  industry  is 
subject  to  the  perfect  pricing  system  from  the  ecological  point  of view.  The 
desire for  profits would  be  in  harmony  with  protection of the  environment. 
There  are,  however,  three  basic  blemishes  on  this  apparently  ideal  method. 
Firstly,  it  is  not  possible  to  put  a  price  on  all  of  nature's  assets4 •  For 
example,  it  is  not  immediately  apparent  how  to  put  a  price  on  the  loss  of 
-:;pecies  or  variety  or  of  a  'pleasant  climate'.  And  what  some  people  would 
regard  as  a  loss  - for  example,  the extinction of certain  species  of snails  or 
wasps,  or global  warming  - may  be  regarded  as  a  gain  by  others. 
Secondly,  although  it  is  quite  clearly  possible  to  put  a  price  on  many 
eco  1  og i ca  1  changes  (for  example,  the  most  recent  storm  damage)  it  is  not 
possible  to  establish  a  causal  chain  or  the  chain  would  stretch way  back  into 
the  past. 
4  F.  Dorow  provides  some  practical  examples  of this  from  the  point  of  view 
of  the  environmental  statistician,  with  particular  reference  to  the 
development  of the  environment  satellite system  in  Germany. 
- 18  -Thirdly,  even  the  most  conscientious  form  of  internalization  cannot  guarantee 
economic  behaviour  which  will  prevent  the  destabilization  of  ecological 
systems.  Internalization  must  always  be  measured  in  terms  of  its  own 
successes  and  is  no  substitute  for  efforts  to  establish  eco  1  ogi ca  1 
objectives. 
Analyses or willingness  to  pay 
To  go  some  way  towards  compensating  for  these  shortcomings,  peoples' 
preferences  for  quality  of  the  environment  compared  with  other  assets  are 
being  investigated.  Analyses  of  'willingness  to  pay'  are  intended  to  assess 
the  willingness  of  more  or  less  representative  sections  of  the  population  to 
pay  a  price  for  certain  improvements  to  the  environment.  This  is  a  means  of 
establishing  approximate  monetary  values  for  the  damage  which  people  suffer 
from  a  specific  deterioration  in  the  environment.  This  method  has  been  used 
to  estimate  the  annua  1  damage  caused  by  deteri oration  in  the  environment  at 
approximately  5%  of Germany's  gross  national  product5 . 
This  figure  is  roughly  five  times  greater  than  the  damage  estimated  on  a  cost 
basis  and  is  therefore  a  greater challenge  to  internalization.  However,  given 
the  subjective  components  and  the  methodological  margin  of  error  of  this  type 
of analysis,  it is  not  possible  to  use  it as  a  basis  of a  form  of liability or 
for  the  payment  of  fines.  In  particular,  it is  not  clear whether  the  quality 
object  i v  e  for  wh i c h  p  eo  p  1  e  are  prep  a red  to  pay  i s ,  i n  e co  1  og i c a 1  terms , 
satisfactory.  Frank  Dorow  is  of  the  opinion  that  analyses  of willingness  to 
pay  tend  by  their very  nature  to  produce  results  which  are  too  optimistic. 
Sustainability 
The  weakeness  of  the  'avoidance'  philosophy  and  the  shortcomings  of  the  other 
ways  of  defining  quality  objectives  call  for  an  additional  approach.  This 
was  the  clear  message  of  the  Brundtl and  report.  The  report  defines  the 
objective  of  environmental  policy  as  a  standard  to  be  applied  to  industry  or 
industrial  operators,  namely  the  sustainability or durability of management  of 
5  Lutz  Wicke,  Die  okologischen  Milliarden  (the  ecological  billions}, 
Munich  (Kosel},  1986. 
In  his  paper  F.  Dorow  points  to  the  'defensive  costs'  estimated  by 
Christian  Leipert  which  amount  to  upwards  of  10%  of national  product. 
- 19  -resources  and  economic  development.  This  postulates  a  condition  of  the 
economic  process  which  will  have  to  be  constantly  monitored  and  redefined  as 
part  of  an  ecological  and  socio-economic  process  of finding  new  solutions. 
Just  as  industry  has  previously  adapted  automatically  and  spontaneously  to  the 
laws  of  nature,  to  climate  or  supplies  of  raw  materials,  so  it will  now  have 
to  adapt  to  ~he  conditions  of  sustainability  on  'Spaceship  Earth'  (Boulding). 
And  jlA~L  a~  the  existing  restrictions  have  nol  prevented  economic  development. 
so  lhe  political  restriction  which  now  has  to  be  introduced  will  not  prevent 
social  and  economic  development  either. 
These  methods  for  determining  environment  policy  objectives  must  in  term 
satisfy the criterion of durability.  The  avoidance  principle  in  line with  the 
state of  the  art,  the  level  of  the  external  costs  that are determined  or  even 
the  quality  of  the  environment  resulting  from  the  willingness  to  pay  may  only 
incidentally  satisfy  the  criterion  of  durability.  Nevertheless, 
internalization  as  a  means  of  implementing  quality  objectives  which  are 
durable  is  an  instrument  adequate  to  the market  system. 
3.  CHOICE  OF  INSTRUMENTS 
Reducjng  the  burden  on  the  environment  and  using  the  market  to  regulate 
shortages 
If  they  are  not  attributable  to  natural  causes,  ecological  problems  are  the 
result  of  emissions,  the  using  up  of  resources,  changes  to  the  landscape  and 
other  interventions  by  man  in  natural  ecosystems.  The  objective  of 
environmental  policy  should  be  to  reduce  as  far  as  possible  the  total  volume 
of  harmful  interventions.  Cumulative  interventions  (eg.  the  emissions  of 
persistent  harmful  substances)  and  irreversible damage  (eg.  the  eradication of 
species  of flora  and  fauna)  should  be  reduced  to  zero. 
Given  the  undisputed  efficiency  of  markets  in  adjusting  to,  and  coping  with, 
various  types  of  shortages,  it  is  quite  natura  1  that  en vi ronmenta  1  policy 
should  make  use  of  market  control  instruments.  Not  only  are  such  instruments 
like-ly  to  result  in  improved  achievement  of  objectives  but  they  will  also 
introduce  the  principle of  econo~ic efficiency. 
- 20  -Limits  to  the  regulatory approach 
At  this  stage,  we  need  to  recognize  the  weakness  of all  instruments  based  on 
plant-specific  emission  levels  or  which  directly  prescribe  techniques  for  the 
avoidance  of  emissions.  This  is  a 11  the  more  necessary  if  the  concept  of 
sustainability  is  given  its  proper  flexible  interpretation,  that  is  to  say 
that  environmental  policy  objectives  are  viewed  as  the  product  of  advances  in 
our  understanding  of threats  to  the  environment  and  the capacity of markets  to 
adapt  progressively to  them.  It will  then  become  clear that,  because  there  is 
bound  to  be  a  delay  in  recognizing  the  problem,  in  finding  a  political  and 
administrative  solution  and  in  actually  applying  that  solution,  a  policy  of 
standards  relating  to  particular  plant  will,  of  necessity,  be  inefficient, 
quite  apart  from  the  fact  that  it  requires  a  considerable  level  of  state 
control  and  is  therefore  expensive  for  all  concerned.  This  type  of 
environmental  policy  is  usually  only  reactive,  intervening  after  the  event, 
and  is  suitable  only  as  a  means  of  repairing  clearly  identifiable  acute 
damage.  A  system  of  static  regulations  is  particularly  useless  where 
irreversible  processes  are  at work6 • 
Directing  economic  interests  towards  ecological  objectives 
An  environmental  policy  able  to  encompass  the  dynamic  capacity  of  the  market 
economy  to  find  new  solutions  as  well  as  'competition  as  a  process  of 
discovery'  {Hayek)  must  mobi 1 i ze  market  forces  for  its  own  objectives.  It 
must  direct  economic  interests  towards  ecological  objectives.  This  implies 
creating  conditions  which  force  industry to move  of itself towards  sustainable 
development  in  the  same  way  as,  in  a  market  economy  unregulated  by 
environmental  policy,  it  manoeuvred  itself  into  the  destruction  of  the 
natural  bases  of life with  no  thought  for  the  future. 
Lasting  forms  of  resource  management  can  never  be  devised  and  applied  by  the 
political  and  administrative  system.  Where  there  is  an  attempt  to  do  so,  it 
i nevi tabl y  results  in  the  stifling  of  a 11  progress  as  a  result  of  centra  1 
administration  of  the  economy.  This  is  the  real  and  valid  main  reason  for 
---------------
6  See  in  particular  the  detailed  review  of  the  shortcomings  of  this 
instrument  by  Hans  Bressers  based  on  experience  in  the  Netherlands. 
- 21  -private  sector  opposition  to  state-controlled  environmental  policy.  However, 
it  must  not  lead  to  a  watering  down  of  environmental  policy  objectives.  The 
private  sector  is  intelligent  enough  not  to  resist  the  increasingly  reliable 
evidence  of  the  internationalization  of  external  harmful  effects  on  the 
environment. 
4.  EXTENT  OF  ECONOMIC  INCENTIVES  REQUIRED 
The  time  factor  in  environmental  policy 
Establishing  environmental  policy  objectives  is  not  just  a  matter  of  setting 
quantitative or qualitative goals:  the  time  factor  is also decisive.  Because 
damage  is  often  irreversible,  the  time  factor  is  an  autonomous  criterion  of 
effit:iency.  Perceptions  of  the  capacity  of  industry  to  adjust  in  terms  of 
time  are  therefore  just  as  important  as  those  concerning  its  'resistance'  to 
environmental  policy  measures.  An  analogy  with  the  processes  of  adjustment 
impo:sed  by  the  market,  technological  progress  or  the  vagaries  of  fashion 
itse~f is  therefore  useful  and  necessary  in  this connection,  too. 
Overburdening  industry? 
The  latent  concern  of  many  po 1 it  i c i ans  that  too  great  a  burden  is  being 
placed  on  industry  reveals  a  selective  and  foreshortened  perception  of 
economic  development.  In  particulai,  +hey  over1:....>1<..  the  ruthless  way  in  which 
enterprise  has  always  thrust  beyond  convent~onal  economic  structures,  assets, 
market  shares  and  jobs.  Economic  theory  has  long  recognized  the  'dynamic 
entrepreneur'  who  uses  a  process  of  'creative  destruction'  to  restructure 
competition7 •  This  is  the  source  of  much  of  technological  progress  and  our 
prosperity  but  also,  because  of  the  absence  of constraints,  of  the  increasing 
number  of  ecologically  damaging  developments  in  past  decades.  Thus,  industry 
produces  from  within  itself far  more  pressure  to  adapt  than  has  ever  emanated 
from  environmental  policy. 
7  These  concepts  developed  by  Joseph  Schumpeter  are  central  to  an 
understanding  of  his  theory  of  economic  development  which  is  a  standard 
work  even  today.  Cf  J  A  Schumpeter  (1911)  'Theory  of  economic 
development',  Berlin  1964. 
- 22  -I' 
The  example  of the  dynamic  enterprise 
Environmental  policy  involves  nothing  more  nor  less  than  directing  the  dynamic 
development  process  towards  lasting  management  of  resources.  This  can  be 
successful  a  priori  only if environmental  policy activates  forces  equal  to  the 
private  sector's  inherent  development  capacity.  Any  other  policy  which,  in 
case  of doubt,  hesitates  and  slavishly  respects  existing  structures  is  doomed 
to  fail.  Even  the  very  best  range  of environmental  policy  instruments  cannot 
compensate  for  inadequate  incentives.  To  this  extent,  limiting  the 
environmental  policy debate  to  the  choice  of  instruments  is not  enough. 
5.  CONSEQUENCES  FOR  THE  ECONOMY  AS  A WHOLE 
The  supposed conflict of objectives 
Closely  related  to  the  1 a tent  fear  of  overburdening  industry's  structural 
capacity to  adapt  is  concern  at  the  possible negative effects of environmental 
policy  on  the  economy  as  a  whole.  This  concern  is  justified  inasmuch  as  any 
inappropriate  policy  in  any  given  field  can,  of  course,  produce  friction  and 
instability  throughout  the  economy.  It  is,  however,  untenable  and  groundless 
if interpreted  as  a  characteristic peculiar to  environmental  policy,  allegedly 
distinguishing that  policy  from  all  others. 
There  is  no  denying, 
environmental  policy 
however,  that  the  first  twenty  years  of  modern 
characterized  by  a  shallow,  transient  approach, 
considerable  bureaucracy  and  an  overemphasis  on  costly  emission  monitoring 
methods- encourage  the  prejudiced  view  of  inevitable conflicts of objectives. 
The  conflict  we  are  discussing  here  is  not  concerned  with  the  problem of what 
private  and  public  goods  should  be  produced  or  spared.  That  is  a  question  of 
preferences  and  en vi ronmenta  1  quality  objectives.  It  concerns  the  everyday 
conflict  between  our wishes  and  the  scarce  resources  and/or  limited  purchasing 
power  (cf.  No.  I.2  above),  which  Beckerman  has  stressed. 
Nor  do  we  mean  that conflict  involving  any  policy which  changes  the  conditions 
for  the  economic  activities  of  private  individuals.  What  we  are  concerned 
with  is  the  conflict  that  is  often  stressed  in  text  books  on  env i ronmenta  1 
economics  between  greater protection of the  environment  and  the macro-economic 
- 23  -objectives  of  employment  and  stable  prices.  Behind  this  conflict  is  the 
practical  and  theoretically  very  significant  concept  whereby  a  preference  for 
the  environment  as  an  asset  can  have  a  detrimental  effect  on  the  functioning 
of  a  market  economy  system.  It is  this  concept  which  has  always  posed  quite 
considerable  restraints on  freedom  of manoeuvre  in  environmental  ·politics. 
The  traditional  concept of income 
The  reason  for  this  incorrect  viewpoint  is  pri  nci pall y  to  be  found  among 
established  economic  concepts.  For  example,  the  current  debate  on  how  to 
define  prosperity  and  growth  is  merely  the  continuation  of  a  subject  long 
discussed  by  economists.  Adam  Smith  and  many  others  understood  nation  a 1 
income,  for  example,  in  terms  of the  accounting  concept  of net  return,  that  is 
to  say  turnover  less  all  costs  including  wages.  Consequently,  only  those 
activities  which  increased  the  net  return  (the  national  income)  could  be. 
described  as  productive.  Smith's  view  has  been  criticized  by,  among  others, 
Friedrich list  (circa  1840,  i.e.  over  a  hundred  years  before  the  beginning  of 
academic  economics)  as  follows:  'According  to  that  view,  a  person  who  raises 
pigs  is  a  productive  member  of  society,  but  a  person  who  educates  peopl~  is 
not!' 
However,  even  in  the  days  of  Adam  Smith  there  were  economists,  rna in  1 y  in 
Italy,  who  categorized  all  work  which  produced  something  useful,  whether  or 
not  material,  as  productive8 •  To  th1 s  extent,  1  t  cannot  be  denied  that 
protecting  the  environment  .is  a  productive  activity  which  increases 
prosperity.  Negative  effects' of  environmental  policy  on  the  economy  as  a 
whole  can  therefore  be  strai~htaway  dismissed,  as  they  influence  only  the 
structure  of  demand  and  not  t~e  level  of  activity  of  an  economy9 •  However, 
8 
9 
Notably  Adam  Smith's  contemporary,  Fernando  Galiani. 
Cf  H.  Flassbeck/G.  Maier-Rigaud,  'Umwelt  und  Wirtschaft  Zur 
Diskriminierung  des  Umweltschutzes  in  der  okonomischen  Analyse' 
(Environment  and  Economy.  Protection  of  the  environment  as  a  factor  in 
economic  analysis),  TUbingen  (Mohr/Siebeck)  1982  and  W.  Koll,  'Geldmenge, 
lohn  und  Beschiftigung.  G~samtwirtschaftliche  Bedingungen  fUr  mehr 
Beschiftigung  bei  Stabilitit',  (The  money  supply,  wages  and  employment. 
Conditions  for  increasing  employment  without  impairing stability),  TUbingen 
(Mohr/Siebeck)  1988. 
- 24  -the  continuing  debate  on  this  issue  is  due  principally to the definitions  used 
in  our  national  accounts10 • 
The  environment  as  a  factor  in  national  accounting 
The  accounting  systems  developed  in  the  thirties  and  forties  are  designed  to 
cover  market  processes  and  the  goods  traded  on  the  markets  (finished 
products)  11 •  Within  these  systems,  production  of  environmental  quality  is 
generally  treated  as  intermediate  input.  Increased  protection  of  the 
env·ironmenl  does  not  mean  increased  national  income  but  increased  production 
costs  for  finished  products.  According  to  the  rationale  of  national 
accounting,  environmental  pol icy  appears  to  be  pushing  up  prices,  decreasing 
productivity  and,  since  resources  used  for  protection  of  the  environment  are 
not  available  for  other  purposes,  forcing  down  growth  rates. 
All  these  effects  are,  however,  merely  a  consequence  of  the  definitions 
applied  and  not  at  all  real.  They  disappear  if protection  of the  environment 
is  properly  regarded  as  an  asset.  The  widely  feared  consequences  of 
environmental  policy  for  the  economy  as  a  whole  do  not  therefore exist  in  the 
real  world  or  only  in  so  far  as  they  are  held  to  be  real  by  economic  policy 
and  thereby elicit a  response. 
A  policy  of  reorganizing  the  structure  of  the  economy  towards  sustainable 
management  of resources  need  not  therefore  arouse  fears  of negative effects  on 
price  levels,  productivity  trends  and  employment.  Production  of  the 
'environment',  1 ike  the  production  of  any  other  commodity,  involves 
sacrificing  certain  goods  but  not  overall  economic  stability  and  employment. 
Were  this  not  the  case,  the  objective of  sustainability would  in  fact  make  it 
necessary  to call  into  question  the market  economy  system  itself. 
10 
11 
In  this  connection  there  is  a  running  debate  today  on  whether  the 
measured  soci a 1  products  has  any  sense  as  an  indicator  of  prosperity. 
Professional  economists  have  long  denied  this.  Cf.  Beckerman's  paper 
with  his  reference  to  Pigou's  work  of  1920. 
cf.  P.  Studenski's  fundamental  study  of  this  whole  problem:  'The  Income 
of  Nations,  Theory,  Measurements  and  Analysis,  Past  and  Present, .  A 
Study  in  Applied  Economics  and  Statistics',  New  York  (University  Press) 
1958. 
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I  PRINCIPLES  OF  ENVIRONMENTAL  POLICY  CONTROL 
No  central  economic management  of the  asset  'environment' 
Despite  the  deficiencies  of centrally  planned  economies  which  have  now  become 
particularly  evident,  the  market  economies  continue  to  apply  planned  economy-
type  models  in  the  case  of  environmental  policy.  There  is  a  sort of two-tier 
system  of  regulation:  the  supp  1  y  and  demand  for  private  goods  is  genera  11 y 
subject  to  the  competitive  market  system.  Supplies  of  the  public  asset  of 
environmental  quality,  however,  are  administered  by  law,  regulation  and 
administrative  provision,  which  frequently  refer directly to  a  specific  source 
of  emission.  This  policy  is  not  fully  capable  of  pushing  developments  in  the 
direction  of  sustainable  management  of  resources.  Indeed,  it  provokes 
wide~pread opposition  to  the  transformation  that  is  needed. 
Analogies  with  market  economy  contro7s 
An  environmental  policy  adequate  to  the  objective of sustainable management  of 
resources  must  take  as  an  example  the  way  in  which  the  market  economy  looks 
for  new  solutions.  There  are  three  factors  here: 
.  the  economic  interests of  individual  oper~~ors on  the  market 
.  competitive  organization  of  the  way  1  n  which  the  i nd i vi dua  1  opera  tors  on 
the  market  interact 
what  is  essentially  a  framework  economic  policy  which  creates  the  same 
conditions  for  all  operators  on  the  market12 . 
The  following  criteria  or  requirements  should  therefore  be  used  in  selecting 
the  instruments  for  environmental  policy: 
12  The  theoretical  basis  is Jevons'  'law of  indifference' 
- 26  -.  The  reduction  in  emissions  and  use  of  resources  must  of  itself  be  an 
economically  profitable  strategy  and  therefore  a  factor  in  competition.  At 
the  same  time  this  ensures  that  the  environmental  policy  objective will  be 
achieved  in  accordance  with  the  principle of economic  efficiency  . 
.  The  details  of where  and  how  those  objectives  are  achieved  must  remain  fully 
in  the  hands  of  the  individual  (subject  to  ethical  and  legal  constraints) . 
.  Objectives  of  environmental  quality  laid  down  in  terms  of  cost  or  volume 
should  (ideally)  be  generally  applicable  to  prevent  structural  rejection. 
The  costs  of  emissions  or  of  a  resource  unit  (with  the  same  potential  for 
damage)  must  be  the  same  everywhere.  (It  follows,  for  example,  that  1 
kilowatt  hour  hydroelectricity  produced  by  comparatively  'clean'  methods  in 
Norway  will  cost  less  than  the  same  unit  produced  in  Spain  where  substantial 
damage  is done  to  the  countryside). 
A  clear distribution of roles 
In  the  case  of  individual  measures,  it is  often  demanded  of those  responsible 
for  environmental  policy  that  they  should  take  into  account  specific  sectors, 
regions  and  size  of  enterprise  or  aspects  of  the  fairness  of  distribution. 
Such  considerations  always  result  in  a  diminution  of  environmental  policy 
objectives  and  unnecessary  comp 1 i cation  of  the  instruments  of  en vi ronmenta  1 
protection  policy  and  cannot  be  justified,  ecologically  speaking,  simply 
because  the  supreme  objective  of  economic  activity  must  be  to  secure  the 
natural  bases  of life. 
As  a  rule,  then,  environmental  policy  must  reject  such  demands.  It  is 
incumbent  upon  the  politicians with  particular responsibility for  such  matters 
to  check  or  a 11 ev i ate  any  undes i rab  1 e  secondary  effects  of  en vi ronmenta  1 
policy.  Above  all,  environmental  policy  must  not  be  frustrated  by  social 
considerations  and  structural  economic  objectives.  It is  not  possible to  look 
for  new  structures  and  forms  of  sustainable  management  of  resources  while  at 
the  same  time  seeking  to  retain  the existing structures. 
- 27  -Social  compatibility 
This  problem  is  an  important  factor  in  discussions  of  environmental  policy. 
It  revo  1 ves  around  the  concern,  expressed  at  the  hearing,  that  an  enhanced 
quality  of  the  environment  may  in  principle  - particularly  with  regard  to 
certain  instruments  - be  possible  only  at  the  price  of greater inequality  and 
purchasing  power  or  incomes.  To  what  extent  is this  concern  justified?  Three 
aspects  need  to  be  examined. 
Firstly  there  are  the  costs  of  adaptation  to  a  given  objective;  in  particular 
costs of  investments  and  additional  operating  costs. 
Secondly,  the  costs  resulting  from  a  comparatively  inefficient  use  of 
production  factors  to  achieve  the  objective.  They  are  a  specific consequence 
of  the  use  in  particular of  ad  hoc  bureaucratic  measures  in  protection of the 
environment.  In  many  areas  these  additional  costs,  which  go  no  way  towards 
improving  the  quality  of  the  environment,  can  be  almost  as  high  as  the  costs 
of  an  optimal,  real  adjustment- ie.  they  can  double  the  total  costs. 
Third-ly,  we  need  to  ask  who  in  the  final  instance  bears  the  total  costs 
(problems  of  passing  on  costs),  which  income  groups  are  particularly  affected 
and  which  ones  tend  to  benefit  more  from  an  enhanced  quality  of  the 
environment. 
For  a  given  environmental  policy  objective,  social  compatibility  can  in 
general  be  increased  at minimal  costs.  Economic  influences  are  most  likely  to 
satisfy  the  profitability  principle.  Using  such  instruments  therefore 
minimizes  the  problem  of  social  compatibility.  Costs  not  incurred  are  social 
advantages. 
However,  s i nee  in  genera  1  economic  instruments  act  vi a  prices,  there  wi 11 
nevertheless  be  additional  charges,  although  these  can  be  used  for  specific 
social  purposes,  particularly  in  the  case of environmental  taxes. 
Quite  clearly,  the  funds  used  for  economic  adjustments  cannot  be  used  for 
compensation.  On  the  other  hand,  however,  there  is  an  enhanced  quality of the 
environment.  The  people  who  benefit most  from  this  are  usually  the  low  income 
- 28  -groups  and  those  in  receipt  of  transfer  payments.  It  is  they  who  pay  the 
highest  price  for  an  unhealthy,  unwelcoming  environment.  To  understand  the 
force  of  this  argument  it  is  necessary  merely  to  look  at  the  quality  of  the 
environment  in  the  areas  where  the  poor  and  where  the well-to-do live. 
To  conclude,  even  considered  from  the  point  of  view  of  social  compatibi I ity 
economic  instruments  are  superior to  a  command  economy. 
2.  CHARACTERISTICS  AND  LIMITATIONS  OF  THE  POLICY  OF  STANDARDS 
Concept  of administration 
The  policy  of  standards  and  prohibitions  directly  transposes  to  environmental 
policy traditional  management  concepts  and  processes.  In  accordance  with  that 
policy,  individual  permits  standards with  reference  to  the  applicable  state of 
the  art  and  subsequent  directives  determine  the  environmental  policy 
1 andscape.  The  notion  preva  i1 s  that  use  of  the  environment  to  accommodate 
certain  harmful  substances  and  as  a  production  factor  can  be  regulated  in  the 
same  way,  for  instance,  as  legislation  is  provided  in  the  Civil  Code.  In 
point  of  fact,  it  is  possible  to  do  that  in  the  same  way  as  it is  possible  to 
have  a  planned  economy.  In  that  case,  however,  sustainable  management  of 
resources  means  neither positive  adjustment  but direct  restriction of economic 
activity,  nor  overcoming  shortages  by  means  of  an  imaginative,  decentralized 
search  for  solutions,  but  the  management  and  allocation  of  rights  to 
environmental  resources. 
It is  not  possible  here  to list the  shortcomings  of the  policy of standards  in 
the  individual  problem  areas.  The  comments  below  should,  however,  provide  an 
idea  of the  general  approach  of this  policy  and  the  related  problems. 
The  philosophy  of a  plant-specific  policy of standards  is that  emission  should 
be  avoided  as  far  as  is  technically  possible.  According  to  the  advocates  of 
that  policy,  it  is  simply  not  possible  to  limit  emissions  further.  That  is 
not  true  in  so  far  as  the  technique  to  be  applied  is  the  product  not  of  the 
establishment  by  engineers  of what  is technically  possible  but  of a  process  of 
calculation  and  assessment  on  the  part of the  authorities  and  plant operators. 
Economic  factors  play  a  large  part  here.  The  operation  a 1  costs  of  1 i mit  i ng 
- 29  -emissions  have  therefore  to  be  'reasonable'  in  relation  to  the  economic 
situation of the  plant  operator. 
The  avoidance  technique  as  instrument  and  objectiv~ 
Gearing  the  policy  of  standards  to  technical  and  economic  factors  in this way 
means  that  the  technical  basis  of the  objective  of  avoiding  emissions  derives 
directly  from  the  capacity  for  emission  limitation  as  defined  in  advance. 
This  circular  linking  of  objective  and  instrument  in  practice guarantees  from 
the  outset  that  the  objective will  be  achieved.  The  policy of standards  thus 
protects  itself  against  intJrnal  criticism.  Objectives  ;can  fail  to  be  met 
l 
only  if  the  requisite  technique  for  limiting  emissions  is  not  universally 
available.  Criticism is  thus  limited  to  shortcomings  in  implementation. 
But  even  where  there  are  no  shortcomings,  the  volume  of total  emissions  is not 
determined  by  the  technical  standards.  The  vulnerability  of  a  plant-specific 
policy of standards  resides  in  the  number  of plants  and  their operating  times. 
En vi ronmenta  l  deteri oration  cannot  therefore  be  prevented  by  en vi ronmenta  1 
po 1 icy  at  a  time  when  there  is  an  upturn  in  the  economy.  All  in  all, 
therefore,  where  this  pol icy  is  applied,  the  position  regarding  emissions 
remains  dependent  on  cyclical  as  well  as  structural  economic  trends.  It can 
therefore  be  argued  that  in  this  process  the  environmental  pol icy  objective 
is,  in  large  areas,  heteronomous. 
This  does  not,  however,  apply  to  those  (few)  pollutants  for  which  emission 
1 imi ts  have  been  established.  In  principle,  it  is  possible  here  to  make 
ecological  factors  hold  sway13 •  However,  limits  set  below  the  true  nuisance 
level  cause  considerable  difficulty  for  the  policy  of  standards,  since  all 
those  who  produce  emissions  hold  permits.  All  that  can  be  done  is  to  refuse 
permits  to  new  p  1 ants  and  hope  that  there  will  be  med i urn  and  1  ong  term 
advances  in  techniques  for  limiting  emissions  or  that  some  plants  producing 
emissions will  shut  down  as  a  result of structural  changes  in  the  economy. 
13  In  practice,  however,  environmental  policy  sometimes  follows  different 
paths  here  too.  In  order  to  avoid  immediately  putting  pressure  on 
activities  by  setting  the  limits  on  nuisance  below  current  levels,  there 
is  a  tendency  to  set  high  limits hitherto rarely achieved. 
- 30  -It  should  be  emphasized  that  the  criticism made  of  the  policy of standards  by 
environmental  economists  relates  principally  to  its  cost-efficiency.  As  a 
result  of  the  differing  marginal  costs  of  emission  limitation  techniques  for 
the  different  polluters,  that  method  in  fact  means  that  a  given  objective  of 
environmental  quality  {for  example  a  limit  on  nuisance},  costs  dear.  In  this 
economic  sense,  excessive  prevention  of  emissions  is  required  of  some 
polluters  and  too  1 itt  1 e  of  others.  In  other  words,  there  is  unexp  1 o i ted 
potential  for  emission  limitation which,  in  cost  terms,  could  be  made  full  use 
of relatively  advantageously. 
End  of pipe  approach 
The  most  significant  criticism  of  the  instrument  of  standards  relates  to  the 
objective  of  further  developing  the  structure  of  the  economy  towards 
sustainability.  That  instrument  is  not  automatically  in  a  position  to  do 
this,  and  where  a  modest  incentive  exists,  it will  be  directed mainly  towards 
techniques  1 inked  to  the  production  process  {end-of-pipe  technology).  Only 
the  manufacturers  of  such  techniques  have  an  economic  interest  in  new 
procedures,  for  which  demand  will  then  be  created  by  the  policy of standards. 
There  will  be  no  wide-ranging  search  for  new  technical  solutions,  starting 
with  input  factors  and  going  on  to  cover  production  and  recycling.  That  type 
of  dynamic  is,  however,  vital  if forms  of  sustainable  resource  management  are 
to  be  found. 
3.  VARIETY  OF  INSTRUMENTS 
Avoiding dogmatism 
Given  the  complex  nature  of  the  ecol ogi ca  1  system  on  the  one  hand  and  the 
market  economy  process  on  the  other,  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  1 ook  for  the 
ideal  instrument  of environmental  policy.  An  effective range  of environmental 
policy  instruments  is  therefore  always  going  to  have  to  form  a  complex  whole 
and  at  the  same  time  be  receptive  to  new  approaches.  In  the  individual  case, 
that  can  certainly mean  making  it compulsory  to  do  or  not  do  certain things  on 
the  basis  of  prohibition  or  requirement.  Standards  too  can  be  ecologically 
advantageous  in  the  form  of  temporary  measures,  where  what  is  needed  is 
rapidly  to  implement  a  tried  and  tested  technique.  The  choice  of  instruments 
to  be  used  must  therefore  be  carefully considered  in  any  given  case. 
- 31  -It  was  also  stressed  at  the  hearing  that  in  many  areas  environmental  policy 
must  also  provide  the  appropriate  institutional  framework.  Nor  can  the  state 
delegate  to  private  industry responsibility for  infrastructural  measures. 
Over  the  past  10  to  15  year  the  debate  on  an  effective  range  of  instruments 
for  the  protection  of  the  environment  has  made  no  headway  for  three  rna in 
reasons: 
False  perception of the  problems 
First,  because  the  scale  and  nature  of  the  ecological  challenge  w~s  not 
understood  or  was  underestimated.  In  the  early  days  of  environmental  policy, 
it  was  in  fact  believed  that  it could  be  regulated  on  the  same  basis  as  road 
traffic,  that  is  by  erecting  signs  to  say  what  you  must  or  must  not  do  or  by 
laying  down  certain  technical  requirements  for  vehicles.  Consequently, 
environmental  policy  has  been  placed  exclusively  in  the  hands  of 
administrators  and  technicians  who  have  so  far  been  successful  in  maintaining 
their dominant  position. 
Failings of environmental  economists 
Second,  because  economists  have,  from  the  outset,  viewed  the  question  of 
instruments  too  rigidly.  Their  starting  point  has  been  (and  in  many  cases 
remains)  the  problem of  how  a  particular environmental  policy objective  can  be 
achieved  most  favourably  in  cost  terms14 .  As  a  result of that  and  of the  fact 
that  the  economists  frequently  placed  limits  on  themselves,  by  requiring  that 
the  instruments  'conform  with  market  condition'  the  discussion  was  narrowed 
down  to  mode 1 s  of  dubious  practical  use,  and  not  on  1 y  in  countries  with  a 
14  Thus,  for  example,  the  advahtages  of  fl exi bl e  instruments  for  US  clean 
air  policy  are  viewed  exclusively  in  terms  of  cost  savings.  R.  Hahn 
writes,  for  ex  amp 1 e:  'Because  marketable  permit  approaches  have  been 
shown  to  have  a  demonstrable  effect  on  cost  savings  without  sacrificing 
environmental  policy,  this  instrument  can  be  expected  to  receive  more 
widespread  use.  (R.  Hahn,  'Economic  Prescriptions  For  Environmental 
Problems:  How  the  Patient  Followed  the  Doctor's  Orders',  in  Journal  of 
Economic  Perspectives  (1989},  Vol  3,  No  2,  p.  112.  Cf.  also  R.  Hahn  and 
. G.  Hoster,  'The  Market  for  Bads'  in  Regulations  (1987},  No  3/4. 
Unfortunately  the  figures  i·n  dollars  quoted  there  are  not  very  conclusive 
because  there  is  no  reference to overall  investment  costs. 
- 32  -patchy  administrative  system15 .  Moreover,  it failed  to  reach  those  to  whom  it 
was  addressed,  principally  the  administrators  and  practitioners,  because  of 
the  extremely  abstract  nature  of  the  proposals.  Economists  failed  above  all 
to  make  the  analogy  with  the  theory  of  economic  development.  That  would  have 
prompted  relegation  of  the  perception  of  costs,  viewed  fundamentally  in 
accounting  terms,  to  its proper  position  among  secondary  concerns. 
Instruments  must  also be  effective 
Third,  because  in  recent  years  an  ideological  or  party-political  dispute  has 
erupted,  and  this  would  appear  detrimental  to  open  discussion  on  the 
instruments  appropriate  at  any  one  time.  The  fact  that  victory  for  one  side 
or  the  other does  not  of itself mean  progress  in  environmental  policy  may  well 
be  being  lost  sight  of  here.  The  real  test,  in  political  terms,  takes  place 
at  the  level  of  the  environmental  policy  objectives  and  the  extent  of  the 
incentives.  The  best  conceivable  economic  instrument  is  of  no  use  if  the 
incentive  it offers  is  too  weak  and  does  not  influence  the  relevant decisions 
of the  private  sector. 
4.  CLASSIFYING  THE  INSTRUMENTS 
Many  different criteria can,  of course,  be  used  to categorize the wide  variety 
of  instruments  available.  In  line  with  the  view  being  advocated  here,  it is 
fundamentally  a  question  of  identifying  the  instruments  likely  to  generate 
development  towards  sustainable  resource  management.  A  distinction  has 
therefore  to  be  made  between  instruments  that  are  highly  effective  in 
providing  such  impetus  and  those  able  to  put  into  effect  only  familiar 
solutions  or  processes.  A  further  di st  i net ion  has  to  be  made  according  to 
whether  the  instruments  are  designed  to  enforce  actions  laid  down  in  law  or 
provide  clear data  for  economic  purposes  or whether  their effect  is rather to 
provide  psychological  support. 
1 5  This  restriction which  is  to  be  found  principa-lly  in  German  literature on 
the  subject,  is  i nd 1  cat  i ve  of  a  not  very  he I pful  approach,  1 i mi ted  1  n 
terms  of the  models  it uses. 
- 33  -Instruments  which  have  an  effect on  behaviour 
The  particular  characteristics  of  the  instruments  which  fall  into  this 
category  mean  that  they  have  only  limited  effect.  They  may,  nonetheless,  be 
significant  by  'setting  a  tone'.  They  can  be  subsumed  under  the  headings  of 
'moral  suasion'  and  information. 
An  open  information  policy,  that  is  to  say  transparency,  is  vital  if 
environment  pol icy  measures  are  to  be  accepted  and  citizens'  initiatives  and 
environmental  groups  given  further  support.  A  policy  of  this  kind  can 
influence  the  conduct  of  consumers  and  industry  even  before  specific  measures 
have  been  taken.  This  applies,  for  instance,  where  particularly  'environment-
friendly'  products  are  labelled  as  such.  A  high  degree  of  awareness  of 
environmental  issues  also  enables  industry  to  use  individual  decisions  on 
environmental  improvement  as  a  competitive  advantage  to  promote  its  image. 
Voluntary  agreements  (sectoral  agreements)  fall  into this  category18 • 
Instruments  which  have  an  indirect effect on  behaviour  include  inter alia: 
.  An  open  information  policy for  problems  of ecology 
.  A deliberate strategy of making  available environmental  data,  including  data 
on  individual  firms  (cf.  the  EC  directive  on  freedom  of  access  to 
environmental  information) . 
.  Labelling  9f products  (environment  symbol) 
Environmentally-friendly  public  procurement,  e.g.  on  the  basis  of  the 
environment  symbol 
.  Voluntary  agreements  between  polluters  and  the  state  and  between  individual 
polluters 
16  Such  agreements  are  all  the  more  effective  where  they  are  clearly  the 
precursors  of  specific  measures.  In  extreme  cases  their  effect  may  be 
comparable  to  the  1 atter.  They  may,  however,  be  abused  in  order  to 
partition off the market  or further other sectoral  interests. 
- 34  -Prompt  discussion  of measures  in  the  media  with  the  various  interest groups 
and  experts 
.  Appeals  to  industry  and  consumers 
It  has,  by  and  large,  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  these  instruments  cease  to  be 
effective  where  it  is  the  economic  calculation,  economic  interests  and 
competition  which  determine  activity.  An  environmental  policy  which  seeks  to 
restructure  the  economy  should  not  therefore  expect  too  much  of  these 
instruments  and  use  them  only  as  supporting  measures17 • 
Instruments  which  are essentially static  in  their effect 
All  instruments  which  apply  only  familiar  technical  and  economic  solutions  are 
static.  They  include  the  whole  of  the  policy  of  plant-specific  standards. 
Economic  incentives  used  only  to  implement  that  policy,  such  as,  for  example, 
the  German  system  of  a  levy  on  effluent  as  well  as  certain  types  of 
compensation  in  clean  air  policy  fall  into  that  category.  This  demonstrates 
that  cost  controls  do  not  in  every  case  provide  new  impetus,  that  is  to  say 
generate  new  solution,  while  prohibitions  for  example,  which  have 
traditionally  been  included  under  the  policy  of  standards,  may  in  fact  prove 
dynami c18 • 
The  static  instruments  include: 
1 7 
18 
Hans  Bressers  also  makes  this  quite  clear  (p.8  ff.  'Communicative 
Instruments'. 
Subsidies  represent  a  particular problem.  They  may  be  very  effective for 
a  period  but,  where  applied  in  the  long  term,  can,  in  certain 
circumstances,  cause  considerable distortion  because  they  result  in  false 
relative  costs  and  thus  false  processes  of  adjustment.  In  line with  the 
principle  that  the  polluter  pays,  what  1s  needed  is  to  make 
environmentally  damaging  behaviour  cost  more  and  not  to  make 
environmentally-benign  behaviour  cost  less.  (The  'Wasserpfenn1g'  [penny 
on  water]  levied  by  one  of the  Federal  Lander  1n  the  FRG  is  in  that  sense 
inappropriate  in  the  long  term  and  has  also  to  be  deemed  part  of 
agricultural  income  policy  rather  than  environmental  policy.  The 
'Wasserpfennig'  is levied  on  consumers  and  goes  to  those  farmers  who  have 
suffered  a  drop  in  earnings  by  taking  fields  out  of  intensive 
cultivation). 
- 35  -.  Conditions  governing  technical  standards  and  procedures  for  production 
processes  and,  above  all,  end-of-pipe  techniques  (filters)  in  new  and  old 
installations . 
.  Levies  designed  directly  and  exclusively  to  ensure  that  previously  defined 
avoidance  techniques  are  applied. 
Compensation,  provided  it is  intended  only  to enable  a  specific objective  to 
be  achieved  at  less  cost  than  is  possible  on  the  basis  of  tf'le  policy  of 
standards  alone. 
.  Solutions  in  the  form  of  funds  can  also  be  described  as  static  where  they 
are  being  used  only  to  implement  a  particular objective,  which  could  equally 
be  achieved  on  the  basis  of administrative measures . 
.  Deposit  systems  which  may  involve  an  unnecessarily  high  cost  to  the  economy 
to achieve  a  given  objective . 
.  Charges.  The  level  of charges  basically reflects  the  costs  of the  relevant 
consideration.  There  is  thus  little  scope  available  when  determining  them 
in  detail.  Nonetheless,  there  may  be  increased  use  of  charges  in  line with 
the  principle  that  the  polluter  pays.  Their  effect  is  then  similar to  that 
of  levies.  An  example  of  this  would  be  aircraft  landing  charges  which  are 
based  on  noise  and  the  emission  of  po 11 utants.  Processes  of  adjustment 
might  result,  particularly when  new  charges  are  being  introduced . 
.  Criminal  law  in  relation  to  the  environment  because  it  can  refer  only  to 
administrative  legislation,  which  is static. 
It should  be  noted  that the  fact  that  instruments  are described  as  static does 
not  mean  that  they  should  be  rejected  as  being  inefficient.  They  have  an 
important  role  within  the  range  of  instruments  available  to  environmental 
policy. 
Dynamic  instruments 
These  include  all  instruments  w~ich  increase  the  cost  of  resources,  emissions 
or  other  undesirable  forms  of  intervention  in  the  environment  by  means  of 
- 36  -levies  and  taxes  (i.e.  controlling  through  a  price mechanism}  as  well  as  those 
which  lay  down  target  quotas  generally,  leaving  it to  industry  to  decide  the 
deta  i 1 s  of  how  and  where  they  wi 11  be  met  ( t radab  1  e  permits} ;  quantitative 
controls. 
These  instruments  will  prompt  a  search  for  the  best  solutions  guided  by 
business  interests.  They  are  therefore  essent  i a 1  to  the  establishment  of 
forms  of  sustainable  resource  management  and  should  be  the  foca  1  point  of 
env i ronmenta  1  po 1 icy.  In  his  paper  Hans  Bressers  points  out  that  'charges 
and  related  instruments  such  as  tax differentiation  have  made  the  most  visible 
contribution  to the  success  stories within  Dutch  environmental  policy'  p.  17}. 
In  principle,  this  covers  all  measures  which  affect  prices,  tariffs  and 
charges  (transforming  fixed  into  variable  costs,  for  instance,  assessment  of 
car  tax  on  the  basis  of  fuel  consumption  or  linear  tariffs  for  electricity 
consumption}. 
This  category  also  includes  measures  concerning  the  law  on  liability, 
part  i cul arl y  where  the  extent  of  liability  is  widely  defined  (e.g.  product 
liability}.  Prohibitions  too  (which  represent  the  infinite price)  can  trigger 
dynamic  adjustment  processes,  in  relation  to  the  use  of  individual  substances 
for  example. 
Examples  of this  type  of  instrument  are given  below: 
.  Taxes 
The  following  may  be  the  subject  of  taxation:  use  of  resources  (land,  raw 
lndLerials,  fossil  and/or  renewable  energy),  emission  of  pollutants  and 
waste.  The  great  advantage  of this  instrument  is  that  the  total  amount  can 
easily  rise  to  5  to  10%  of  GNP.  Taxes  do  not  involve  the  obligation  to 
prove  the  cause  of  damage;  and  because  in  principle  taxes  are  not  for 
specific  purposes,  the  full  amount  of  the  revenue  from  environmental  taxes 
can  be  returned  to  the  taxpayer  in  the  form  of  tax  cuts  or  social 
compensation  payments.  In  this case,  even  very  high  environmental  taxes  are 
neither  a  fiscal  burden  on  the  private  sector  nor  a  form  of  disadvantaging 
any  particular  social  stratum.  However, 
phased  in  in  order  not  to  overburden 
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env 1  ronmenta  l  taxes  have  to  be 
the  adaptability  of  technology, infrastructure  and  patterns  of  behaviour.  Annua 1  increases  in  rates  wi 11 
also  solve  a  possible  'conflict  of  interests'  between  the  yield  and  the 
contro  1  function  of  en vi ronmenta  1  taxes,  at  1 east  in  the  20-30  year  phase 
of raising  the  rates19 • 
.  Tradable  emission  rights 
The  assumption  here  is  that  the  environmental  policy  creates  the  conditions 
under  which  markets  can  deve  1  op  properly.  Possible  examples  are  tradable 
rights  for  the  consumption  of  resources  and  other  interventions  including 
emissions.  One  socio-political  problem  is  that  the  state  receives  no 
revenue  from  tradable  rights  from  certain  systems,  with  the  result  that  it 
wi 11  need  to  finance  from  other  sources  the  compensation  amounts  deemed 
necessary  for  socio-political  reasons  for  the  increase  in  the  cost  of 
living.  It  also  needs  to  be  borne  in  mind,  however,  that  industry must  not 
be  deprived  of any  liquid  funds.  However,  this  is not  absolutely  necessary. 
The  emission  rights  can  a 1 so  be  so  1  d  by  the  state,  thereby  constituting  a 
source  of  revenue . 
.  Levies 
19 
20 
In  principle,  these  cover  the  same  range  as  taxes  and  tradable  permits. 
But  unlike  taxes,  the  size  of  the  levy  must  be  re  1 a ted  to  the  extent  of 
environmental  damage  and  the  cost  of  repair.  In  contrast  to  taxes, 
therefore,  levies  provoke  far  1 ess  in  the  way  of  forward-1 ooki ng  dynamic 
adjustment  processes20 • 
A resume  of the  arguments  for  and  against  regulation  by  taxation  is  to  be 
found  in  E.U.  von  Weizsacker,  'Erdpolitik,  Okologische  Realpolitik an  der 
Schwelle  zum  Jahrhundert  der  Umwelt'  (A  policy for  the earth:  a  practical 
environmental  pol icy  as  the  century  for  the  environment  approaches}, 
Darmstadt  (Wissenschaftliche  Buchgesellschaft}  1989,  p.  159  ff. 
The  current  level  of  environmental  levies  in  14  OECD  countries  is  the 
modest  figure  of  less  than  0. 1%  of  GNP.  Opschoor,  J.  B.  and  H. B.  Vos 
(Free  University  of  Amsterdam}.  The  Application  of  Economic  Instruments 
for  Environmental  Protection  in  OECD  Member  Countries,  OECD  Publications 
Paris,  1989. 
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These  consist  fundamentally  in  levies,  the  revenue  from  which  is  used 
specifically  as  an  incentive  to  promote,  for  example,  technical  progress. 
As  a  control  function  these  systems  are  therefore  superior  to  levies. 
However,  th 1  s  increased  effectiveness  has  genera  11 y  to  be  paid  for  in  the 
form  of  high  administrative  costs  for  the  redistribution  of  the  resources 
raised . 
.  Compensation  and  solutions  based  on  funds 
These  can  a 1 so  have  a  dynamic  effect,  but  they  have  to  be  designed  for 
objectives  requiring  more  than  the  application  of  familiar  solutions.  The 
boundaries  between  these  and  tradable  permits  and  levies  are  fluid . 
.  Provisions  under  the  law  on  liability 
These  can  also  have  a  dynamic  effect.  This  is  true  of  a  broad 
in lerpreta  t 1  on  of  abso  1 ute  1 i abi 1 i ty  and  revers  a 1  of  the  burden  of  proof. 
However,  the  cost  to  the  economy  of  multiple  court  cases  and  frustrated 
industry may  be  considerable . 
.  Subsidies 
These  are  quite  contrary  to 
established  in  the  EEC  Treaty. 
the  principle  that  the  polluter  pays  as 
They  should  not  therefore  be  used  as  an 
instrument  of  environmental  protection  policy  even  if they  could  stimulate 
dynamic  processes  in  certain  areas.  Most  importantly,  the  fixing  of 
criteria for  subsidy  could  constrict  from  the  outset  the  open  search  for  new 
solutions  (cf.  also  note  11). 
5.  TAXATION  VERSUS  TRADABLE  PERMITS 
Two  sides or the  coin 
Where  there  is  a  specific  objective  of  environmental  policy  and  full 
information  as  to the  response  of those  affected  (price elasticity for  the  use 
- 39  -of  environmental  assets}  control  of  volume  is  exactly  the  same  as  control  of 
cost.  In  this  (hypothetical}  case,  environmental  policy  can  determine  the 
number  of tradable  permits  and  leave  it to  the  market  to determine  their cost 
or  fix  the  cost  by  way  of  a  tax  and  allow  the  market  to  determine  the  number 
of tradable  permits.  In  this  situation,  cost  and  volume  are  just  two  aspects 
of  the  same  problem.  The  right  cost  will  produce  the  desired  volume  or  the 
right  volume  the cost,  which  will  otherwise  have  to  be  established on  a  policy 
basis.  A  shared  advantage  of  these  two  instruments  is  that  the 
internalization  of  external  effects  can  be  made  to  extend  far  beyond 
establishing  a  causal  chain  of  environmental  damage.  They  would  therefore  go 
a  long  way  towards  creating  a  harmony  of  interests  between  creative  industry 
and  protection  of the  environment.  (cf.  W.  Beckmann's  paper}. 
Di f'f'erences 
Practical  environmental  policy  has  in  many  cases  to  contend  with  the  problem 
of  finding  it difficult  or  not  wishing  to  quantify  its objective.  The  latter 
applies,  for  instance,  where  pressure  is  generally  being  exert  eo  to  protect 
resources.  The  risk of this  approach  is that  the  impetus  provided  by  taxation 
will  prove  to  be  too  weak.  This  is  almost  i nevi tabl y  the  case  with  taxes 
which  are  introduced  in  a  single  stage  - a  stage  which,  to  relieve  industry 
and  society,  should  not  be  too great. 
As  an  environmental  measure,  the  concept  of  fixing  the  number  of  permits  is 
more  appropriate  to  the objective.  The  uncertainty  here  really relates to  the 
establishment  of  markets  able  to  operate  on  these  lines  (transaction  costs). 
We  have  as  yet  no  experience  of  markets  in  tradable  permits,  and  the 
instruments  used  in  the  US  can  be  considered  only  as  the  forerunners  of  such 
markets21 • 
21  There  is  a  tendency  in  international  discussions  on  measures  to  limit 
emissions  of  C02  to  set  national  targets  which  could  be  made  tradable. 
In  theory  this  could  lead  to  a  semi-automatic  North-South  transfer  of 
resources  which  would  be  politically  acceptable  to  most  OECD  countries, 
since  the  North  would  undoubtedly  have  to  buy  C02  emission  permits  in  the 
South.  However,  neither  the  USA  nor  the  countries  of  Eastern  Europe 
would  be  prepared  to  take.  up  this,  propos  a 1  at  present.  Furthermore, 
an  international  C02  trade  in  licences  does  not  in  any  way  prejudice what 
happens  in  the  individual  states.  The  choice  between  levies  and  licences 
will  be  made  on  a  practical  rather than  a  theoretical  basis.  (cf.  Grubb, 
Michael,  The  Greenhouse  Effect:  Negotiating  Targets,  Royal  Institute  of 
- 40  -6.  ADMINISTRATIVE  PERFECTIONISM  AND  THE  DYNAMIC  SEARCH  FOR  SOLUTIONS 
The  advocates  of  the  inherited  pol icy  of  standards  consider  that  flexible 
economic  instruments  present  considerable  disadvantages.  Their  most 
significant objection  probably relates to what  is called the  hot-spot  problem, 
that  is  where  there  is  a  heavy  concentration  of  pollutants  at  one  site.  This 
argument  can  be  refuted  as  follows: 
A  f'a 7  se  ref'erence  system 
It  is  in  practice  impossible  for  taxes  on  emissions  or  input  to  produce  the 
same  results  as  a  plant-specific  policy of standards.  Were  that not  the  case, 
it would  not  be  necessary  to  argue  over  instruments  for  the  protection of the 
environment  from  the  ecological  point  of  view.  Unlike  the  policy  of 
standards,  a  uniform  rate of taxation  for  emissions  or  input  naturally  has  the 
.effect  of  changing  the  structure  of  emissions  and  input  from  place  to  place. 
In  certain  cases,  the  result  is  not  improvement  but  in  fact  deterioration  in 
the  quality  of  the  local  environment.  The  same  would  result  in  the  event  of 
a  shift from  economic  instruments  to  the  policy of standards. 
If existing  standards  and  emission  limit values  are  retained  in  problem  areas, 
1 oca  1  deteri orations  can  be  avoided  without  any  s igni fi cant  impairment  of 
dynamic  efficiency.  Seen  from  a  dynamic  point  of  view,  the  objections  of 
those  who  favour  a  policy  of  standards  rapidly  loses  significance;  the 
processes  of  adjustment  render  them  obsolete22 . 
22 
International  Affairs,  London,  1989).  Despite  the  technological 
successes  in  fue  1  economy  in  cars,  average  consumption  of  fue  1  has  not 
fa  11 en  in  the  1 ast  20  years.  This  is  rna in  1 y  because  cars  have  become 
heavier,  bigger  and  faster. 
Thus,  for  ex  amp 1 e,  the  1 i mi ts  on  emissions  from  power  stations  in  Japan 
have  in  practice  become  completely meaningless  following  the  introduction 
of the  sulphur dioxide  levy.  No  power  stations  operator considered  using 
the  limits  to  the  full  because  that  would  have  been  much  more  expensive 
than  the  sulphur  dioxide  duty  payable  at  the  time.  See  J.  Jes  i nghaus, 
'Instruments  of  environmental  protection  policy:  a  comparison  between 
Japan  and  the  Federal  Republic',  in  'Spektrum der Wissenschaft',  February 
1988,  p.  44. 
- 41  -Economic  instruments  free  from  bureaucracy 
It  must  be  borne  in  mind  when  considering  the  choice  of  instruments  of 
environmental  policy  that  administrative  regulation  cannot  be  effective  once 
the  issue  ceases  to  be  one  of  administratively  perfecting  the  implementation 
of  familiar  approaches  but  of  d1scover1ng  fresh  approaches.  In  this  respect, 
administrative  regulations,  which  are  largely  static,  cannot  provide  an 
alternative  to  economic  instruments.  Nor  is  there  any  point  in  requiring  the 
same  detailed  perfection  from  economic  instruments  as  from  the  policy  of 
standards.  The  tendency  in  favour  of the latter appears  to  be  one  of the main 
obstacles  to  the  use  of  economic  instrumertts.  In  point pf fact,  as  a  result 
of  such  requirements,  those  instruments  no  longer  provide  the  same  level  of 
impetus,  become  complicated  and  involve  excessive  bureaucracy,  so  that,  in  the 
final  analysis,  they  actually  appear  subordinate  to  the  process  of 
administrative regulation. 
III.  ENVIRONMENTAL  POLICY  IN  INDIVIDUAL  AREAS 
1.  PRINCIPLES 
For  a  long  time  now,  environmental  policy  has  been  extremely  one-sided,  not 
only  in  its  choice  of  instruments  for  environmental  protection  but  in  the 
areas  in  which  it  took  effect.  There  was  an  obsession  with  the  problem  of 
emissions  of  harmful  substances  and  with  industry's  contribution  to 
pollution.  This  is  now  seen  as  too  restrictive an  approach.  It is clear that 
the  restructuring of the  economy  on  an  ecological  basis  can  be  successful  only 
if' its  whole  structure  is  influenced  by  environmental  policy.  The  objective 
must  be  to  create  a  framework  of  environmental  policy,  while  leaving  the 
appropriate  structures  to  the  system of competition. 
It has,  however,  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  in  areas  where  there  are  ecological 
problems,  such  as  transport,  agriculture  or  energy,  it  is  by  no  means 
exclusively  ·market  factors  that  are  at  issue.  The  state  has,  in  part 
traditionally,  intervened  more  or  less  directly  in  those  sectors  and  thereby 
- 42  -itself  created  not  an  insubstantial  number  of  the  current  problems23 . 
Environmental  policy  has  therefore  by  and  large  to  provide  an  analysis  of 
policy direction  in  those  areas.  We  should  remember  Article 30r of the Treaty 
which  states:  'Environmental  protection  requirements  shall  be  a  component  of 
the  Community's  other policies'. 
A  number  of  prob  1 ems  relating  to  four  se  1 ected  policy  areas  are  described 
below.  They  were  discussed  in  greater detail  by  the experts  at  the  hearing  on 
21  and  22  June  1990. 
2.  ENERGY  POLICY 
The  supply of energy  - a  state responsibility? 
The  guaranteed  supply  of reasonably  priced  energy  has  long  been  a  self-evident 
objective  of  state  policy.  The  energy  sector  was  considered  a  key  area  for 
economic  development.  Consequently,  energy  pol icy  was  for  the  most  part 
energy  supply  policy.  Today,  the  energy  sector  is  seen  as  crucial  to  a  change 
of course,  ecologically  speaking,  towards  sustainable management  of  resources. 
However,  the  view  that  energy  must  be  available  to  meet  anticipated  or 
potential  demand  has  still  not  been  surmounted.  Only  the  points  of  emphasis 
have  changed.  Many  states  take  the  view  that  it  is  their  primary 
res  pons i bi l i ty  to  find  new  sources  of  energy,  to  subsidize  energy  saving  or 
increase  the  potential  for  energy  saving  on  the  basis  of  technological 
incentives  and  regulations  on  efficiency.  This  policy  is  often  backed  up  by 
appeals  to  save  energy,  that  is  to  say,  by  asking  consumers  in  effect  to  act 
uneconomically,  in  many  cases  at  least.  Not  only  does  a  policy  of this  kind 
reveal  the  limits  of  the  inadequate  measures,  it  also  shows  how  little 
understanding  there  is  in  many  cases  of  the  constraints  of  competition  and 
market  rationale. 
23  The  state  has,  in  many  cases,  been  the  generator  or  catalyst  here  of 
external  effects which  were  not  produced  to  the  same  extent  by  the market 
system.  For  example:  agriculture,  investment  in  infrastructure  in  the 
transport  sector  or  subsidies  for  nuclear  power.  In  this  sense  the 
state  shares  responsibility  for  pollution.  Cf.  G.  Maier-Rigaud, 
'Environmental  policy  in  an  open  society'  Opladen  1988,  p.  85  et  seq  and 
126  et seq. 
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market  development  by  programmes  of  incentives,  obligations  and  'moral 
suasion'.  Oespite  the  progress  that  has  undoubtedly  been  made  in  individual 
instances,  overall  this  strategy  is  economically  inefficient  and  ecologically 
inadequate.  Not  even  intelligent administrative measures  are  able  to  regulate 
or  provide  incentives  in  the  same  way  as  costs,  nor  can  they  disguise  false 
cost  signals. 
False  price signals  on  the  energy market 
Import  costs  for  coal  and  crude  oil  as  well  as  petroleum  products  are 
currently  nominally  below  their  1974  levels.  Only  in  the  case  of  the 
relatively environmentally  benign  natural  gas  is the cost  a  little higher  than 
it was  at  that  time.  In  real  terms,  that  is  after  deduction  of  the  general 
increases  in  cost  levels,  not  only  the  import  cost  but  the  cost  to  the 
consumer  of the  most  important  fuels,  including electricity,  is markedly  below 
the  levels  reached  at  the  end  of  the  sixties.  Industry  and  the  consumer  are 
therefore  being  given  signals  which  largely  contradict  the  policy  objective. 
This  is  why  the  latent  technical  potential  for  energy  saving  has  so  far  been 
tapped  only marginally  in  relation  to what  could,  presumably  be  achieved. 
To  make  greater savings,  the  immediate  aim  should  be  to  harmonize  all  rates of 
taxation  and  duty  on  energy  within  the  highest current rate  and  to  abolish  all 
existing  degressive  electricity  tariffs  and  electricity  price  differentials 
between  con:sumer  groups.  At  the  same  time,  subsidies  and  exemptions  in 
taxation  of energy  should  be  systematically  phased out. 
In  addition,  a  tax  on  carbon  dioxide  or  system  of  tradable  permits  with  the 
appropriate  reductions  in  permitted  quantities  (in  accordance  with  an 
international  convention)  should  be  introduced  throughout  the  European 
Community.  Care  must  be  taken  to  ensure  that  nuclear  power  does  not  gain  a 
competitive  advantage  because  of  the  resultant  change  in  energy  costs  or  in 
costs  for  fossil  fuels.  Special  incentive  programmes  for  energy  technology 
and  the  subsidizing  of demonstration  projects would  then  become  superfluous. 
- 44  -The  problem of international  competitiveness 
High,  rising  energy  prices  influence  the  level  and  structure  of  all  prices 
for  goods  and  services  in  the  economy.  This  triggers off changes  in  behaviour 
(a  shift  in  purchasing  power)  and  investments  as  a  means  of  avoiding 
additional  energy  costs.  Resources  are  used  which  are  no  longer available for 
other  purposes.  This  is  the  price  for  the  soc  i a 1  ide  a 1  of  fue  1  economy, 
particularly of fossil  fuels. 
As  a  genera  1  condition  of  rna i nta  in  i ng  the  competitiveness  of  a  firm  or  an 
economy,  the  development  in  prices  of  export  goods  must  match  the  trend  on 
the  relevant  foreign  markets  (constant  terms  of  trade).  What  this  means  is 
that  if  there  is  not  a  clear  intention  to  do  without  specific  national  or 
Community-wide  preferences,  reflected  in  higher  prices  than  abroCld,  domestic 
costs  must  rise  at  a  slower  rate  to  maintain  international  competitiveness. 
There  are  two  ways  of  doing  this.  Firstly,  slowing  the  rise  in  wages  (all 
other  costs  such  as  raw  materia  1 s  or  capita  1  costs  are  fixed  by  the  world 
market)  and,  secondly,  an  additional  increase  in  productivity. 
ThcrP  is  no  alternative  lo  this  necessary  and  adequate  condition  for 
preserving  international  competitiveness.  A"ll  measures  to  compensate  for 
energy  prices  higher  than  those  abroad,  for  example  through  energy  taxes, 
merely  cause  a  shift  in  the  distribution  of  real  domestic  adjustment  costs. 
The  advantage  lies  in  the  possible  enhanced  political  acceptance  of  scarcity 
prices  for  energy  which  are  higher  than  abroad24 ;  the  disadvantage  lies  in 
lower  environmental  efficiency  as  energy  taxes  are  shifted more  from  producers 
to  energy  consumers. 
3.  TRANSPORT 
Economies  are  becoming more  transport-intensive 
Over  the  past  two  decades,  tw~  developments  have  stood  out  in  the  transport 
sector:  first,  the  decline  in  the  carriage  of  passengers  and  goods  by  ra  i 1 
24  Cf.  the  strategies  to  change  tax  structures  discussed  by  T. G.  Potma  in 
his  paper  (p.  10  ff.).  See  also  the  comments  on  'social  compatibility' 
above. 
- 45  -and,  second,  the  constant  and  rapid  growth  in  road  traffic.  In  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany,  for  example,  all  forecasts  of  increases  in  road  traffic 
from  the  fifties  onwards  have  fallen  far  short  of the  actual  increases.  Long 
distance  haulage  of  goods  by  road  {transport  performance  in  t/km)  has 
generally risen  faster than  industrial  production. 
The  internal  market  and  opening  up  of  frontiers  in  Eastern  Europe  will 
further  promote  road  haulage.  The  rise  in  air  traffic  is  particularly 
pronounced,  a 1 though  quantitative  1  y  speaking  not  yet  cruc  i a 1 .  Demand  for 
transport  is  increasing  in  the  national  economies,  and  in  many  countries 
energy  consumption  is  rising  merely  because  of  the  transport  sector25 • 
Transport  myst  therefore  be  central  to  a  pol icy  of  reducing  carbon  dioxide 
emissions.  Furthermore,  transport  bears  a  1 arge  responsibility  for  NOx  and 
C02  emissions  and  the  destruction  of  the  countryside  and  biotopes.  It 
pollutes  groundwater  through  tyre  abrasion  and  oil  consumption.  It is  a  major 
cause  of  the  water  problem;  and  air  transport  is  having  a  serious  impact  on 
the  atmosphere. 
Eco7ogica77y  subsidized prices 
Developments  thus  far  come  as  no  surprise  if it is  clearly  understood  that, 
bearing  in  mind  its external  effects,  road  transport  is one  of the  most  highly 
'subsidized'  sectors.  End-of-pipe  solutions  {catalytic  converters)  do  not 
provide  an  adequate  response  in  the  light  of  the  many  negative  effects  of 
transport  on  the  ecosystems.  What  is  really  needed  is  a  fundamental  rethink 
of  the  role  of  transport  in  terms  of  the  division  of activity between  sectors 
and  a  strategy  involving  a  change  of  emphasis  in  favour  of  the  more 
environmentally  compatible  rail  network  and  shipping  and  the  avoidance  of 
{road)  traffic. 
The  immediate  aim  should  be  to  harmonize  taxes  on  petrol  and  motor  vehicles  in 
the  Community  in  line with  the  highest  rates  of tax applicable.  Harmonization 
below  that  level  would  result  in  counterproductive cost  signals  in  some  of the 
Member  States.  It  is  most  probable  that  mere  harmoniztion  will  be  far  from 
25  Despite  the  technical  savings  achieved  in  motor  cars,  average  fuel 
consumtion  has  not  fallen over the  past  twenty  years.  The  prime  cause  of 
that  is that cars  have  become  heavier,  larger  and  faster. 
- 46  -enough  to  achieve  a  reduction  in  carbon  dioxide  emissions,  for  example. 
Greater  tax  incentives  are  required,  for  example  in  the  form  of  an  annual 
Inc  r· f1 a ·, ,,  I n  r a L  e  ~·  o v  ,~ r  a  I on g e r  p  e r 1  o  d .  The  ex len l  l o  w  h i c h  r a l e s  o f  l n x  a l I on 
will  have  to  be  raised  depends  on  general  energy  pricing  policy.  At  the  same 
time,  considerably more  resources  must  be  made  available  for  investment  in  the 
construction  and  modernization  of rail  transport  and  local  transport  systems. 
If  an  ecologically  appropriate  price  structure  prevails  here,  too,  private 
industry  will  become  more  attracted.  There  is  no  reason  why  the  railways  and 
buses  should  remain  the  preserve of the  state. 
John  White l egg  has  pres  en ted  a  proposal  to  the  hearing  which  has  so  far  not 
been  discussed  in  great  depth  in  Europe.  The  proposal  is  concerned  rna in  l y 
with  long-distance  goods  transport  by  road  and  it  involves  a  weight-distance 
tax.  Taxes  of  this  nature  are  already  in  force  in  ten  states  of  the  USA,  in 
Sweden  and  in  New  Zeal and.  In  France  and  Portugal ,  too,  there  are  similar 
taxes.  The  advantage  of  this  sort  of  tax  is  that  it has  an  immediate  effect 
on  the  cost  of  long-distance  transport  and  the  only  way  of  avoiding  paying 
the  tax  is  by  cutting  back  on  road  transport.  One  important  aspect  of this  is 
that  energy  consumption  is  cor·rectly  identified  as  only  one  problem  of  the 
transport  of goods  by  road. 
4.  AGRICULTURAL  POLICY 
Reducing  intensification 
Agriculture  is  one  of  the  sectors  in  the  economy  which  has  experienced  the 
hi~he~l  increase  in  productivity.  The  main  reasons  for  this  are  mechanization 
and  a  massive  increase  in  the  use  of  fertilizers  and  pesticides.  Since· 
agricultural  policy  is  also  conceived  in  terms  of  an  income  policy  for  the 
agri cultural  community,  increased  productivity  was  not  able  to  effect  a  drop 
in  market  prices  but  has  led  - quite  rationally  as  far  as  the  individual 
farmer  is concerned  - to  increased  production  quantities with  serious  economic 
consequences.  Examples  of  this  are  the  decline  in  the  number  of species,  the 
pollution  of water  by  nutrients,  particularly  nitrates  from  liquid  manure  and 
chemical  fertilizers,  and  land  erosion  and  compression  as  a  result  of the  use 
of agricultural  machinery. 
- 47  -The  objective  of  an  agricultural  pol icy  geared  towards  protection  of  the 
environment  must  primarily  be  to  reduce  over-intensive  agricultural 
production.  With  that  in  mind,  as  a  first  step,  all  regulations  should  be 
examined  and,  if necessary,  amended  if they  encourage  intensive  farming.  In 
addition  to set-aside,  the objective  should  be  extensification. 
Seeking sustainabi7ity 
This  objective  should  not  be  regulated,  implemented  and  monitored  down  to  the 
last  detail  but  should  be  achieved,  as  far  as  possible,  by  establishing  the 
appropriate  framework  conditions  for  European  agriculture.  This  clearly 
requires  the  application of economic  instruments  and  fiscal  incentives.  A tax 
on  nitrogen  should  be  introduced  as  a  priority,  and  this  would  gradually make 
production  based  on  extensification  profitable  in  accounting  terms,  too. 
Only  by  establishing  standards  of this  kind  will  it  be  possible  not  only  to 
introduce  a  greater  degree  of  market  economy  into  agriculture  but  also  to 
instigate,  on  this  basis,  efforts  at  local  level  to  establish  methods  of 
sustainable  resource management. 
The  scope  for  nitrogen  and  pesticide  taxes  is  discussed  by  Alex  Dubgaard  in 
his  paper.  On  the  basis  of  experience  in  Denmark  and  theoretical 
considerations,  he  proposes  levies  on  fertilizers  and  pesticides  and,  as  an 
alternative,  tradable  quotas  as  a  means  of  regulating  quantities.  The 
advantage  of  the  latter  is  t,hat  it  has  1 ess  effect  than  taxes  on  farmers' 
incomes.  The  overall  objective  is  to  transform  exist  1  ng  support  programmes 
into  environmental  incentives.  This  relieves  the  problem  of  surpluses  which 
are  becoming  increasingly  important  in  connection  with  international  trade 
agreements. 
5.  WASTE  MANAGEMENT 
About  2.2  billion  tonnes  of waste  are  currently  produced  in  the  Community  and 
waste  incineration  can  shift the  problem  into air pollution.  There  is  limited 
capacity  for  its  proper  disposal .  Harmless  i nci nerat  ion  is  by  no  means  a 
certainty.  There  is  also  a  great  danger  that  the  way  in  which  we  dispose  of 
waste  today  could  result  in  an  inherited  problem  for  future  generations.  The 
priority here  must  therefore  be  to  avoid  producing  waste. 
- 48  -What  is  waste? 
Waste  is  not  a  concept  that  can  be  immutably  defined  once  and  for  all.  In 
economic  terms,  waste  is  fundamentally  a  question  of  relative  costs  and 
production  techniques,  each  of  which  influences  the  other.  That  is  to  say 
that  the  production  techniques  which  are  prevalent  today  and  the  related  use 
particularly  of  raw  materials,  are  inextricably  linked  with  current  costs. 
Higher  relative  costs  for  raw  materials  and  energy  will  therefore  produce  new 
solutions  throughout  the  economy.  Waste  will  then  be  defined  differently  in 
economic  terms. 
The  path  to  an  economy based on  recycling 
The  basis  for  a  market  economy  strategy  of  waste  avoidance  has  to  be 
production  input  costs.  It  should  not  be  forgotten  that  current  raw  material 
costs  reflect  1 itt  1 e  more  than  the  costs  of  extraction.  They  provide  no 
indication  either  of  scarcity  in  the  medium  or  long  term,  or  of  the  costs  of 
'disposing'  of  them  as  waste.  It  is  therefor  proposed  that  the  costs  of  the 
most  important  non-renewab  1 e  raw  materia  1 s  should  be  increased  by  taxation, 
gradua  11 y  and  in  a  way  that  can  be  anticipated  by  a 11  market  operators.  A 
strategy  of  this  kind  must  be  supplemented  by  regulation  of  the  remaining 
'residual  materials',  and  here  again  costs  - namely  the  costs  of  long-term 
disposal  and  the  full  costs  of  incineration  plant- should  be  emphasized  to 
encourage  the  avoidance  of  waste.  Werner  Schenkel  discusses  these  costs  in 
more  detail  {e.g.  including  the  groundwater  risks  of  disposal}.  The  cost  of 
disposal  of  domestic  waste  should  be  20  times  higher  and  those  of disposal  of 
special  waste  100  times  higher.  A  disposal  levy  of  this  nature  would 
concentrate  the  economic  tension  of  everyone  on  the  objective  of  waste 
avoidance.  This  objective  can  also  be  achieved  by  making  it  incumbent  on 
producers  to  take  back  their  products  after  they  have  been  used.  This  wi 11 
compel  them  to  take  recycling  into  account  in  the design  of their products. 
These  strategies  wi 11  act  as  a  spur  which  wi 11  bring  our  modern  economies 
closer  to  the  objective  of  sustainable  management  of  resources.  The  throw-
away  economy  will  become  a  recycling  economy  which  takes  care  of  its 
resources,  and  which  does  so  without  the  State  becoming  involved  in  details, 
but  on  the  basis  of the  economic  interests of industry  as  a  whole. 
- 49  -CONClUSION 
In  terms  of  a  social  objective,  methods  of  sustainable  economic  development 
place  special  demands  on  environmental  policy  instruments.  The  old dispute of 
economic  and  fiscal  incentives  versus detailed administrative rules  appears  in 
a  new  light.  While  previously  it was  characterized  by  legitimate  concern  at 
over-regulation  of  the  economy,  dynamic  factors  are  now,  additionally,  coming 
to  the  fore. 
It  is  now  clear  that  the  traditional  procedure  for  admini,stering  the  scarce 
resource  of  the  environment,  on  the  basis  of  rna in  1  y  techni ca  1  standards  as 
well  as  an  environmental  policy objective  founded  on  the  technically feasible, 
is  no  longer  sufficient. 
Environmental  policy  must  now  open  itself  up  to  the  principles  of  the  market 
economy,  not  on 1  y  for  reasons  of  economic  efficiency  but  a 1 so  in  order  to 
achieve  sustainable  resource  management.  Its  objective  must  be  to  mobilize 
the  whole  range  of  economic  interests  in  the  search  for  new  ecological 
solutions  and  to  use  competition,  too,  as  a  tried  and  tested  means  of 
establishing  such  solutions.  General  economic  incentives  must  therefore  be  at 
the  centre  of  env i ronmenta  1  po 1 icy.  On 1  y  a  pricing  system  will  make  it 
possible  to  avoid  the  otherwise  inevitable  subsequent  imposition  of  a 
controlled  economy  in  terms  of environmental  policy. 
- so  -~CONOMt~  INCENTIVES  AND  ENVIRONMENTAL  POLICY 
by  Wilfred  BECKERMAN,  Fellow of  Dalliol  College,  Oxford. 
(Talk  to  Committee  on  the  Environment,  Public  Health  and  Consumer  Protection 
of  the  European  Parliament,  Brussels,  21  June  1990) 
Since  I  have  very  little  time  at  my  disposal  and  would  like  to 
concentrate  almost  exclusively on  the  role of economic  incentives  on  achieving 
environmental  objectives  1  shall  say  very  little about  the  other  topics  that, 
according  to  the  programme  of  this  session,  I  am  expected  to  talk  about.  As 
far  as  sustainable economic  development  is  concerned  I  shall  limit  myself  to 
one  or  two  very  brief  introductory  remarks.  Since  I  shall  confine  myself  to 
criticisms of  the  value of  this  concept  the  brevity of  my  remarks  may  mean 
that  I  fail  to  do  justice  to  its merits. 
First,  I  have  seen  several  different  interpretations  of  the  concept  of 
'sustainable'  development  but  have  yet  to  see  one  that  can  be  of  much 
guidance  in  the  formulation  of  practical  environmental  policy  - or  that  even 
looks  like a  promising  starting  point  for  helping  in  the  formulation  of 
environmental  policy.  Most  interpretations  and  definitions  of  'sustainable 
economic  development'  emphasise  the  goal  of  ensuring  that  future  generations 
are  able  to satisfy  their  'needs'.  But  the  concept  of  'needs'  is  one  that 
raises  innumerable  difficult  philosophical  questions. 
It seems  to  me  that  the  introduction of  the  concept  of  sustainable 
development  will  not  advance  us  at  all  in  the  search  for  socially desirable 
environmental  policy  until  some  ansh·ers  are  given  to  questions  such  as:-
(i)  how  to distinquish  bet\veen  'needs',  'wants'  and  'desires'?; 
(ii)  which  'needs'  have  to  be  satisfied?  Without  some  precise 
answer  to  t.b is  qtws t ion  the  concept  of  sus ta inah I e  dP.vP l  opi!H'fl t 
does  not  help  us  define  how  far  society  current  ge1wrat ior1s 
ought  to  make  sacrifices  in  the  interests  of  satisfying  the 
environmental  needs  of  future  generations; 
and  (iii)  how  does  one  trade  off one  component  of  the  environment  agajnst 
another.  not  to  mention  how  does  one  trade-off  some 
environmental  assets  against  man-made  assets,  many  of  which  may 
be  the  source.  directly  or  indirectly,  of equally desirable 
enhancements  in  the  quality of  life? 
And.  as  far  as  I  can  see.  much  of  the  publicity  given  to  the  concept  of 
sustainable development  does  not  even  begin  to ask  these  questions.  let  alone 
answer  them. 
Closely  related  to  this  is  the  fashionable  attack  on  the  concept  of 
national  income.  or  G~P.  It  is  widely  asserted  that  economists  are  largely 
- 51  -responsible  for  disseminating  the  view  that  the  only  valid objective of 
policy  is  to  maximise  national  income  - or,  in  some  versions.  its  rate of 
growth.  Of  course.  nothing  could  be  further  from  the  truth.  It  was  the  great 
British economist.  P  igou.  in  his  book  The  economj~~  ___ QL_\!e 1.  f~re..  (  1st  edition. 
Macmillan,  1920)  who  first  emphasised  the  distinction  between  economic  and 
non-economic  welfare.  According  to  Pigou,  economic  welfare  was  that  part  of 
total  welfare  that  '' ...  could  be  brought  into  relation with  the  measuring  rod 
of  money".  It  is  this  alone  that  national  income  attempts  to  measure,  and  ttw 
literature  of  national  income  -including  a  textbook  on  the  subject  that  I 
published  in  1968  - emphasises  this  point  and  the  numerous  crucial  value 
judgements  involved  in  the  concept  of national  income. 
Pigou  also went  on  to emphasise,  with  a  degree  of  learning,  wisdom  and 
insight  that  is  rarely matched  in most  of  the critical  literature,  that  there 
might  sometimes  be  a  conflict  between  economic  and  non-economic  welfare.  All 
economists,  therefore,  at  least all well-educated  economists,  are  well  aware 
that economic  welfare  is  only one  component  of welfare  and  that  it may  often 
conflict with other  components  of  welfare  that  are  often  more  important. 
These  do  not  merely  include  the  environment,  they  include  also conditions  of 
work,  international  peace  and  security,  absence  of violence  domestically,  and 
social  harmony  and  mutual  tolerance  in  all  fields  of  human  activity and 
relations. 
So  much  for  the  fashionable  concerns  of many  environmental  movements. 
What  the  economist  tries  to  do  is  to  see  how  far  perfectly  legitimate 
environmental  concerns  can  be  handled  in  terms  of  economic  analysis  with  a 
view  to  arriving at clear principles  for  policy guidance.  The  starting point 
is  not  too  difficult.  For  it boils  down  to  the  simple  proposition  that  the 
environment  is  a  resource,  like any  other resource,  and  that  since  access  to 
it  forms  part  of  peoples'  welfare  it should  only  be  used  up  up  to  the  po~nt 
where  the  loss  of  welfare  to  society  from  using  it up  is  matched  by  the  gain 
to  society  from  using  it up. 
At  this  point  many  people  are  immediately  offended  by  the  notion  that 
there  can  be  any  gain  to  society  from  using  up  the  environment.  But  a  little 
reflection will,  I  hope,  convince  them  that  this  is  not  the  case.  In  the 
first  place,  Mankind  has  always  used  his  environment.  The  first  homo  sapiens 
sapiens  were  forced  to  live a  nomadic  existence  and  to  be  limited  to  fJirly 
small  communities  since  their  means  of  livelihood were  restricted  to  hunting 
and  eating certain  locally available grasses.  As  they  exhausted  these  sources 
of  nourishment  in  their  local  environments  they  then  moved  on.  When  they 
learnt  how  to cultivate grasses  they  were  able  to  become  more  settled  and  to 
live  in  large commun1t1es.  At  the  same  time  this still  involved  using  the 
environment  in  one  way  or  the  other,  either  for  food  or  for  heat  or  dwell inqs. 
In  modern  industrial  economies  the  use  of  the  environment  is.  of 
course,  on  an  incomparably  greater  scale.  which  is  why  we  are  far  more 
concerned  with  it.  But  the  basic principle  is  the  same.  For  clean  air or 
clean  water,  for  example,  are  environmental  assets  and  insofar  as  modern 
industrial  and  agricultural  activities pollute  the  air or  the  water  they  are 
using  up  these  components  of  the  environment.  This  did  not  matter  so  much 
when  clean air or clean water  were  so  abundant  that  nobodv  suffered  from  the 
loss  of  it,  but  in  many  parts of  the  world  this  is  no  longer  the  case,  and 
certain  forms  of pollution,  such  as  the  'greenhouse'  gases.  threaten  to  have 
effects on  the  environment  which  will  be  felt  by  the  population of  the  whole 
world. 
- 52  -Today  probably  all  modern  industrial  and  agricultural  activities  make 
use  of  the  environment  as  an  input  into  their productive  activities  one  way  or 
the other.  The  environment  is  a  factor  of  production  for  them.  Hence,  if 
they  were  induced,  by  one  means  or  another,  to  reduce  their  use  of  the 
environment  they  would  have  to  try  to  replace  it by  substituting other  factors 
of  production- such  as  labour,  capital  goods.  or  raw  materials.  As  I  shall 
explain  in  due  course,  this  may  well  increase overall  welfare,  since  thP  cost 
to  society of  u.siuq  morP  of  thP  ott1(·r  Ltclors  of  prod11cliot1  to  ;tC"hiPV('  it~ 
output  may  be  less,  up  to  a  point,  than  the  loss  of welfare  that  society  may 
incur  from  the  destruction of  the  environment.  But  this  does  not  detract  from 
the  proposition  that  insofar  as  they  have  to  replace  use  of  the  environment  in 
their productive activities  by  the  use  of  more  labour  or  capital  or  raw 
materials  these  other  factors  of  production w1ll  not  be  available  to  society 
for  other purposes.  In  short,  other  things  be1ng  equal,  society will  be  able 
to  produce  less  of other goods  and  services  - whether  they  be  clothes  or  food 
or  schools  or hospitals  or  housing  or Hi-Fi  equipment  or  whatever  it  is  that 
contributes  to  society's economic  welfare.  Some  people  may  pretend  to despise 
these other uses  of  resources  but  most  people  in  the  world,  particularly  those 
living  in  poverty,  happen  to want  a  lot  more  of  the  basic goods  that  have  to 
be  provided  with  the  aid of  labour  and  capital. 
Of  course,  other  things  will  not  remain  equal  and  the  gradual  growth 
of  productivity  and  technical  progress  will  usually ensure  that  economir. 
output  of  the  conventional  kind  will  continue  to  rise.  Nevertheless,  it 
remains  true  that,  for  a  given  level  of  technological  knowledge  and  a  given 
supply of all  factors  of  production,  the  less  use  is  made  of  the  environment 
and  the  more  it  is  replaced  as  an  input  into  the  productive  process  by  labour 
and  capital,  the  less  labour  and  capital  is  available  for  other goods  which 
would  also have  added  to overall  welfare  one  way  or another. 
Hence,  let  there  be  no  mistake  about  it.  Reducing  environmental 
pollution has  a  social  cost.  This  is  the  same  as  saying  that  pollution  has  a 
social  benefit  - much  as  this  proposition  may  shock  some  environmentalists. 
Consequently,  it is  unfortunate  that  there  is  a  widespread  tendency  in  public 
debate  to  refer  to  polluters  as  if they  were  engaged  on  some  wicked  activity 
and  to  those  who  suffer  from  pollution as  innocent  victims  of  this  wicked 
act1v1ty.  Using  up  the  environment  releases  resources  for  other uses.  which 
will  add  to  welfare.  But.  of  course,  as  I  indicated  above,  using  the 
environment  also  has  a  social  cost.  The  whole  problem  is  to  find  the  right 
balance.  At  this  point  social  welfare  is  maximised.  It  is  conceivable  that 
some  people  may  not  regard  the  maximisation  of  social  welfare  as  a  desirable 
objective  to start with.  But  if - as  I  suspect almost  everybody  does  - you 
subscribe  to  the  objective of maximising  social  welfare.  defined  as  widely  as 
you  like,  then  you  should  want  t.o  use  the  environment  up  to  the  point  where 
th(~  contribution  to  welfan!  thro11~Jh  economising  in  other  resources  mild('  by  <l 
further  unit  of  pollution  would  be  just  outweighed  by  the  damage  to  social 
welfare  made  by  this  extra unit  of  pollution. 
As  pointed  out  in  Dr  Maier-Rigaud's  paper.  with  most  private  goods  and 
services  the  market  mechanism  tends  to  bring about  the  right  balance  and  to 
ensure  that  such  goods  and  services  are  produced  up  to  the  point  where  the 
costs of producing  them  is equal  to  their  benefits.  Why  does  this  not  happen 
in  the  case of  pollution of  the  environment?  Why  don't  firms.  say,  only  use 
the  environment  up  to  the  point  where  the  social  benefits  of doing  so  equal 
the  social  costs?  This  amounts  to  asking  the  question  why  don't  firms  only 
use  the  environment  up  the  point  where  the  costs  to  them  of  not  using  it would 
be  less  than  the  damage  that  their  use  of  the  environment  inflicts  on  society? 
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anybody  and  one  does  not  have  to  be  an  economist  to  see  what  it  is.  The 
answer  is  simply  that  the  firm  does  not  usually  have  to  pay  for  its  11se  of  the 
environment.  Since  it  usually  pays  nothing  for  it,  it  will  use  the 
environment  as  long  as  there  is  the  slightest gain  to  it  in  doing  so- i.e. 
even  where  this gain  is  far  less  than  the  social  cost.  The  basic  theory of 
what  is  known  as  'welfare economics'  - of  which  the  Pigou  book  I  referred  to 
above  was  the  first  full  exposition  - sets  out  numerous  conditions  that  have 
to be  satisfied  in order  to  ensure  that  a  free  market  will  lead  to  a  socially 
optimal  allocation of  resources  between  different  uses.  Hardly  any  of  these 
conditions  are satisfied fully,  and  in  the  case of  the  environment  one  of  them 
is  rarely satisfied at all.  This  is  the  condition  that  there must  be  a  market 
in all goods  and  services  relevant  to  the  allocation of  resources. 
This  indicates  at once  why,  in general,  a  firm  will  not  bear  the  cost 
of  using  the  environment.  For,  in general,  nobody  owns  it.  In  general  there 
are  no  ~property rights'  in  the environment.  Consequently,  in general,  there 
is  no  market  in  it.  And  if nobody  owns  it anybody  can  come  along  and  use  it 
up  free  of  charge~  If ..  instead,  the  people  who  are  harmed  by  use  of  the 
environment:  who,  for  the' sake  of  simplifying  the  argument.  we  shall  call  the 
'victims',  had  property rights  in  it,  it might  be  possible  to set  up  a  market 
in  which  they  would  sell  some  of  their property rights  in  it.  In  other words 
they  would  allow  polluters  to  buy  the  right  to pollute  provided  they  paid 
enough.  In  general,  and  subject  to various  assumptions  which  I  shall  not  go 
into here,  the  price  would  be  fixed  at  the  point  where  their  loss  of welfare 
from  a  marginal  unit of  pollution  was  just  compensated  by  their  gain  in 
welfare  from  their  sale  of  it  to  the  polluters.  In  this  way  social  welfare 
would  be  maximised. 
This  way  of  looking  at  the  problem  indicates  the  lines  on  which  one 
ought  to  be  thinking  in  devising  policies  to  deal  with  the  problem  of 
environmental  pollution.  For  it seems  to  follow  from  the  above  that  the 
solution must  consist of making  polluters  pay  for  their pollution.  It  happens 
to be  true  that  it may  not  matter  much  if it is  the  polluter  who  pays  or  the 
victims.  There  is  a  classic  theorem  in  economics.  known  as  'the Coase 
theorem'  after  the  economist  R.H.  Coase  who  published  a  seminal  article on  the 
subject  in  1960,  to  the effect  that  as  long  as  the  property  rights  in  the 
environment  are clearly defined  the  market  will  lead  to  an  optimal  solution 
irrespective of  to  whom  the  property rights  are  assigned.  Thus,  for  example. 
if  the  polluter had  clearly defined  property  rights  in  the  environment  then  it 
would  be  theoretically possible  for  the  victims  to  get  together  into  some  sort 
of  association  in  order  to  bargain with  the  polluter  and  reach  somf>  mutuf\llv 
acceptable deal  whereby  the  polluter agreed  to  reduce  his  pollution  in  return 
for  some  payment.  In  other words  the  polluter would  sell  his  property  rights 
in  the  environment.  Indeed.  there  are  some  instances  where  some  such 
transactions  may  indeed  take  place. 
But,  for  various  reasons  - notably  high  transactions  costs  - such  a 
solution  is  rarely  feasible.  Instead.  therefore.  the  optimal  solution  is  for 
some  authority  to  intervene  to  set  a  price on  pollution  that  the  polluter has 
to pay.  If  the  correct price  is set  then  the  polluter will  finish  up  reducing 
his  pollution  to  the  socially optimal  point  as  defined above.  Of  course, 
there are  innumerable  practical  difficulties  in  trying  to  find  the  correct 
price and  one  should  have  no  illusions  about  this.  Unfortunately  these  and 
other difficulties  have  often been  alleged  to  be  sufficient justification for 
an  alternative  approach,  namely  quantitative  rules  and  regulations  and 
standards governing  pollution control. 
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'command  and  control'  approach.  It  is  true  that  one  cannot  know  exactly what 
pollution charge  .sho11ld  be  impos£ld  on  polluters.  Out  for  thP  very  samP  rP.1SOII 
one  cannot  know  exactly  what  is  the  socially  optimal  level  of pollution  that 
should  be  permitted.  The  two  ways  of  looking  at  the  optimal  level  of 
pollution  - in  terms  of  quantities  or  in  terms  of  the  optimal  charge  - arP 
just  different  ways  of  guessing  the  point  at  which  the  marginal  social 
benefits of pollution equal  the  marginal  social  costs.  If  one  cannot  estimate 
this  optimal  point  accurately  one  cannot  estimate either  its  price  dimension 
or  its quantity dimension. 
And,  at  the  same  time,  if  one  has  to get  it wrong  - as  one  does-
there  are  lots of  advantages  in  getting  it wrong  the  charges  way  rather  than 
getting it wrong  the  command  and  control  way  - as  the  disastrous  experience  of 
the  East  European  economies  now  demonstrate  clearly  to  the  whole  world.  With 
pollution charges,  one  can  at  least  be  confident  that  such  pollution  abatement 
as  is  carried out  will  be  achieved  at  less cost  than  with  the  command  and 
rontrol  method.  With  the  lat.U!r  there  is  no  mechanism  to  flnsure  that 
pollution abatement  is  carried out  most  in  firms  that  can  do  so  at  least  cost. 
By  contrast,  if  firms  have  to  pay  a  charge  for  using  the  environment,  those 
who  can  reduce  pollution cheaply will  prefer  to  reduce  pollution more  than  the 
firms  who  would  find  it very  expensive  to  do  so.  In  other  words  pollution 
abatement  will  tend  to  be  concentrated  on  those  firms  that  can  carry  it out  at 
least cost.  Hence,  a  given  amount  of  pollution abatement  will  be  achieved  at 
lower  cost  to  society  as  a  whole.  This  amounts  to  saying  that,  for  a  given 
real  cost  to  society,  more  pollution  abatement  can  be  carried  out.  Hence, 
those  who  profess  to  be  most  concerned  with  the  environment  ought  to  be 
strongest  in  their  support  for  this  price mechanism  approach  to  environmental 
protection. 
Furthermore,  the  pollution  charge  approach  provides  a  continuous 
incentive  to  firms  to  find  ways  to economise  in  their  use  of  the  environment, 
for  which  they  will  have  to  pay  in  the  same  way  that  they  have  to  pay  for 
their use  of  labour  and  capital  and  raw  materials.  One  would  thus  achieve  not 
only  economies  in  the  reduction of pollution  for  any  given  degree  of  technical 
knowledge  but,  in  addition,  much  greater  progress  in  pollution  abatement 
technology. 
Of  course.  numerous  other  objections  have  been  raised  to  the  use  of 
pollution charges.  and  I  do  not  have  time  here  to  go  through  them  all.  I  did 
try  to  answer  most  of  them  in  the  ~inoritv Report  of  the  2nd  Report  of  the 
Royal  Commission  on  Environmental  Pollution  (H.M.S.O  London,  1972)  and  in  a 
pamphlet  I  wrote  in  1975  called Pricing  for  Pollution and  which  has  just  been 
reprinted  (London,  Institute  for  Economic  Affairs,  reprinted  1990),  so  I  hope 
you  will  not  mind  if  I  do  not  repeat  all  the  arguments  contained  therein  and 
confine  myself  to  answering  specific questions  later  today. 
I  would  only  like  to  make  one  amendment  to  the  arguments  that  I  have 
already set  out  in  these  (and  other)  publications.  This  concerns  the  use  of 
what  are  known  as  'tradeable permits'.  These  are  permits  to  pollute  the 
environment  up  to  a  certain  fixed  quantitative  amount  that  are  either 
auctioned or are distributed  to  firms  who  then  have  a  right  to  buy  and  sell 
them  amongst  each  other.  This  method,  which  was  first  stJggested  in  1968  by  a 
Canadian  economist,  J.H.  Dales  <Pollution,  property  and  prices,  University  of 
Toronto  Press)  combines  the  advantages  of  the  price  mechanism- i.e.  achieving 
a  given  pollution  reduction  at  least cost  - with  the  security of  knowing  that 
pollution will  not  exceed  a  certain  fixed  physical  limit.  How  important  this 
latter advantage  is  depends  on  one's degree  of  risk  aversion  - i.e.  how  much 
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importance  one  attaches  to  the  possibility  that,  through  failing  to  guess  the 
correct  pollution  charge,  the  physical  amount  of  pollution may  exceed  the 
target  amount  to  an  extent  that  would  be  very dangerous. 
Because  of  this  aspect  of  the  tradeable  permit  system  it  has  been 
widely  assumed  that  it  is  the  best  system  to  be  used  to  deal  with  the 
international  pollution problem  associated with  the  global  warming  threat.  I 
do  not  have  the  time  here  to go  into  the  economics  of global  warming  and  it is 
anyway  outside  my  terms  of  reference.  But  I  would  like  simply  to  say  that, 
personally,  I  think  that  (i)  the  global  warming  threat  has  been  greatly 
exaggerated  in  the  media  and  the  case  for  early and  costly measures  to  reduce 
C02  emissions  is  by  no  means  clearly established;  and  <ii>  it  is  an  illusion 
to  believe  that  internationally  tradeable  permits  hold  the  key  to  the 
terribly difficult  problems  that will  have  to be  faced  in attempting  to  reach 
some  form  of  international  agreement  to  deal  with  greenhouse  gases,  and  I 
suspect  that  pollution charges  associated with special  kinds  of  subsidies  to 
pollution abatement  hold out  more  promise. 
By  contrast,  there  are  serious  problems  of  local  and  regional 
pollution that  have  to be  faced  here  and  now.  The  whole  international  aspect 
of  trans-national  pollution opens  up  a  host  of  further  difficult  issues. 
Economics  can  play  its part  in  clarifying  many  of  these  issues,  I  believe,  but 
they  are  not  simple  and  if  I  have  not  spent  any  time  on  them  today  it  is  not 
because  1 want  to minimise  their  importance. 
In  conclusion,  I  can  only  say  that  the  environment  is  a  serious  matter 
and  if one  wants  to make  a  serious  contribution to  the  formulation  of  proper 
policy  to deal  with  it one  has  to  be  prepared  to understand  the  basic analysis 
of  the  problem.  It is not  enough  to bandy  around  vague  slogans  and  emotional 
assertions  of  one's  spiritual  purity  and  dedication  to  higher  values. 
Rhetoric  may  be  fine  on  the  University campus  or  the  political hustings.  But 
when  it  gets  down  to serious  policy  formulation  one  has  a  duty  to master  the 
details of  the  argument.  For  all  their  faults,  this  is  one  area  in which 
economists  can  provide  some  guidance,  though  it  can  only  be  used  in 
conjunction with  advice  from  experts  from  a  variety of  other disciplines. 
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A DIMENSION TRANSNATIONALE: 
NECESSITE ET LIMITES DES INSTRUMENT~  ECON0!\1IQUES 
1. Une classe de problemes a  structure tres spccifique: 
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Depuis le debut des.  anm!es.  1980 plusieurs dossiers,  souvent spectaculaires, ont marque la 
venue sur le devant de la  scene d'une  classe de  problemes d'environnement a dimension 
fortement  transnationale  (pluies  acides,  risques  nucleaires,  ozone  et  maintenant  nsques 
climatiques} dont les modalites de prise en charge collective sont fon probh~matiques. 
Je partirai  de l'idee  simple que,  sauf a  adopter un  comportement de  "laisser-faire,  laisser 
aller" le probleme a  resoudre est celui des formes de coordination des interets et des actions a 
l'echelle intemationale, fonnes susceptibles de promouvoir ce qu'une part croissante de  la 
litterature designe sous le  vocable de  "sustainable development".  C'est en  effet dans cette 
perspective que doit etre examinee la contribution potcntielle des instruments cconomiqucs. 
Mais il  convient alors de bien percevoir au  prealable en quoi cc type de problcn1c  bouscule 
notablement  la  structure  logique  de  l'economie  de  l'environnen1ent  telle  gu'elle  s'est 
constituee au cours des annees soixante et soixante-dix. 
Merne si ces enseignements n'ont pas, tant s'en faut, ete sui  vis dans les politiques reellement 
appliquees, merne si l'on peut aisernent en montrer le caractere reducteur, il  reste que cette 
econornie a  su  produire  des concepts  de reference pour les  debars environnementaux (par 
exemple le principe "pollueur-payeur")  et sous-tendre de politiques  souvent efficaces,  par 
exemple dans le domaine de l'eau. Sa structure de raisonnement est tres simple : 
- la protection de l'environnement doit etre, comme les autres biens collectifs, soumise 
a  un arbitrage economique: !'amelioration de la qualite d'environnement est justifice tant que 
le coGt  additionnel qu'elle entra1ne reste inferieur aux satisfactions qu'une societe en attend 
(bilan cout/benefice). Celles-ci sont certes difficiles a  calculer, mais peuvent etrc "reve1ees" 
par exemple en evaluant la disponibilite des differents agents d'une col1ectivite  ft  payer pour 
tel ou tel niveau de qualite; 
-l'essentiel des dysfonctionnements dans Ia  liaison economie-environncmcnt vient de 
!'existence "d'externalites",  c'est-~t-dire du  fait  que les agents  "pollueurs"  ne  rec;oi vent  pas 
d'infom1ation  adequate  sur les  dommages  qu'i1s  causcnt ou  peuvent  se  pcrmettrc  de  les 
tgnorer; 
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extemalites" : nonnes, reglements, subventions, principe pollueur-payeur, marches de droits a 
polluer.  Mcme  si  les  pratiques  institutionnelles  dorninantes  sont  de  type  juridique  et 
rcglemcntairc, Ia plupart des cconon1istcs de l'environncrncnt y voient des risques de rigidite, 
d'inefficacite  economique,  voire  d'inequite  ou  d'arbitraire.  Sauf dans  le  cas  notable  de 
phenomenes irreversiblcs, d'effets de seuil ou de derive exponentielle des coflts ecologiques, 
ils privilegient pour leur souplesse les solutions de marche.  A travers le principe "pollueur-
- _  payeur"  par exemple,  on  inclut le  cout  des  nuisances  dans  les  prix  de  biens  et ·services, 
information  dont  les  agents  economiques  seront  forces  de  tenir  compte  dans. leurs 
comportements de production (choix de technologies propres) et de consommation (reduction 
de la demande de  biens et services a  fort impact environnemental comme les  transports par 
exemple). 
_  Ce schema: intellectuel suppose, on le voit, des couts et benefices calculables, de meme que 
des acteurs bien identifies, qu'ils 'soient pollueurs, pollues ou offreurs de solutions techniques 
ecologiquement saines.  Or,  l'histoire recente montre que les problcmes d'environnement a 
dimension transnationale presentent, plus que d'autres, les caracteristiques suivantes : 
- situation  d'incertitude  compliquee  ici  de  la  permanence  de  controvcrscs 
SCicntifiqutS quant  ?\  }a  l'Ca\itC  dCS  ll\JlSt\nCCS, a  }Cllf Origillt.:  Otl  :1  I'LJfic:tCill~ dt:S  So:utiOllS J 
n1erne de les reduire. Ce fut et ccla reste le cas pour la sccuritc nuclcairc, pour l'originc de  lJ 
mort des forets ou  pour le  role reel  des phosphates. Toute la  difficulte vient de cc que des 
decisions doivent etre prises avant meme qu'un consensus scientifique puisse etre atteint;  le 
cas le plus spectaculaire est bien sur ici celui de l'effet de serre. 
- tentation normale et permanente d'instrumentaliser les debats environnerncntaux, de 
lcs  rnettre  au  service  d'objectifs  economiques,  industriels  et  technologiqucs.  L'adjectif 
"normal" peut-surprendre;  no us  voulons simplernent in sister sur le fait  que  no us  ne  voulons 
pas juger  ici  ces  pratiques d'un  point de  vue  moral.  Elles  font  partie  du  jeu  nature}  des 
rapports de  force et,  meme si  l'on  tient compte du  progres dans  la deontologie  des  agents 
economiques, il  reste que  le  role  de procedures  internationales eventuelles est d'eviter que, 
dans ces  confrontations, 1a  protection de  l'environnement ne  disparaisse comme objcctif en 
soi. 
- non  perception directe  par la  population de la  realite des  problemes; alors que des 
riverains  d'une  autoroute,  trouvant  le  bruit  insupportable,  peuvcnt  faire  pression  pour  la 
construction de murs anti-bruit et que les automobilistes ou les contribuables acceptcnt de les 
payer (peage ou impots), personne ne se plaindrait de Ia degradation de Ia couche d'ozone ou 
~e l'effet de serre sans l'activite des scientifiques, des medias et des  hommes politiques.  Ceci 
rend bien  sur peu  fiable  !'evaluation  monetaire des  dommages  par des  "pollues"qui  ne  se 
pensent  pas  comme  tels  et  dont  la  sensibilite a une  nuisance  resulte  principalemcnt d'un 
processus mediatique.  Dans  bien  des  ~as d'ailleurs,  une  difficulte  supplementaire surgit du 
fait que ces  "~ollues' sont  les  gem!rations  futures  et que,  dans ce cas,  Ia  solution  theorique 
passe par Ia  p~se en compte de Ia solidarite des generations presentes avec ces generations. 
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l'environnement  qui  se  trouve  largement  inapplicable,  sinon  invalidec  au  plan  theorique. 
Passer du  constat a  !'abandon de  tout instrument econon1ique de  gestion de l'environnement 
et au  recours a une  approche  purement  reglementaire  est  une  demarche  frcqucnte.  Trois 
considerations permettent cependant d'en cerner les limites: 
- l'impossibilite  d'une  evaluation  economiquc  standard  n'cmpcchc  pas  que  toutc 
decision a un coGt et qu'il faut bien trouver des bases pour les arbitrages necessaires, 
- la prise de  decision par norme et reglement voire par interdit de  tel  ou  tel  type de 
technique, si elle est tres souvent necessaire (voir le cas des  CFC), comporte un  risque reel: 
edicter  des  regles  du  jeu  en  fonction  d'un  etat  donne  des  connaissances  et  des  jeux 
d'influence,  regles  susceptibles  d'orienter  !'innovation  technique  dans  des  voies  dont  les 
progres dans la connaissance scientifique demontrerait ulterieurement la non-pertinence; 
-dans un contexte international marque par la competition economique, et ou  il n'y a 
pas d'autorite legitime reconnue dans les domaines qui nous concement ici, toute proposition 
de  normes  environnementales  peut  etre  per~ue comme  une  arme  en  service  de  tel  ou  tel 
groupe  d'interets;  c'est  ce  que  le  sociologue  franc;ais  Philippe  Roqueplo  appelle  une 
perception de  "risque inverse", ou  le  danger environnemental n'est plus traite dans sa nSalitc 
rnais  comme  simple  argument  de  la  concurrence·  industrielle.  La  multiplication  de  telles 
situations, que nous avons connu lors des controverses sur le pot catalytique comme rcponsc a 
la  "mort  des  forets",  aurait pour consequence de retarder considerablemcnt la  realisation de 
consensus, done le traitement des problemes. 
Les  impasses  d'approches  purement  reglementaires  pour  la  gestion  collective  des  risques 
ecologiques a  dimension transnationale apparaissent done  dans  tous  les cas ou  un  consensus 
rapide est hors de  ponce auteur de  normes  acceptt~es par chacune des  parties prenantes (1). 
Nous ferons  done !'hypothese ici que le recours a  des instruments economiques merite alors 
d'etre rcconsidere a  condition que  le fondement  theorique de  leur emploi  puisse etre  trouve 
ailleurs que dans la probh!matique classique d'un panage optimal entre des coCas et benefices 
eux-memes fortement controverses. 
2.  Un  parametre clef a integrer  d~ns les  comportements et  anticipations  des  agents 
economiques: Ia valeur de la prudence et du temps d'apprentissage. 
Mcme si  Ia  theorie  de  la  decision  n'est  pas si  avancee qu'elle puisse pretendrc  fournir une 
solution toute faite, elle nous donne  un  point d'appui non  negligeable a  partir du  concept de 
(1) Un bon exemplc est ici foumi par !'accord sur l'ozonc: le consensus scientifique ctant r~el sur les risques. lcs 
CFC bien identifies comme facteur responsable. et devant un nombre limite d'industriels et d'Etats conccmcs. 
un accord normatif pouvait etre atteint sur l'climination progressive des CFC. et, cc qui est lc plus important, 
applique. A !'oppose, devant la pluralitc des intercts engages, on voit mal tout accord forme! sur Ia r&.luction des 
emissions de C02 pouvoir etre traduit en decisions effcctives mondialemcnt acccpttcs de contingentement de 
telle ou telle activitt. 
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de  pouvoir  decider  demain  devant  une  gamme  elargie  de  solutions  et  en  presence  d'une 
information meilleure, d'autre  part  le  coGt  de toute decision qui  nous  entralncrait dans  des 
processus irreversibles ou comportant des coGts d'adaptation tres elevcs. 
Ce retrecissement des marges de manoeuvres peut venir de deux types de comportement: 
-des "positions d'attente" qui font que lorsque nous disposerons des preuves definitives de la 
materialite de tel ou tel danger, il sera trop tard en raison ineme de l'inertie des phenon1enes 
ecologiques et de nos propres temps de reponse 
- des decisions prises au nom de l'urgence mais. qui, nous fixant de  maniere precipitee dans. 
des choix technologiques ou  institutionnels rigides,  nous empecheraient de  tenir compte de 
!'amelioration  de  !'information  sur  la  nature  des  problemes  ou  freinerait  !'apparition  de 
solutions techniques plus adaptees. 
Le seul critere a  meme de fonder une conduite collective semble done devoir celui du gain de 
temps d'apprentissage: ralentir le rythme auquel nous nous rapprochons de risques majeurs 
mais  incertains · et  controverses  et  reculer  le  moment  ou  des  paris  n1ajeurs  difficilen1ent 
reversibles seraient ineluctables. II faut bien insister ici sur le fait que ce  temps gagne, utilise 
pour  accro!tre  notre  connaissance  des  phenomenes  et  elargir  la  gamme  de  nos  solutions 
techniques est aussi un temps necessaire pour assainir et renforcer les bases de la cooperation 
international e. 
Le secteur de l'energie nous  fournit  ici un  exemple tres  eclairant avec ·Ie  dilcmme "risques 
clirnatiques"  .versus  "risques  nucleaires".  En  l'etat  actuel  des  controverses  et  des  donnees 
scientifiques, ·  vu  l'enormite des  imerets employes,  il  est  a  peu  pres  exclu  que  I'  on  puisse 
rapidement  obtenir  un  consensus  sur  l'arbitrage  a faire  entre  deux  types  de  risques 
difficilement commensurables et dont  la  perception  varie tres  fortement  selon  les  pays.  Le 
rythme et_l'intensite du premier sont largement inconnus quand la realite du second peut etre 
nie,  malgre  Tchernobyl,  par  les  tenants  du  nucleaire  sur.  En  revanche,  les  donnees 
scientifiques sont suffisantes pour etablir la "presomption de risque" dans les deux cas. 
Attendre  que  se  fasse  un  accord  international  soit  sur  les  parametres  de  comparaison 
coilt/benefice (approche economique classique) ou directement sur Ia  necessite de  limiter ou 
d'interdire le recours a  une filicre technique precise reviendrait a  gelcr toutc action.  Des lors 
!a maitrise des consommations, Ia recherche d'une faible elasticite energie-croissance offre un 
terrain  de  consensus  rapide  puisque  qu'elle  ralentit  la  monH~e en  puissance  de  ces  deux 
risques tout en ne condamnant aucune filiere. Le champ reste alors ouvert pour chercher d'un 
cote les  moyens d'une efficacite d'utilisation  maximale des energies fossiles  ou  le  non  rejet 
de C02 dans !'atmosphere, de l'autre la mise au point d'un nucleaire intrinsequement sur, sans 
compter evidemment sur les perspectives de percee des energies nouvelles et renouvelables. 
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Dans ce contexte, le role des instruments economiques appara1t clairement: i1 s'agit d'inciter a 
!'exploitation,  surtout  dans  les  pays  industriels,  des  potcnticls  existants  de  solutions 
flexibles,  rapidemcnt  applicablcs,  le  plus  souvcnt a coiH  assez  rcduit,  voirc  nul  ou 
negatif,  ct  servant  de  toutc  fa~on  d'autres  objcctifs  sccuritc,  cquilibrcs 
macroeconomiques},  et  d'evitcr un  nouveau dcrapage vers  des  modes  de  consommation 
plus intensifs en energie. Pour ce faire, il convient de corriger les prix de l'energie tels qu'ils 
ressortent de  l'etat du  marche a  court tenne, par un  parametre refletant la prise de risque a 
long terme qu'implique la consommation d'energie. 
C'cst bien sur !'evaluation de  cc  parametre qui  dcvient alors  l'enjcu de tout  accord.  11  est 
exclu d'attendre de l'economiste qu'il puisse calculer un  tel  parametre; par definition un  tel 
parametre ne  peut venir que  de  !'expression collective  du  prix  qu'une  societe  est  prete a 
donner a  la prudence; sa determination doit integrer des donnees scicntifiques n1ais  reste par 
definition,  qu'elle  resulte  de  processus  democratiques  technocratiques  ou  dictatoriaux, 
prealable a  tout calcul economique. 
L'economiste peut  alors  simplement  aider a en  clarifier les  terrnes.  Pour  rester  sur  notre 
exemple de l'energie, un  debat vif se cristallise aux  USA  autour d'une projection des col!ts 
macrocconomiques a tres long  tenne d'une politique de limitation des emissions de C02 (2). 
La polemique vient de ce que le COllt estime reviendrait a  4o/o  du PID  americain a  2030 et 2o/o 
a 2100,  chiffre  qui  est  per<1u  comme  enorme  et  susceptible  de  decourager  toute  action 
preventive face a  un .risque incertain et qui entraine done, de la  part des  n1ilieux  convaincus 
de  la  necessite  d'une  telle  action,  une  vive critique de  la  fiabilite  de  !'etude.  En  fait,  en 
admettant tels quels ces resultats, la question a  poser ici est de sa voir, par exemple en  Europe 
de I'  Ouest,  si les  0,001% de  croissance annuelle  ainsi sacrifies a horizon  2030 ne  son t pas 
finalement un coilt acceptable pour une assurance devant des risques potentiels. C'est ici que 
se  situe le choix  central a  partir duquel  il  est possible d'etudier le contenu  et le  niveau des 
instruments economiques a  meme  de  traduire un  tel  effort dans la pratique,  pour maximiser 
son efficacite. 
3. Des instruments nccessaires mais non suffisants 
Dans la problematique qui vient d'etre suggeree, la selection des outils pertinents pour Ia prise 
en  charge  des  risques  environnementaux  doit  done  integrer  le  fait  que  les  acteurs 
economiques doivent recevoir, de maniere decentralisee, les impulsions necessaires, celles-ci 
devant simultannement: 
a) inflechir Jes comportemcnts itnmediats de consommation et de production, 
(2) Je n'cn citerai pas lcs protagonistcs ici car jc nc vcux ni prendre parti ni discutcr de Ia validitc de J'ctudc 
mais simplement illustrcr Ia nature du problcmc pose. 
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b) eclairer les anticipations des acteurs dont les choix detenninent l'univers des possibles a 
long terme (recherche-developpement, infrastructures) par un signal clair sur lcs risqucs et 
contraintes a  long terme, 
c}  eviter l'engagement premature dans des options technologiques ou institutionnellcs 
lourdes  et  rigides,  afin  de  pouvoir  n1ettre  a  profit,  Je  moment  venu,  le  ten1ps 
d'apprentissage conquis; a  cette fin, sauf dans les cas ou un produit ou une technique sont 
intrinsequement "nocifs", il convient d'entretenir la pluralite des options en rapprochant le 
niveau des efforts de R & D qui leur sont respectivement consacres. 
Par ailleurs, pour ne pas perdre de temps dans la mise en place de strategies preventives, il 
convient de mettre l'accent sur des criteres d'acceptabilite que l'on peut resumer ainsi: 
-respect des souverainetes (ou jeu sur les domaines ou une autolimitation est aisement 
concedable) pour minimiser les controverses de legitimite, 
- equite dans la repartition des efforts, y compris les effets secondaires de telle ou telle 
action, 
- progressivite dans la  mise en oeuvre, ceci pour minimiser les coOts  d'adaptation et 
donner a  chaque partenaire le temps de verifier le serieux de l'engagcment de chacun, 
- practicabilite en utilisant au maximum les savoir-faire administratifs existants et en 
minimisant les cofits de controle et de gestion. 
Ces criteres pennettent de clarifier quelque peu le debat sur le choix a  faire entre les outils 
institutionnels  les  plus  couramment  envisages  (d.roits  a polluer,  taxes  incitatives,  taxes 
additionnelles affectees, subventions) et de preciser le statut de mesures d'accompagnement 
(information, formation, nonnes et reglements) dont on verra qu'elles sont necessaires. 
La formule  des  droits  d'emission  echeangeables  permet theoriquen1ent  d'obtenir de  fa<;on 
cenaine un niveau determine d'emissions sans que 1'  autorite tutelaire ait besoin de conna1tre 
les fonctions de cofits de chaque agent;  elle permet une efficacite  maximale de l'effort de 
reduction des  emissions  puisque  les  agents  clisposant  d'alternatives  techniques a bas  coGt 
peuvent proceder a une  reduction  importante  de leurs  emissions  et ceder leurs  droits  aux 
agents soumis a  des  rigidites techniques plus importantes. Seduisante en  son  principe, cettc 
formule donne cependant lieu  a  de  frequents  COntresens  en  ctant  pcn;uc  COinlllC  la  fom1c 
rneme d'une solution de marche: 
- aux  USA,  seul  pays  presentant  quelques  expenences  en  vraie  grandeur,  ce 
mecanisme a, en fait, ete jusqu'a present un  moyen d'introduire un  peu de souplesse dans un 
systeme tres strictement reglemente paf des nonnes (d'emission et de qualitc du milieu) ct par 
des autorisations et con troles administr~Hifs tres lourds, 
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contrebalance par la lourdeur des controles necessaires pour verifier que les agents disposent 
de droits  correspondant a leurs emissions.  Dans le  cas de  la  pollution  atmosphcrique  aux 
USA,  les  coOts  d'information,  lcs  coOts  et  dclais  de  controlc  administratif,  lcs  couts  de 
transaction, les strategies de retention des droits comptent panni les facteurs ayant limite lcs 
{:·..  :1ges,  la plupart des transactions  effectives se sont deroulees a  l'intcrieur d'une  men1e 
installation,  entre  plusieurs  sources,  ou  a l'interieur  d'une  meme  finne,  entre  plusieurs 
etablissements. On n'a done pas jusqu'a present d'experience d'un veritable march  e. 
- pour  mettre  sur  pied  un  mecanisme  de  droits  echangables,  on  doit  specifier 
prealablement  un  ensemble  de  variables  qui  toutes  posent  des.  problemes  difficiles  de 
legitimite: les regles d'allocation initiale des droits, les regles de duree de validite des droits, 
les regles d'emission ou de resorption ulterieures des droits, l'identite des agents ayant acces 
au systeme, la nature de l'autorite institutionnelle assurant son fonctionnement, l'etendue ou 
la limitation des possibilites d'echange, les fonnes de penalisation en cas de depassement des 
droits, les regles de comportement envers les pays qui n'auraient pas adhere au n1ecanisme. 
Pour s'en  tenir a  un exemple simple, aucune regie de repartition initiale entre pays des 
droits d'emission  de C02 (prorata des emissions actuelles,  quota par habitant, par unite de 
superficie, par unite de PNB, en fonction des projets de croissance, ou simplement mise aux 
encheres intemationales) ne satisfait aux criteres de fondement  rationnel justifiable, de 
simplicite suffisante pour etre maniable dans le cadre d'unc ncgociation intcrnationalc 
et d'absence d'effets pervcrs sur les incitations. 
En  d'autres  terrnes,  la  reference  au  marche  dans  le  fonctionnement  de  tels  systemes 
n'empeche pas qu'il s'agisse de systemes administrativement et politiquement tres  reguh~s. 
dont  la  .mise  en  place  a l'echelle  intemationale  risque  d'entrainer  une  ncgociation 
hasardeuse et longue de meme que la mise en place d'institutions nouvelles. On  attirera 
done !'attention  sur les  risques d'une  transposition  trop rapide a  l'echelle planetaire d'une 
formule  insuffisamment  experimentee a l'echelle  locale  et  regionale.  Que  des  pratiques 
s'inspirant de ces principes puissent ep-e developpees a  cette echelle fait partie des possibilites 
a  examiner, qu'elles puissent fonder une gestion internationale semble plus deli cat. 
Le deuxieme type d'outil economique mobilisable serait un  systen1e de taxes incitatives non 
affectees sur les activites polluantes. Dans la mesure ou ces taxes ne pcuvent etrc fondees sur 
le schema pigouvien de l'internalisation des effets externes visant la reduction des ecarts entre 
couts et benefices prives et couts et benefices sociaux. ces taxes doivent reprcscnter le  cout 
d'option  int<~grant  le  prix  de  Ia  prudence  face  a des  risques  n1ajcurs  ct  Ia  valeur 
cscomptee des progrcs attendus de !'information sur les donnees du problcrnc ct sur Ies 
moyens d'y rcpondre. 
Parler de  taxe  non  affectee signifie bien  sur que l'on raisonne a  pn!levements obligatoires 
constants  (imp6ts  plus  cotisations  S,ociales)  soit  par  une  diminution  des  taxes sur  des 
substituts moins polluants, soit par.unc diminution de Ia fiscalitc gcncralc sur lcs biens et 
services.  En  dehors  de  son  aspect  incitatif,  cette formule  prescnte  l'avantage  d'offrir  une 
- 63  -' 
solution partielle au  probleme de Ia  base sur laquelle il  est legitin1e d'asseoir lcs ressources 
fiscales dans  un  contexte de  mise en  concurrence croissante  des  economies  qui  aboutit a 
reduire !'imposition sur le capital et les revenus, et a  faire porter l'effort sur Ia  seule valeur 
ajoutee et done sur l'emploi. 
Une  telle  formule  presente  des  avantages  significatifs  :  instrument  techniquement 
maitrisable, son  cout  administratif  est  reduit,  puisqu'il  repose  sur  )'utilisation  des 
circuits existants; il peut entrer rapidement dans les faits avec Ia progressivite desiree; Ia 
maitrise de son niveau permet de construire Ia previsibilite strategique requise; ses effcts 
sont cernables par des etudes economiques standard. 
L'interet d'une telle approche peut etre mis en evidence sur le dossier de l'energie que nous 
avons deja utilise comme exemple.  Alors  qu'il  est difficile  d'imaginer un  accord  portant 
directement sur des objectifs par! pays pour la reduction des emissiods de C02 ou des risques 
nucleaires,  ou  en  tous  cas  d'accord  accompagne  de  garanties  d'application,  il  devient 
envisageable de  s'entendre sur  une  taxe  unique  sur l'energie pour inciter a un  mode de 
developpement sobre en energie,  c'est-a-dire en  fait sur une  "regie du jeu" pennettant de 
mettre rapidement  en oeuvre  le sous  ensemble de solutions  susceptible de faire  objet de 
consensus. 
Deux arguments doivent cependant etre examines, qui vont a  l'encontre de cette hypothese de 
taxe non-affectee: 
- le  premier,  aisement  contoumable,  a  trait  aux  possibilites  de  distorsions  de  la 
concurrence internationale:  s'il  est  vrai  que,  pour les  grands  dossiers,  la  voie  fiscale  nc 
pourrait etre suivie que de maniere concertee a  l'echelle internationale, on peut penser a 
un effet de demonstration lance dans le cadre de la CEE par exemple et qui s'appuyerait sur 
· les demarches d'hannonisation actuellement en cours. Une marge importante de progressivite 
dans !'extension progressive de tels systemes. pourrait etre par ailleurs trouvee, dans le cadre 
du GATT, en imposant des taxes compensatoires a  proportion de la nocivite des produits, aux 
importations en provenance de pays n'ayant pas adhere au systeme. 
- le  deuxieme  est  celui  du  montant  auquel  fixer  de  telles  taxes  pour  que  l'effet 
d'incitation joue vraiment. Pour beaucoup d'experts  ~m tel  effet ne saurait etre atteint qu'en 
fixant  ces  taxes  a des  niveaux  totalement  prohibitifs  risquant  de  mettre  en  cause 
l'acceptabilite des  sys~emes. L'argumert est rcccvable si l'on attend des adaptations en jouant 
sur  les  "effets-prix"  purs;  les.  rigidites  techniques,  les  manques  d'infom1ation,  le  fait 
comptable qu'il  faut une  taxation importante pour que  l'impact  soit  notable  sur les  prix  et 
coilts  globaux  des  produits  et  techniques,  les  contraintes  financieres  contraignent  tres 
fortement  les  comportements  d'adaptation.  C'est  pourquoi,  cet  argument  renvoie  a un 
probleme de fonds qui est celui  de ce qu'on peut attendre des instruments cconomiques, et 
finalement de leur statut dans la panoplie des dispositifs possibles. 
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sur la periode 1973-1987 est bien sur correlatif des chocs petroliers; mais on sait aussi qu'il a 
tnis  en  jeu. a  cote de  l'effet prix,  des elements  aussi  importants  que  le  progres  technique 
autonome incorpore dans les nouvelles generations d'equipement, les changen1ents structurcls 
dans le secteur industriel, et les politiques plus ou moins volontarist.es lancees dans les annees 
soixante-dix  en  matiere  d'econornie  d'energie  (incitations  fiscales,  labels,  assistance 
techniques etc .. ;). 
En  d'autres  termes  le  niveau  de  taxation  incitative a fixer  est largement  function  des 
n1esures  d'accompagnement qui  determinent Ia  qualitc de  Ia  reponsc aux  prix.  C'est 
pourquoi. le debat opposant de  fa~on systematique le jeu sur les prix relatifs (par voie fiscale 
ou comme resultat des marches de droits}. aux subventions et mesures non-economiques doit 
etre relativise. Alors que les deux demiers elements sont le plus souvent disqualifies par une 
partie de la litterature economique, le bilan qu'on peut faire des pratiques reelles en  matiere 
d'environnement et d'energie, nous  rappelle !'attention qu'il convient de  porter a ce qu'on 
pourrait appeler "la construction du marche": celle-ci passe par un ensemble d'actions visant 
la  recherche  technologique,  Ia  diffusion  de  !'information,  Ia  definition  de  normes 
techniques et de labels de qualitc, Ia structuration de rcseaux techniques cotnpetcnts ct 
Ia  rnise  sur pied  de  procedures ad hoc  de  financement.  A !'inverse,  le  signal-prix  est 
indispensable, a  court terme,  pour reguler efficacement les  arbitrages  m.icroeconomiques  et 
pour  donner  leur  pleine  efficacite  aux  autres  mesures  d'accompagnement.  Au  niveau 
international. il existe cependant une difference de statut entre ces deux ensembles de mesures 
tous deux necessaires: les instruments economiques doivent necessairement faire  l'objet d'un 
accord international (taxe unique sur les emissions de C02 par exemple) alors que les mesures 
d'accompagnement ne peuvent le plus souvent que relever de decisions nation ales. 
C'est dans cette demarche de "construction du marche" qu'il convient de souligner !'interet de 
subventions  d'investissement  financees  par  des  taxes  affcctccs.  Ces  formules  sont 
frequemment critiquees sous deux angles d'attaque: le fait qu'une fois lancees clles perdu rent 
sans qu'on puisse toujours mesurer leur efficacite specifique, le fait qu'elles introduisent des 
distorsions dans  le jeu du marche.  Si  Je  premier argument pose le  probleme  bien  connu de 
l'autonomisation de dispositifs administratifs, le second merite d'etre reexamine dans tous les 
cas ou il s'agit de reparer des assymetries dans les moyens d'acces au capital. Tres souvent en 
effet,  une  alternative  technique  tres  efficace  microeconomiquement  ne  peut  ctre  diffusee 
parce que les agents economiques pour lesquels elle serait rentable a  long tennc ne disposent 
pas  des  moyens  de  la  financer.  Le  cas  classique  est  bien  sur  celui  des  operations  de 
conservation  de  l'energie  (renouvellement  de  la  chaudiere par  exemple)  pour les  menages 
ayant achete  leur logement  en  epuisant  leurs possibilites de  recours  au  credit.  A l'echelle 
internationale un accord sur de tels systemes ne peut qu'etre partie!;  il  ne peut porter que sur 
l'assiette et  le niveau de la  taxe,  plus  difficilement sur ces conditions d'utilisation  puisque, 
pour etre  efficace,  on  doit  ici  coller au  mieux  aux  realites  socio-economiqucs  locales.  En 
revanche,  puisque  des  considerations  d'equite  sont  unc  condition  incontournablc  pour  Ia 
panicipation des  pays les plus pauvres a  une politique de prevention des risques globaux, on 
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depasser les contraintes sur lesquelles ils buteront pour financer les adaptations nccessaires. 
CONCLUSION 
Nous  avons  mis  ici  l'accent  sur  les  instruments  economiques  de  gestion  des  risques 
ecologiques transnationaux dans la mesure ou ceux-ci peuvent a  Ia  fois faciliter des accords 
dans des domaines scientifiquement tres controverses et apporter des garanties d'application 
des efforts de prevention. Il nous  faut cependant souligner ici que la mise en place de tels 
elements  ne  represente  qu'une  partie  des  dispositifs  necessaires.  Des  elements  aussi 
detenninants a  long terme  que les  infrastructures de transport,  la dynamique urbaine ou  la 
forme du progres technique dans  l'agriculture, pour enumerer quelques domaines majeurs, 
dependent  largement  de  decisions  et comportements  autonomes  par  rapport  aux  strictes 
incitations economiques. On ne pense pas par exemple aux coGts  en~rgetiques dans les plans 
d'urbanisation qui determinent pourtant l'ampleur des deplacements domicile-travail-loisirs et 
aucune taxe ne suffua a  modifier les trajectoires en cours en jouant sur les seuls parametres 
microeconomiques. II y a la tout un ensemble de leviers decisifs a  actionner n1ais sur lesquels 
il  semble difficile d'agir a  travers  un  accord international. Par rapport a  eux, l'interet des 
instruments economiques  serait simplement de creer un  contexte ou  la  valeur des  risques 
ecologiques a  long terme serait a.ffichee  de fac;on  suffisamment claire pour que, meme non 
contraints par la logique microeconomique statique,  tous  les  agents porteurs de ce type de 
decision structurante a long  tem1e  les  integrent peu a peu  dans  leur comportement.  C'est 
l'effet dynamique lie a la presence d'un contexte d'anticipations collectives materialise par 
des signaux-prix clairs qui doit etre recherche ici ce qui n'empeche pas, bien au  contraire que 
l'on reflechisse, a  l'echelle des Etats nationaux ou des ensembles comme les  Communautes 
Europeennes sur des politiques de structure sans lesquelles une part importante de l'efficacite 
de ces signaux risque d'etre perdue. 
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urn  etwas  uber die okonomische  Dimension  von  Umweltnutzungen, 
von  Umweltschaden  und  Umweltbelastungen  aussagen  zu  konnen, 
muB  man  sie kennen. 
Es  gibt fur die  Bundesrepublik  Deutschland  inzwischen  eine 
ganze  Reihe  von  Arbeiten,  die die  Umweltschaden  auf  Teil-
gebieten beschrieben  und  auch  monetar  bewertet  haben. 
Und  es  gibt auch  umfassendere  Ansatze,  die  liber  die Addi-
tion  sogenannter  "defensiver  Kosten"  bei  Leipert  oder  uber 
Umfragen  zur  Zahlungsbereitschaft  fur  Umweltverbesserungen 
bei  Wicke  zu  einem Anteil  von  rund  10  % des  Sozia1produkts 
kommen.  Es  geht also  urn  eine betrachtliche  GroBenordnung 
( 200  Mrd.  DM)  . 
Ich mochte  in meinem  Beitrag auf  drei  Punkte  eingehen, 
die  sich mit  den  Informationen  beschaftigen,  die  zu  einer 
aktiven  Umwe1tpo1itik  oder  zu  einer Wirtschaftspolitik 
benotigt werden,  die  auch  6ko1ogische  Be1ange  berUcksich-
tigt.  Zu  Fragen  des  wirtschafts- und  umweltpolitischen  In-
strumentariums  werde  ich  mich  dagegen  nicht  auBern. 
1.  Meine  erste  Bemerkung  bezieht  sich  auf  die  Frage, 
welche  Informationen  bereitgestellt werden  mUssen, 
wenn  die  Beanspruchung  von  Umwelt  und  Natur  in  poli-
tische  Uberlegungen  einbezogen  werden  sollen. 
Die  menschlichen Aktivitaten  benutzen  die  Umwelt 
in dreifacher  Weise: 
- Die  Umwelt  dient als  Lieferant  von  Rohstoffen 
aller Art. 
Die  Umwelt  nimmt  Abfalle  und  Emissionen  aller 
Art  auf. 
- Die  Umwelt  dient  als  Lebensraum  und  Standort. 
- 68  -Daraus  ergibt sich,  daB  Informationen  fiber  den  Ver-
brauch  von  regenerierbaren  und  nichtregenerierbaren 
Ressourcen,die  Emissionen,  die  im.Zuge  der  Produktion 
und  bestimmter  Verbrauchsprozesse  entstehen,  und  die  Nut-
zung  der  Urnwelt  von  Interesse sind.  Diese  Angaben 
werden  erganzt  durch  Daten  uber  die  Immissionslage 
und  durch  Angaben  uber  die  Ausgaben  fur  den  Umwelt-
schutz,  die  schon  zur  Emissionsminderung  und  zur 
Sanierung der  Umwelt  vorgenommen  werden. 
Die  Anforderungen  an  ein entsprechendes  Berichtssystem 
mit  Urnweltinformationen,  in  dern  die  zahlreichen  Ein-
zelinforrnationen  zeitlich  und  geographisch  zu  ent-
sprechenden  Durchschnitten  verdichtet  sind,  komrnen 
von  zwei  Seiten. 
Erstens ben6tigt  man  stark aggregierte Angaben, 
die  es  ermoglichen,  die  traditionellen wirtschafts-
politischen  Ziele  urn  den  Umweltaspekt  zu  erganzen. 
Die  vier klassischen  Ziele 
- Wirtschaftswachstum 
- Preisstabilitat 
- auBenwirtschaftliches  Gleichgewicht 
- Vollbeschaftigung 
- und  - haufig  vergessen  - Zeitallokation 
(also der  Grad  der  Erwerbsbeteiligung,  die 
Relation  zwischen  Arbeitszeit  und  Freizeit 
usw.) 
vernachlassigen  in  ihrer  Kombination  die  Umweltprobleme. 
Bezieht  man  das  Feld  der  Umweltprobleme  in  die  Betrach-
tung  ein,  dann  konnen  drei  weitere  Zielsetzungen  formu-
liert werden: 
- 69  -- Sparsamer  Verbrauch  nichtregenerierbarer  Ressourcen 
und  Beschrankung  des  Verbrauchs  regenerierbarer Res-
sourcen  auf  den  in  der  Periode netto hinzuwachsenden 
Teil, 
- moglichst  weitgehende  Verrneidung  von  Aofallen  und 
Emissionen  aller Art,  weitgehende  Entsorgung  und 
Recycling, 
- okologisch  schonende  Behandlung  der  Natur als  Lebens-
raum  und  als Standort  fur rnenschliche Aktivitaten. 
Uber  diesen  Zielen steht noch  eine Reihe  von  Grundzielen 
wie  Leben  und  Gesundheit,  Eigentum,  Entscheidungs- und 
Vertragsfreiheit  und  Stabilitat des  gesellschaftlichen 
Systems. 
Alle  diese  Ziele  stehen  in einem  bestimmten  Verhaltnis 
zueinander,  meist  konkurrieren  sie miteinander.  Jedes 
dieser  Ziele  kann  in  bestimmten  Situationen stark ge-
fahrdet  sein.  Es  ist dann  Aufgabe  der Wirtschafts- und 
Umweltpolitik,  die Relation  zwischen  den  acht  genannten 
Zielen  zu  verbessern. 
Die  zweite  Anforderung  an'die  Informationen  resultiert 
aus  der  Notwendigkeit  einer speziellen aktiven  Umwelt-
politik. 
Die  meisten  der  acht  eben  genannten  Ziele  regeln  sich 
in marktwirtschaftlich orientierten Wirtschaften  ohne 
staatliche Eingriffe.  Das  gilt  im  Prinzip  auch  fur  die 
drei  Umweltziele. 
Dazu  muB  man  sich  klarmachen,  daB  sich  Knappheiten  und 
Uberlastungen  im  Umweltbereich  in der  Regel  auch  oko-
nomisch  mit  entsprechenden wirtschaftlichen  Vorgangen 
- 70  -<1uswirken,  um  di£'~;c  Knappheitcn  zu  bcsciti<Jen.  Wf'nn 
zum  Beispiel  der  Luftraum  uber  einem  Flugplatz  wegen 
des  Verkehrsaufkommens  zu  voll  ist,  wird  eine  zusatz-
liche Startbahn gebaut.  Das  erhoht  normalerweise  den 
Flugpreis.  Der  verminderte  Holzeinschlag,  der  aus  der 
fur  die  neue  Startbahn  verbrauchten Waldflache  resul-
tiert,  flihrt  auaerdern  tendenziell  zu  einern  hoheren 
Holzpreis. 
Das  bedeutet:  Okologische  Knappheiten  fuhren  in  der 
Regel  auch  zu  okonornischen  Knappheiten  und  werden 
durch  Wettbewerb  und  Marktpreismechanisrnen  geregelt. 
Es  sind  aber  Falle denkbar,  in  denen  eine derartige 
marktwirtschaftliche  Losung  okologischer  Knappheiten 
nicht  befriedigen  kann. 
Dazu  gehoren: 
- Umweltbelastungen,  die die Gesundheit  der  Menschen 
beeintrachtigen, 
- Umweltbelastungen,  die  nach  dem  heutigen  Stand  der 
Technik  und  Wissenschaft  irreversible  Schaden  an-
richten  (wie  z.B.  Quecksilber  im  Trinkwasser,  Ver-
schmutzung  der  Weltmeere), 
- Umwe1tbelastungcn,  bei  denen  wir  vermuten  mUssen, 
dafi  sie  unerwUnschte  oder  katastrophale  Langfrist-
folgen  haben  konnen  (z.B.  fur  das  Klima,  das  Ozon-
loch  durch  Fluorchlorwasserstoffe,  Treibhauseffekte 
durch  Kohlendioxyd). 
In  solchen  Fallen  regelt der  Markt  die  Knappheiten  zu 
spat  und  meist  liber  die Selektion der  Nachfrager  nach 
Umweltleitstungen,  zum  Beispiel  sterben  Menschen  an 
Hunger,  wenn  infolge  Erosion  fruchtbare  Boden  knapp 
werden,  oder  die  Lebenserwartung  von  Menschen,  die 
dauernd  verschmutztes  Wasser  trinken,  sinkt. 
- 71  -In  der  neueren  Diskussionwurde  seit einigen  Jahren 
h§ufig die  Forderung  erhoben,  die drci  Umweltziele 
muBten  im  Zuge  des Wirtschaftsprozesses  so  behandelt 
werden,  daB  auch  in spateren Perioden ein  Einkomrnen 
in mindestens  gleicher  Hohe  erzielt werden  kann. 
Diese  sogenannte  nachhaltige Entwicklung  (sustainable 
development)  ist also  eine  Forderung,  die  aus  der 
allgemeinen  Zielsetzung  der Stabilitat abgeleitet 
werden  kann,  sie stellt sozusagen  ein Quantifizierungs-
kriterium fur die  Umweltschonungsziele  dar. 
Es  gibt also eine  ganze  Reihe  von  Grunden  fur  eine 
aktive Umweltpolitik:  Einerseits  mussen  Gesundheit  und 
das  Leben  der  Menschen  ohne  zeitliche Verzogerung  ge-
schlitzt,  irreversible  Prozesse  in  der  Natur  gestoppt 
werden  und  vermutete  Langzeitfolgen  mlissen  vermieden 
werden,  andererseits  konnen  aus  der  allgemeinen  Forderung 
nach Stabilitat des  gesellschaftlichen Systems  unter 
dem  Gesichtspunkt  des  nachhaltigen Wirtschaftens  Ziele 
fur  einen  schonenden  Umgang  mit  den  Ressourcen,  mit 
der  Kapazitat  der_Natur  zur  Aufnahme  von  Abfall  und 
anderen  Emissionen  und  mit  der  Nutzung  der  Umwelt 
als Standort ableiten.  Die  Knappheit  von  Umweltlei-
stungen  oder  die erwarteten  Knappheiten  mussen  in 
allen diesen  Fallen politisch verwaltet  werden. 
Dazu  sind  zwei  Voraussetzungen  zu  erfullen: 
- Es  mlissen  politische Entscheidungen  tiber  Prioritaten 
und  den  angestrebten  Umfang  der  Umweltnutzung  sowie 
die dazu  einzusetzenden umweltpolitischen  Instrumente 
getroffen werden.  Dazu  mochte  ich mich  hier nicht 
auBern. 
- Es  mlissen  objektive  Informationen  tiber  den  Umwelt-
zustand  und  die erwarteten Belastungen  vorliegen. 
- 72  -Wegen  der  unterschiedlichen  Instrumente  im  Bereich  der 
Umweltpolitik  sind  hier Aggregationen  weniger  nutzlich, 
sondern  vielmehr  stark gegliederte Angaben  gefordert, 
die  untereinander  kombiniert  werden  konnen.  Die  Umwelt-
politik benotigt  zum  Beispiel  Daten  Uber  Emissionen 
und  Ressourcenverbrauch  in  der  Gliederung 
nach  Produkten, 
nach  Anlagen, 
nach  Produktionsprozesse, 
nach  der Art  der  Entsorgung, 
nach  Recyclingsmoglichkeiten. 
Diese  Angaben  mUssen  erganzt  werden  durch  weitere  Daten, 
zum  Beispiel  Uber  die  Irnrnissionslage  und  uber  die  Man-
nahmen  und  Ausgaben  zum  Umweltschutz. 
Und  alle Daten  mussen  regional  tief gegliedert  werden. 
2.  Meine  2.  Bemerkung  bezieht sich  auf  die Moglichkeiten 
einer monetaren  Bewertung 
Eine  besonders  elegante  und  effiziente Moglichkeit, 
umweltrelevante  Informationen  fur  umweltpolitische 
incentives  nutzbar  zu  machen,  besteht  in der  monetaren 
Bewertung. 
Wenn  es gelingt,  Urnweltbelastungen  in  Wahrungseinheiten 
auszudrlicken,  dann  sind  sowohl  Vergleiche  der  Belastungen 
untereinander als auch  Vergleiche  mit  anderen  okono-
mischen  Kosten- und  Ertragsgrofien  moglich. 
Man  muB  sich allerdings  darUber  im  klaren  sein,  dan 
Umweltpolitik  natlirlich  auch  ohne  monetare  Bewertungen 
auskomrnt:  Auflagen  und  Verbote,  auch  Anreize aller Art 
lassen  sich  auch  an  physikalischen  Grofien  binden. 
Das  Hauptproblem der  ~ewertung,  der  Belastung  der  Natur 
mit  Emissionen  und  der  Nutzung  der  Natur als  Lebens-
raum  besteht darin, daB  es  haufig  keine Marktpreise  gibt. 
- 73  -Unterden  in Betracht  kommenden  BewertungsmaBstaben 
halte  ich  folgende  Kombination  fur  besonders  geeignet 
Die  Ressourcenentnahme  wird  mit  dem  Marktpreis  oder 
den  Forderkosten  bewertet, 
- Emissionen  werden  mit  Schadensvermeidungskosten 
bewertet, 
Immissionen  werden  mit  Reproduktionskosten  bewertet, 
die Entsorgung  und  das  Recycling  mit  den  Entsorgungs-
kosten. 
Diese  Bewertungen  knupfen  eng  an  die  Kosten  an,  die 
tatsachlich entstehen,  wenn  VermeidungsmaBnahmen  im 
Emissionsbereich durchgefuhrt  werden  oder  wenn 
Sanierungen  im  Immissionsbereich  erfolgen. 
Die  Bewertungen  beziehen  sich  damit  entweder  auf  bekannte 
Kostensatze  aus  tatsachlich durchgefuhrten  MaBnahmen 
an  oder  sie erfordern  entsprechende  Ingenieursgutachten. 
Es  werden  Antworten  gesucht  wie 
11Die  Entschwefelung  der 
Abgase  bei der  Stromerzeugung  kostet  pro Kilowattstunde 
2  Pfennig"  oder  "Das  Auswechseln  von  kontaminierten 
Boden  kostet  pro  Kubikmeter  800  DM". 
Ich halte  Zahlungsbereitschaftskonzepte als  Bewertungs-
maBstab  fur  weniger  interessant,  weil  sie  tendenziell  zu 
Ergebnissen  kommen,  die  zu  optimistisch sind,  weil  die  Be-
fragten  ja meistens  selbst  in sogenannten  "Angstmodellen" 
wissen,  daB  sie nicht  wirklich  zu  zahlen  brauchen,  und 
weil  sich  lange Listen  mit  Einzelbelastungen  praktisch 
kdum  ahfragrn  lassen. 
Bestimmte  Umweltnutzungen  oder  Umweltbelastungen 
werden  sich aber einer monetaren  Bewertung  liberhaupt 
entziehen  (wie  z.B.  Schaden  der  menschlichen  Gesund-
heit)  oder  aber  wegen  ihres Charakters  als  fur  den 
Menschen  unverzichtbares  existenzielles Gut  alle 
Bewertungen  zwischen  ~ull  und  Unendlich  zulassen 
(z.B.  Luft  zum  Atmen,  Schwerkraft,  aber  auch  die 
Nutzung  der  Natur  als Standort). 
- 74  -Daraus  folgt  zweierlei: 
- Die  monetare  Bewertung  kann  sich  nur  auf  ausgewahlte 
Tatbestande  beziehen.  Wichtige  Indikatoren  werden 
aus  der  monetaren  Betrachtung ausgespart;  sie  lassen 
sich  m6glicherweise  aber  in  physikalischen  Gr6Bcn 
darstellen  oder  umschreiben. 
- Die  Bewertung erfolgt  im  Rahmen  einer Konvention, 
andere  BewertungsmaBstabe  und  -ergebnisse  sind 
denkbar. 
- Die  an  Ingenieurwissen  anknupfende  monetare  Bewertung 
von  Emissionen  und  Nutzungseinschrankungen  mithilfe 
von  Schadensvermeidungskosten  und  eine  erganzende 
Bewertung  der  Immissionen  mithilfe  von  Reproduktions-
kosten  bezieht  sich natlirlich  auf  den  jeweiligen  Stand 
der  Technik.  Technischer Fortschritt  und  Veranderungen 
der  Kosten  fuhren  damit  zu  standigen  Neubewertungen. 
3.  Bemerkung 
Meine  letzte Bemerkung  bezieht  sich darauf,  daB  es 
noch  keine  fertigen  und  erprobten  Konzepte  daflir gibt, 
wie  die  Umweltbelastungen  in ein analytisches  System 
gebracht  werden,  das  leicht durchschaubar  und  fur 
wirtschaftspolitische  und  umweltpolitische  Zwecke 
effizient ist. 
Mein  Vorschlag  ist,  die  Informationen  Uber  die wirt-
schafts- und  umweltpolitischen  Ziele  fur  jedes  Ziel 
getrennt  zu  sammeln  und  fUr  die Analyse  der  Entwicklung 
zusammenzustellen.  Die  Ergebnisse  sollten  pur  und  unsal-
diert dargestellt werden.  Das  hat  den  Vorteil,  daB  die  eln-
zelnen  Daten  nicht  durch  Zu- und  Abschlage  fUr  Ertrage 
und  Kosten  aus  dem  Umweltbereich  verandert  werden.  Es  ist 
dabei  auch  zu  beachten,  daB  die  Umweltpolitischen  An-
satze Ressourcenschonung,  Emissionsminimierung  und  okolo-
gische  Nutzung  des  Lebensraums  nicht  zusammengefaGt  werden 
dUrfen,  weil  sie  zum  Teil  miteinander  konkurrieren. 
- 75  -Es  ist moglich,  diese  Informationen  1n  einem Satelliten-
system  zu  den  Volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrechnungen 
unterzubringen.  Dabei  wird  neuerdings  haufig  die  For-
derung  erhoben,  die Volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrech-
nungen  mul3tcn  umgcstaltet  werden,  um  falsche  Sign01c 
tiber  das  okologisch vertretbare wirtschaftliche  Wachs-
tum  zu  vermeiden. 
Dazu  mochte  ich  folgendes  sagen: 
Die Volkswirtschaftlichen  Gesamtrechnungen  sind  fur 
eine  ganz  spezifische  Aufgabe,  namlich  Konjunkturbeo-
bachtung,  konzipiert  worden,  sie  nehmen  diese  Aufgabe 
in  den  meisten westlichen  Landern  hinreichend  genau 
und  aktuell  wahr.  Unter  diesem  Aspekt  besteht  kein 
Grund,  auf  diese  bewahrte  Information  zu  verzichten. 
Dabei  ist zu  bedenken,  daB  Angaben  aus  den  Volkswirt-
schaftlichen Gesamtrechnungen  kein direktes  Lenkungs-
instrument der Wirtschaftspolitik sind.  Das  Verhalten 
der  Unternehmen  auf  Markten  und  im  Umweltbereich  hangt 
uberhaupt  nicht  von  den  Ergebnissen  der Volkswirtschaft-
lichen Gesamtrechnungen  ab  (wie  auch  immer  diese  ge-
staltet sind),  sondern  von  den  Gewinnen  und  Gewinn-
erwartungen. 
Der  staatliche Bereich  benutzt Angaben  aus  den  Volks-
wirtschaftlichen Gesamtrechnungen  in erster Linie,  urn 
das .VcrhJl tnis  von  Wirtschaftswachstum,  Be~;chaftigunqs-­
grad,  Inflationsrate  und  auBenwirtschaftlichem Gleich-
gewicht  zu  beobachten  und  zur  Beurteilung  von  Einkommens-
belastungen.  Dafur  reichen  Ergebnisse der  Volkswirt-
schaftlichen Gesamtrechnungen  in  ihrer  jetzigen  Form 
vollstandig aus. 
Das  Statistische Bundesamt  arbeitet  zur  Zeit  an  der  Kon-
zeption  einer  Umweltokonomischen  Gesamtrechnung  (Inte-
grated  System of  Environmental  Accounting),  die  sowohl 
Angaben  tiber  den  Umweltzustand  und  seine  Veranderung  im 
Zeitablauf  fur  ein Satellitensystem der  Volkswirtschaft-
lichen Gesamtrechnungen  als  auch  fur  andere  analytische 
Zwecke  in  physikalischen  und  monetaren  GroBen  sammeln 
und  bereitstellen soll. 
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Fur  ein eigenstandiges  Rechenwerk  aufiernalb  der  Volks-
wirtschaftlichen Gesamtrechnungen  gab  es  folgende  Grun-
de: 
Die  konzcptionellen  Arbeiten  an  einem  Satellitensystem 
Umwelt  fur  die  Volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrechnungen 
sind  noch  nicht  abgeschlossen.  Die  Formulierung  der 
neuen  Konzepte  ist schwierig,  in  erster Linie  wahl 
deshalb,  weil  die Berilcksichtigung  von  Umweltschaden 
einerseits  und  entsprechenden  Kosten  zur  Vermeidung 
der  Emissionen  und  zur Reparatur  von  Umweltschaden 
gleichzeitig negative  und  positive Wirkungen  in  bezug 
auf  die Wohlfahrt  der Volkswirtschaft.hat.  Uberlegungen 
zum  Wohlfahrtsniveau  stehen aber  in der  traditionellen 
Form  der Volkswirtschaftlichen  Gesamtrechnungen  bisher 
nicht  im  Mittelpunkt  der  Betrachtung.  Ihre Einbeziehung 
wirft eine Reihe  gravierender  Fragen  auf. 
- Ein  solches  Berichtssystem ist wegen  der  Fillle  von 
Einzeldaten  auBerst  umfangreich.  AuBerdem  ist es  fur 
viele analytische  und  wirtschaftspolitische  Zwecke  er-
forderlich,  Umweltbelastungen  und  Umweltschaden  sowie 
ihre Verbindung  zur  Produktion  bestimmter  Gilter,  die 
Entsorgung  bestimmter  Schadstoffe  und  Abfalle  in  mog-
lichst tiefer Gliederung  zu  zeigen.  Es  liegt nahe, 
diese Verwaltung  von  umweltrelevanten  Einzelergebnissen 
in  einem  Berichtssystem mit  tiefen Gliederungen  von  den 
Arbeiten  der Volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrechnungen 
organisatorisch  zu  trennen. 
Wlr  gehen  deshalb  davon  aus,  daB  es  zunachst  einfacher ist, 
die  fur  die Wirtschafts- und  Umweltpolitik  benotigten 
umweltrelevanten  Informationen  ohne  Einbindung  in  ein 
Satellitensystem  zur  Volkswirtschaftlichen  Gesamtrechnung 
in  einem  separaten  Rechenwerk  zu  sammeln  und  aufzubereiten. 
Die  konzeptionellen  Arbeiten  zur  Darstellu~g der  positiven 
und  negativen  Effekte  von  Umweltbelastungen  auf  die 
Aggregate  der  Volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrechnung  werden 
aber  fortgesetzt. 
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Dutch  environmental  policy  deploys  a  large  number  of  different  policy 
instruments designed  to influence the environmental behaviour of the various 
policy  target  groups.  The  policy  instruments  break  down  into  a  number  of 
categories. Some aim to encourage new behavioural alternatives or, alternatively, 
to stop existing forms of behaviour. Others manipulate the information that the 
target  group  receives  about  the  behavioural  alternatives  and  their  specific 
characteristics, or determine the importance the target group attaches to these 
characteristics.  Finally,  we  have  a  large  group  of  policy  instruments  that 
manipulate the characteristics of the behavioural alternatives themselves. Their 
purpose is  to make one or several behavioural alternatives either more or less 
attractive to the target group. 
Policy instruments that enlarge or restrict the number of behavioural alternatives 
have so far been negligible in Dutch environmental policy. The category of policy 
instruments that provides information and moulds the target group's perception 
of the  environmental  impact  of its  behaviour is  rapidly gaining ground.  Such 
"communicative" instruments include public information programmes, covenants 
and environmental effect reports. Their part in  Dutch environmental policy  is 
discussed in section 3. 
By far  the largest category of policy instruments in  Dutch environmental policy 
concerns  those  that  alter  the  consequences  of  the  various  behavioural 
- 79  -alternatives. These include regulations as well as financial incentives. The Dutch 
experiences with financial incentives are dealt with in section 4.  But first section 
2  will  discuss  the  licensing  systems  and  other regulations  which  play  such  a 
dominant part in environmental policies, both in  the Netherlands and in many 
other countries. This will provide a background with which we can compare the 
experiences with communicative instruments and financial incentives. 
There  is  a  variety  of  criteria  by  which  we  can  assess  policy  instruments. 
Evaluation studies of the practical effects of Dutch environmental policy tend to 
concentrate  on the  achievement  of objectives  and  effectiveness.  Often  these 
studies look at whether the instrument  is  being applied properly rather than 
addressing the question whether it is up to the task of realising the actual policy 
objectives. As far as the research materials allow, we will also devote attention 
in the concluding paragraphs to the following questions: 
- does the instrument permit spatial differentiation, e.g.  to prevent "hot spots"? 
- how much uncertainty s.urrounds the ap-plication of the instrument? 
- Is  the  instrument flexible  enough  to  respond  to  changes,  such  as  economic 
growth or more drastic environmental objectives? 
- what are the costs and who are to pay? 
- is  the introduction of the instrument a  feasible proposition? 
2.  Licensing systems in practice 
The central instrument in Dutch environmental policy is  the ban on performing 
any  environmentally harmful activities without a  licence. The 70s in particular 
brought  legislation  covering  virtually  every  aspect  of  the  environment.  The 
various  environmental  laws  put  forward  this  ban  as  the  cornerstone  of  the 
environmental policy instruments. For a  long time, the licensing systems based 
on  the  ban  were  virtually  the  only  available  instruments  for  manipulating 
environmental behaviour. The most important licensing systems concern nuisance, 
air  quality,  surface  water  quality,  (chemical)  waste  substances  and  ionising 
radiation. A survey of a largy number of Dutch evaluation studies gives us the 
following  overall  picture  of  the  implementation  and  effectiveness  of  this 
dominating policy instrument. 
Nuisance 
The first major studies of the effects of licensing systems centred on the Nuisance 
Act. The aim of this act, incidentally, is not only to counter nuisance experienced 
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regulated under any of the other environmental acts. The results of these initial 
studies came  as  a  bombshell. It was  estimated  that  in  1976  only  25% of the 
relevant businesses had a valid licence. Hardly impressive, considering that the 
act had been in force since  1952  and had precursors dating back even further. 
Applications for licences took about eight months on average to process. But in 
15% of the municipalities, mainly the larger cities, applications could take over 
a year to handle. One reason for this was that almost all of the applicants were 
operational long before the licence was granted. So no-one was in too much of 
a hurry. "For this reason, the Nuisance Act Departments of local authorities are 
often operated on a  shoe-string,  both  in  terms  of manpower and resources." 
(TG,1976) 
In a  follow-up  study in 1979,  the research agency concludes that only 38% of 
approximately half a million businesses falling within the Nuisance Act actually 
possessed  a  licence.  And  only  24%  had  a  licence  that  was  sufficiently  far-
reaching. Among industrial and agricultural businesses the percentage was even 
lower  (20%  ).  1be study  also  finds  that,  in  certain  cases,  the  Nuisance  Act 
imposes licensing requirements on environmentally harmless or fairly harmless 
businesses while failing  to clamp down on some of the confirmed polluters. At 
one-third  of the  businesses,  the  level  of environmental  damage  had  actually 
increased after being granted their most recent licence. About 65% of the time 
that  officials  spend  on  implementing  the  Nuisance  Act  is  taken  up  by  the 
processing of licence applications. Important tasks - such as the monitoring and 
tracing  of businesses  that  fall  within  the  Nuisance  Act  - receive  only  scant 
attention. (TG,1979) 
Aalders  {1980)  concludes  from  a  study  in  5  municipalities  that  the  formal 
sanction - i.e.  the closure of the business  - is  rarely,  if ever,  carried out. He 
remarks that the sanction and, by extension, the act itself seem to have a purely 
symbolic function. This theme is elaborated in his dissertation that appeared in 
1984. {Aalders, 1984) Aalders ascribes the problems that bedevil the enforcement 
of the Nuisance Act to the following factors: There are staff shortages. Serious 
forms  of nuisance often stem from virtually irreversible legacies from the past. 
Police do not give  the enforcement of the Nuisance Act priority, partly due to 
their reluctance to create precedents. "If you check one, you've got to check them 
all, and we simply don't have the manpower to do that." Local authorities often 
give  precedence to  economic considerations, especially employment.  (Aalders, 
1980) 
In order to provide a more practical sanction, a provision for penalties was then 
incorporated into the Nuisance Act. But in practice, penalties prove to be almost 
as cumbersome as  the ultimate sanction of closure as the courts require all due 
caution  to  be  exercised  before  proceeding  to  impose  the  slightest  sanction. 
(Hillen and Nijhoff,  1983) 
- 81  -A study carried out in  1983 by Berenschot, a consultancy, confirms this picture. 
The Nuisance  Act  is  enforced passively  or selectively. There is  no  question of 
strict  enforcement  (either  to  the  letter  or  the  spirit)  and  this  laxity  is  often 
deliberate. There is  a shortage of manpower and  equipment, both in  terms of 
quantity and quality. More intermunicipal cooperation is badly needed, but so far 
this has been slow to get off the mark. (Berenschot, 1983) 
In 1986, the situation in two  categories of business - then still falling within the 
Nuisance Act but later to be governed by general rules - was  far  from  optilnal. 
The first category was the bakeries: though 86% had been issued with a licence, 
only 44% had one that was sufficiently stringent. On balance, the second category 
-propane storage plants - showed a slightly more favourable picture: admittedly, 
only 72% had a licence, but 64% of these were at least sufficiently far-reaching. 
But again these licences are not vigorously enforced. Local authorities tend to 
turn a blind eye unless residents complain. (TG, 1987) In his dissertation, Aalders 
claims that it is only through "social side-effects" (i.e. manipulation of perceptions 
and attitudes) and informal consultation that the Act has any practical effect. 
Bennet (1984) also points to the importance of consultation between industry and 
government. The cases he studied show that in the event of serious differences 
in opinion, both parties inevitably look for a compromise. It also became evident 
that the authorities are inclined to bow to business and industry, not least out of 
economic (employment) considerations. 
In an effort to improve the implementation, and thereby, the effectiveness of the 
act,  the  so-called  nuisance  act  enabling  programme  was  introduced  (HUP). 
Under  this  programme,  an  inventory  is  made  of  the  existing  backlogs  and 
measures are taken to  improve the issuing and enforcement procedures. Local 
authorities that commission a HUP qualify for a refund of the costs involved and 
many have taken advantage of this opportunity. An evaluation study conducted 
by  the  Consultancy  DHV  remained  unpublished.  However  Ten  Elshof  did 
combine the results of DHV's study with  the results from his own  research. His 
study  shows  that  HUPs  do  help  to  reduce  the  backlogs  of  applications  for 
licences, but fail to stimulate n1ore vigorous enforcement efforts. For this reason, 
he  concludes that the HUP is  too weak an instrument and even voices the fear 
that the Nuisance Act  is  doomed to remain a paper tiger. (Ten Elshof,  1988) 
Air 
In 1972 the Air Pollution Act entered into force.  By  1 January 1976 about half 
of the  businesses concerned had  applied  for  licences  and  in  60o/o  of the  cases 
licences had  indeed been issued.  (TG, 1976) So  it's  fair  to  say  things got off to 
a rather slow start. A follow-up study of the situation in North Brabant until mid-
1977 showed  that  15 of the 50 businesses concerned had one or 1nore  licences 
under the Air Pollution Act.  (TG,  1977) 
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effective,  three-quarters  of the  businesses  concerned  had  been  issued  with 
licences.  According  to  the  provincial  authorities,  two-thirds  had  adequate 
licences. (VAR, 1981) 
A study of the Rijnmond area (where the refineries are concentrated) revealed 
that the levels of S02 emissions had fallen between 1974 and 1980, but that this 
had little bearing on the licensing requirements. Far from it, in fact. For these 
requirements permitted pollution levels one-and-a-half times higher than those 
actually produced. The main reasons for the reduced  levels are the economic 
slowdown,  the switch to cleaner fuels  (gas) and a central government measure 
reducing the maximum permitted levels of sulphur in fuels.  (TG,1982) 
Unlike  previous.  studies,  Horugh  (1985)  first  measures  the  achievement  of 
objectives and the effectiveness of the Act, and only  then turns his  attention 
towards the implementation process in  order to explain the results.  His study 
centres exclusively  on S02 and  NOx  pollution caused  by  industry and power 
stations. This form of pollution rose between 1976 and 1982 by 7%. The slight 
deterioration is  made up of various components. It turns out that it was mainly 
S02 pollution from refineries and other industrial plants that fell sharply (  -33%  ), 
but that this  reduction was  more than offset by  the increase in pollution from 
electricity- generating plants. Almost 50% of the fall in industrial pollution is the 
product of increased energy efficiency. The air pollution policy seems to provide 
the  most  plausible  explanation  for  at  least  part of the  remaining 50%.  The 
pollution from power stations has increased largely because the shift to cheaper 
and dirtier fuels  (coal and oil) in the research period was not compensated by 
additional purification facilities. 
In order to explain these results, Honigh analyses the aims, available information 
and power  of the  parties  involved  in  the policy  implementation process.  His 
explanation for the failure to effectively curb industrial pollution is  that not all 
provinces  see air pollution  as  a  policy  priority and  often give  precedence  to 
economic  considerations.  The  enforcement  efforts  and  the  percentage  of 
adequate licences also differed widely from province to province. Furthermore, 
many  provinces  did  not  have  the  know-how  required  to  assess  the  licence 
applications properly. As a consequence, they often erred on the side of caution 
to avoid making unrealistic demands. The provincial authorities also complained 
that the law only provided them with heavy-handed - and therefore impractical -
sanctions. The reason for  the deterioration in  the electricity generating sector 
is  ascribed  to the high  prioricy  that the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the 
electricity-generating  companies  give  to  minimising  electricity  prices  and, 
furthermore,  to  their (informal) position of power  vis-~-vis the  licence-issuing 
provinces.  Van der Tak  (1988)  takes  issue  with  this  view.  He  argues  in  his 
dissertation that the electricity generating companies in  the province of North 
Holland were subjected to  a  rigorous regime. It is  hard to say whether or not 
North Holland is  an exception. 
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'The  implementation of the licensing system under the Surface Water Pollution 
Act is  also far from perfect. Again we  note the by  now familiar phenomena of 
(substantial) backlogs of applications for  licences and inadequate enforcement 
(Audit Office, 1987). This even.:holds true for heavy metal pollution, one of the 
water management boards' top priorities. 
Since  1984  regional  water  quality  managers  have  been  empowered  to  issue 
licences directly in  order to  enable them to  impose  restrictions on firms  that 
discharge the so-called grey and black list substances - in particular heavy metals 
- into the municipal sewage systems. A survey conducted by DHV among water 
quality managers from 1984 to 1987 shows that just over half of these firms were 
issued with licences. Moreover, the requirements contained in these licences were 
more moderate than initially envisaged. The business's economic position was 
often  the  overriding  concern,  even  to  the  extent  that  the  "best  existing 
techniques" criterion was  often interpreted as  "the  best practicable/affordable 
techniques",  a  formulation  that  central  government  had  expressly  avoided  in 
relation to these substances. 
Chenzical and other waste substances 
Various  researchers  have  observed  that  by  no  means  all  chemical  waste  is 
disposed  of legally.  Henselmans and  Noe (1984)  estimate  that disposal  takes 
place legally in merely 15% of the cases. The main reason for  this is  that the 
waste disposal is  often carried out by  the businesses themselves. This, in itself, 
need not be a bad thing. But the absence of supervision has detrimental effects. 
With  small  chemical waste,  40%  (Meijer et al.,  1986;  study  of the Gooi and 
Vecht areas) or 50% (Heuvelman et al.,  1988; nationwide study of 10,000 small 
businesses) of the businesses are guilty of illegal disposals. Excluding used oil, 
it is  estimated that 18% (Meijer et al.,  1986) or 36% (Heuvelman et al.,  1988) 
of the disposals are  illegal.  Furthermore, Kremers et al.  (1989)  studied thirty 
dumps  for  ordinary waste  and  found  that the  requirements  laid  down  in  the 
licences were often not compatible with  the  policy  guidelines. And even these 
requirements were not fully  observed at a single dump. 
Radiation 
Studies into the implementation and effects of the licensing system and reporting 
scheme contained  in  the  Nuclear Energy Act  for  radio-active  substances and 
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case the licensing system is  effective.  Most businesses operating in the field  of 
radiation have licences. Though not all the licence requirements are consistently 
observed, most infringements have little bearing on safety. One reason perhaps 
for  this  exceptionally good  record is  that  in  this sector, unlike most sectors of 
environmental policy,  the staff of the businesses involved stand to suffer most 
frorn  the  consequences of carelessness.  Furthermore,  the  researcher attaches 
great value to the easily enforceable requirement that institutions must employ 
at least one expert whose training corresponds with the specific radiation sources 
used. 
However, excessive zeal on the part of officials and time-consuming advisory and 
co-signing procedures do impair the effectiveness of the current licensing system 
(Arentsen, 1988). 
Conclusions 
Clearly the mere existence of a licensing system in an environmental act does not 
necessarily entail  that  the  businesses  falling  within  the  act will  actually have 
adequate licences. And even those that do have licences are not compelled to 
comply with them due to the lack of efficient enforcement. If we link the findings 
of these evaluation studies to our other criteria, the foJiowing  picture emerges. 
The backlogs of licence applications and checks vary frorn  region to region, but 
this  of course  is  not  the  kind  of spatial  differentiation  envisaged  by  policy-
makers. The ability of the system to respond to altered circumstances - e.g. by 
issuing revised licences - is also questionable considering its inability to issue all 
businesses with proper licences in the first place. On paper, the licensing system 
is an effective means of controlling the operational activities and environmental 
behaviour  of  businesses.  But  practice  shows  the  system  is  fraught  with 
uncertainties,  and  therefore  often  ineffectual.  One  cause  may  be  that  the 
implementation costs of the licensing system are underestimated, resulting in a 
lack of manpower (both in numbers and skills).  On the other hand, adequate 
implementation would probably be very expensive. Another disadvantage is that 
the  degree  of  implementation  varies  from  region  to  region.  As  a  result, 
businesses in  a relatively strict area will  pay more in  the way  of environmental 
costs  than  a  business  in  a  laxer  area.  This,  in  turn,  could  distort  domestic 
competitiveness. But notwithstanding all these drawbacks, the universality of the 
licensing system in Dutch environmental policy does indicate that this instrument 
is  still very feasible. 
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Direct regulation through licences and other regulatory 1ncasures has not been 
selected as the main policy instrument in  all environmental sectors. In the field 
of energy saving and products policy, for instance, there is  a clear preference for 
communicative  instruments.  We  have  defined  communicative  instruments  as 
instruments  that  provide  information  (e.g.  through  public  information 
programmes) in an attempt to  manipulate the target group's behaviour or to 
change  the  significance  the  target  group  attaches  to  environmental  values 
(persuasion). These instruments were particularly popular in the 80s because they 
seemed  to  fit  in  with  the  new  relationship  that  had  developed  between 
government  and  society.  The  80s  saw  government  and  the private sector  as 
partners who  were both instrumental  in  the shaping of social  developments. 
Within the framework of Dutch environmental policy, the following instruments 
have been applied and assessed:  information on energy saving to industry and 
households,  so-called covenants between government and (representatives of) 
business and industry, and the environmental effects reports. Though the latter 
instrument is  based on regulations, its purpose is  to increase the environmental 
awareness of the various actors (and so influence their environmental behaviour) 
by guaranteeing the availability of sufficient relevant environmental information. 
For this reason, it certainly belongs among the communicative instruments. 
Information on industrial energy-saving 
The  literature  distinguishes  between  four  types  of energy-saving  behaviour, 
namely energy management (e.g. comparing meter readings), investments in the 
adjustment  of existing  plant  (e.g.  insulation),  investments  in  an  independent 
energy supply and investments in the replacement of existing installations. 
Van  der  Doelen  (1989)  studied  the  application  and  effectiveness  of policy 
instruments in the field of industrial energy-saving from 1977 to 1986. This study 
shows that information sent to businesses in the form of publications had some 
positive effects on energy management but failed  to stimulate other forms  of 
energy-saving  behaviour.  In  fact,  the  indications  were  that  the  information 
actually discouraged investments in adjusting existing plant. Evidently additional 
information  tends,  on  balance,  to  make  businesses  averse  to  invest  in 
adjustments.  Two  more  targeted  information  instruments  - i.e.  visits  from 
information officers and grants to pay for external advisors - had no visible effect 
on any form of energy-saving behaviour. 
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An experimental study among households (Ester, 1979) examined whether certain 
communicative  instruments  had  indeed  prompted  consumers  to  start  saving 
energy. It was found that public information and the advice given to consumers 
to read the meters regularly resulted in small but lasting savings. 
Covenants 
In the 80s,  the Dutch government concluded covenants in  diverse  fields  with 
(representatives  of)  business  and  industry  in  an  effort  to  counter  various 
environmental problems. A covenant is a written agreement that is deliberately 
not given formal  legal status. The government hoped that industry would be 
more  willing  to  do  business  on  this  basis  and  also  that  it  would  be  more 
committed  to  such  arrangements  than  to  regulations  imposed  from  above. 
Covenants also provided a  means of circumventing EC rules which are highly 
sensitive to any threat of market distortion whenever regulatory product policies 
are  involved.  Covenants  were  concluded  in  such  fields  as:  mercury  oxide 
batteries, alkaline batteries, thinks packagings, PET bottles, cadmium in crates, 
air pollution from heavy commercial vehicles, CFCs in aerosols and phosphates 
in detergents. 
Klok (1989)  concludes  that,  considering the  objectives of the  Ministry of the 
Environment, the content of the covenants was satisfactory in five  out of eight 
cases. In three of the five cases, agreement was not difficult to reach as industry 
had already decided of its own accord - albeit for different reasons - to aim for 
the  same  result.  The  main  purpose  of  these  covenants,  therefore,  was  to 
document  existing  intentions.  In  two  of  the  eight  cases,  the  result  was  less 
satisfactory.  One  case,  concerning  the  use  of phosphates  in  detergents,  was 
difficult to judge. It involved a successive series of moderate covenants of which 
the last, though again not far-reaching, did lead to good results. 
This brings us to the achievement of the objectives and the effectiveness of the 
covenants. The breakthrough in the detergents sector did not come until one of 
the manufacturers ventured to go ahead with  the large-scale introduction of a 
phosphate-free detergent. The move was a great commercial success and others 
were  quick  to  jump  on  the  bandwagon.  As  a  consequence,  the  results  far 
surpassed the objectives laid down in the covenant. It is  hard to say whether the 
covenant was actually instrumental in  this development. The same goes for the 
other covenants. In  four out of eight  ca~es, it  looks as if  the objectives will  be 
achieved. But again the actual significance of the covenants is  open to question. 
In the other four cases,  it  is  either still  too early to judge or there arc already 
signs that the covenants will prove unsuccessful. All in all, an unimpressive result. 
But  this  should  be  seen  against  the  background  of  the  equally  limited 
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highly  questionable whether  alternative  instruments  would  have  given  better 
results. 
Environmental impact assessment 
Like most industrialised countries, the Netherlands operates an environmental 
impact assessment system. The system came into force in 1987, but was preceded 
by a voluntary interim scheme. The scheme was designed to put the environment 
firmly on the decision-making agenda. To this end, it aimed not only to provide 
sufficient environmental information during the decision-making process but also 
to ensure that decision-makers would actually take this information on board. In 
addition,  the  arrangement  was  to  help  streamline  the  decision-making 
procedures. The evaluation studies of both the interim scheme and the actual 
scheme see improvements as regards the latter point, but are less positive about 
the main objective. In his  evaluation of the interim scheme, Haskoning (1986) 
observed that in most of the evaluated cases the actor and the local authorities 
had already reached agreement before the e.i.a. procedure was set in motion. 
There was a  danger that the e.i.a.  reports would thus degenerate into a  mere 
procedural formality, serving exclusively to make proposed plans more acceptable 
to the public at large. 
The actual e.i.a. scheme has been evaluated in  greater detail. But Berenschot 
(1990)  arrives  at similar conclusions  to  Haskoning.  Despite doubts voiced  by 
some when the sche~e  was first introduced, the actual implementation seems to 
pose few problems. Thanks to the e.e.r, there is also a plentiful supply of good-
quality  information.  But  whether  this  information  has  helped  to  give  the 
environment added weight in  the decision-making process is  doubtful. A more 
realistic view would probably be to assume that -in addition to the objectives and 
sources of power of the various actors - information is  only one of the factors 
that determine the decision-making process and, as such, the importance attached 
to  the  environment within  that  process.  As  a  consequence,  even  if the  e.e.r 
functions well as  an instrument for diffusing information, its  ability to put the 
environment high on the decision-making agenda is strongly dependent on other 
factors. 
Conclusions 
The adopted communicative  instruments  are too diverse  to allow  any general 
conclusions about their effectiveness. But what goes for  the e.e.r, probably also 
applies to communicative instruments in general. Communicative instruments can 
effectively manipulate behaviour only insofar as other factors create a decision-
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does not already exist, it may be created by  means of other policy instruments. 
This brings us  back to  policy  instruments which  are capable of changing the 
consequences of hehavioural alternatives for  the target group. In section 2 we 
discussed  the  experiences  with  licensing  systems.  In  the  next  section,  our 
attention will  centre on financial incentives. 
4.  Financial incentives 
In the past, financial incentives have proved more stimulating to the imaginations 
of environmental policy scientists than to the willingness of businesses to change 
their  environmental  ways.  Throughout  the  Western  world  a  wide  range  of 
financial incentives has been used, but rarely did these instruments ever have any 
real  practical  impact  (Opschoor  and  Vos,  1989).  Instruments  with  a  direct 
regulatory effect, such as licensing systems, generally set the tone. Still, a number 
of  financial  instruments  with  regulatory  potential  have  been  used  in  the 
Netherlands  ...  Ille Dutch water pollution  levy,  for  instance,  is  one of the most 
interesting  examples  in  the  world  of  a  financial  incentive  used  as  an 
environmental policy instrument. For this reason, we have discussed it at greater 
length in appendix 1. The Netherlands also operates several subsidy schemes. Of 
these schemes, the results of the subsidies granted for industrial energy-saving, 
the reduction in water pollution from heavy metals and the reduced use of PCBs 
have  been  evaluated.  Researchers  have  also  evaluated  the  Dutch  tax 
differentiations  introduced  for  cleaner  and  dirtier  cars,  and  for  leaded  and 
unleaded petrol. Finally, an evaluation study has been made of a compensation 
scheme whereby industry is granted subsidies to cover "abnormally high" costs for 
cleaning up, most specifically, the air. 
Industrial energy-saving subsidies 
In  the same study as cited above in connection with  information on industrial 
energy-saving, Vander Doelen (1989) also investigated the effects of the various 
subsidies on industrial energy saving. The investment grant scheme effective from 
l<JRO  to  19R7  had  no  significant  impact  on  the  relative  level  of adjustment 
investments (insulation, heat recovery, etc.), but did have some positive effect on 
investments in  independent energy supply systems.  The energy credit scheme 
(soft  loans)  also  encouraged  businesses  to  a  certain  extent  to  invest  in  the 
replacement of energy-intensive parts of the production process. But the policy 
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forms of energy-saving behaviour is energy prices. Van der Doelen concludes that 
the effectiveness of the instruments is  overshadowed by what he has called the 
Matthew effect  after  the  apostle's words  "To  him  that  hath,  shall  be given". 
Businesses that already have information and/  or financial resources will get the 
most benefit out of the communicative and financial policy instruments without 
making any additional changes to their behaviour. 
Subsidies for the reduction of heavy metals in effluents 
Heavy  metals  in  industrial  effluents  contribute  to  water  pollution.  As  a 
supplement to other policy instruments, one of the water managers decided to 
introduce a  subsidy  for  businesses who  removed  heavy  metal pollutants from 
their effluents. The scheme was successful in  the sense that most businesses did 
indeed proceed to clean up their effluents. Vermeulen (1989),  however, argues 
that this  was  not directly attributable  to  the subsidy which,  incidentally,  only 
covered a small portion of the costs. But he does note an indirect effect of the 
subsidy:  the scheme did wonders for  the relations between the water manager 
and industry and this,  in turn, significantly enhanced the effectiveness of other 
policy instruments (licences and levies). 
Subsidy for the reduced use of  PCBs 
PCBs  are  used  in  coolants,  transformers  and  condensers.  A  scheme  was 
introduced to subsidise the replacement of PCBs before the PCB replacement 
drive  had  well  and  truly  got  under way.  But  the  period  from  1984  to  1989 
brought the replacement of 72% of all PCBs. No less than 21% of this result was 
accounted for by one company which fell  under a separate scheme. Vermeulen 
and Goes (1989:119) also observe that the scheme deserves credit for 32% of the 
reduction while the remaining 19% is attributable to other considerations. PCBs 
are still widely used in small condensers and these account for the largest part 
of the unreplaced portion. The researchers point out that the subsidy not only 
acted as a financial incentive, but also prompted industry to think more about 
the problem. 
Compensation scheme 
Various environmental laws incorporate compensation schemes to ensure that the 
principle of "the polluter pays" does not  significantly distort the competitiveness 
of certain businesses.  For this  reason,  businesses that incur "abnormally high" 
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evaluation  study  of  the  effects  of  the  compensation  scheme  under  the  Air 
Pollution Act (Grimbergen et al., 1988-a) reveals that compensation was effective 
in  five  of the seven  ca<;es  studied in  greater detail. The term "effective"  here 
means  that  without  compensation  the  competitiveness  of  the  businesses  in 
question would have been seriously undermined. It was also found that, especially 
in the initial years of the scheme, compensation was often allocated without due 
regard to the two  key criteria, i.e.  the "abnormally high"  costs and the serious 
distortion of competitive relations if compensation were withheld. 
In  a  follow-up  study,  Grim  bergen  et  al.(1988-b)  investigated  whether  the 
compensation scheme enabled the authorities (provincial or local) to negotiate 
additionally stringent environmental regulations with the licencee (the business). 
For  the  second  objective  of  the  scheme  is  to  permit  the  licensor,  where 
necessary, to take additionally strict environmental measures (  cf. the problem of 
the "hot spots"). The follow-up study of all 67 cases showed that, in 40% of the 
cases, compensation did not stimulate the businesses to make "abnormally high" 
investments in environmentally friendly facilities; and,  in a further 13% of the 
cases, such a causal relationship is doubtful. On the other hand, it seems that in 
about half of the  ca<;es  compensation did induce businesses to  take more far-
reaching  environmental  measures  than  their  competitors,  and  that  these 
businesses would not even have contemplated such action without compensation. 
Cleaner cars 
The Dutch government is not completely free in the way it chooses to stimulate 
the  introduction  of cleaner  cars.  The  European  Community  views  national 
measures  in  this  field  with  considerable  distrust,  fearing  that such  initiatives 
might lead to unfair competition. For this reason, and also because clearly more 
can be achieved through a pan-European approach, the policies of the individual 
memb~r  states are governed by a European policy. This restricts the policies of 
member states such as  Germ~ny  and the Netherlands who actually favour more 
radical  action.  However,  these  states were  given  permission  to  promote  the 
introduction  of  cleaner  cars  (i.e.  cars  that  already  comply  with  the  future 
European  standards)  by  means  of financial  incentives  on  condition  that  the 
incentives did not exceed the additional costs. In other words, cleaner cars were 
not  allowed  to be cheaper than dirty  ones, but  at  best just as  expensive. The 
Netherlands achieved parity between the two kinds of cars by applying different 
rates of sales tax. The tax was reduced for cars that complied with future Euro-
standards and raised for the dirtier models. 
Though less  drastic than originally envisaged,  the  measure was  an immediate 
success (Klok, 1987). In the market for small cars (two-thirds of the market), the 
percentage of future Euro-standard cars jumped from 37% to 70%, an increase 
- 91  -achieved  in  half  the  time  the  ministry  of  the  environment  had  expected. 
Considering the ineffectiveness of most environmental policy instruments, this 
was an exceptionally good result. The results were less spectacular in the market 
for larger cars, partly because the tax differentiation did not fully compensate the 
more stringent standards applicable in  this category.  In view of this success,  it 
was not surprising that the Dutch government extended the mea~ure to include 
compensation for  compliance with  the stricter American standards. This was 
initially done under protest of the European Commission, but with the general 
approval of the Dutch parliament. Again the measure caused the number of new 
cars fitted with a regulated three-way catalytic converter to shoot up. Because the 
European Commission was  eventually  reluctant/ to  ba·n  the  measure,  it  even 
helped to reinforce the Community's overall commitment to the clean-car policy. 
Unleaded petrol 
Cars fitted with catalytic converters run on unleaded petrol. For this reason, a 
regulatory levy - the only official regulatory levy in Dutch environmental policy -
was introduced to ensure that unleaded petrol wo1,1ld be widely available. In this 
case,  the absence of EC restrictions even made it  possible to make unleaded 
petrol cheaper than leaded petrol. The result was that, within the space of two 
months,  unleaded  petrol  had  completely  ousted  normal  petrol  from  the 
forecourts. (Klok, 1987) 
Water quality charge 
The most far-reaching and best-known financial incentive in Dutch environmental 
policy  consists  of the  charges on water pollution.  In  1970  the Surface Water 
Pollution Act came into force, delegating the task of water quality management 
to the provincial authorities and often,  through these authorities, to the water 
management boards. An important aspect of the task in  hand was the need to 
clean up  sewage water. This called  for  a  great  deal  of money.  So the water 
boards were permitted to introduce charges in order to cover their annual costs. 
Degradable organic pollution,  for  instance, was  taxed  with  a  hefty  charge per 
unit  of~ pollution.  Each water: board applies different rates,  according to their 
costs  and the number of units of pollution these  costs  have  to  cover in  their 
district. Within a few years almost every water board had raised the rates to such 
a level that it paid businesses to start significantly reducing pollution levels. From 
1970  to  1980  organic  pollution  from  industrial  effluents  fell  by  two-thirds. 
Research (Bressers, 1980, 1983,  1988 and Schuurman, 1988) showed that almost 
all credit for this reduction went to the charges. The licences introduced at the 
same  time  as  the  charges  had  had  little  effect.  This  is  a  striking  result, 
- 92  -considering that it was the licences, not the charges, that were officially designed 
to  manipulate  the  environmental  behaviour  of  businesses.  Bressers  (1983) 
attributes part of the charges' success to the drastic change they bring about in 
the consultative climate between the water manager and industry. The keynote 
of the contacts is  collaboration rather than conflict now that industry is  able to 
achieve  significant  savings  by  cleaning  up  pollution.  In  practice,  therefore, 
environmental charges do not function as a purely economic mechanism. They 
do  not  replace  consultation  between  authorities  and  industry,  but  actually 
increase its beneficial effects on environmental conservation. 
In view  of the damage  that heavy  metal pollution causes to the sewage water 
treatment process and to  the quality of the resulting purification sludge,  most 
water boards  also  introduced  a  charge  on  the  presence of heavy  metals  in 
effluents. But as the charge was relatively low, the water boards felt it had little 
to do with  the 50% reduction of heavy metals in industrial effluents achieved 
between 1975 and 1980. Without negotiations and licensing regulations, so they 
thought, industry would be unwilling to budge. Statistical analysis (Bressers, 1988) 
showed, however, that negotiations in districts that had substantially raised the 
charges were  much  more successful  than in  other districts.  So  the regression 
analysis revealed that the charges, far from being insignificant, were in fact the 
most powerful policy instrument! 
Conclusions 
The Netherlands has used a number of financial incentives in its environmental 
policy.  Generally speaking, these incentives have given good results compared 
with the other instruments. In fact, so far, it's the charges and tax differentiations 
that lie behind the success stories of Dutch environmental policy.  One of the 
main  strengths  of financial  incentives  is  that  they  do  not simply  operate  as 
economic  mechanisms,  but  also  help  to  enhance  the  effects  of consultation 
between government and industry. 
A look at criteria other than effectiveness shows the following picture. As a rule, 
spatial differentiation within the Netherlands was not an environmental policy 
aim.  The  only  exception  is  the  compensation  scheme.  With  this  particular 
scheme, we do indeed see strong regional variations. But these evidently reflect 
the familiarity (or unfamiliarity) of the local and provincial authorities with the 
scheme and tell  us little about the relative gravity  of the local  environmental 
problem. However, the example of water quality charges • where  higher local 
rates led to stronger local reductions in pollution · do make it clear that charges 
are capable of achieving spatial differentiation where required. Naturally, such 
spatial differentiation would  make certain "expensive"  areas less  attractive  to 
businesses than "cheaper" areas. But the same holds true for differences in land 
prices, and everyone accepts these without a second thought. 
- 93  -The same exan1ple  indicates that charges are fairly  easy  to adjust to changing 
circumstances. Note, however,  that in  the Netherlands such  changes were  not 
prompted by the desire to reduce pollution levels, but rather by the need to meet 
water treatment costs. Businesses may be less willing to accept increases in rates 
for  financing  new  policy  objectives  than  increases  necessary  to  meet  higher 
purification costs. 
In  all  cases,  there was  a  great  deal  of uncertainty  about  the  effects  of the 
instruments in all cases. As we have seen, the water quality charges were actually 
not even intended to change environmental behaviour. Strikingly enough, this 
uncertainty did not in most cases lead to disappointing results and, in a number 
of cases,  even to  much-better-than-expected  results.  After the generally poor 
performance of licensing systems, this is  truly remarkable. 
The feasibility of financial instruments varied strongly. Subsidy schemes seem to 
meet with  little  resistance.  In  the  case of tax  differentiations,  EC restrictions 
clearly impressed their stamp on the policy. The charges on water pollution were 
acceptable  because  they  were  introduced  as  charges  for  sewage  water 
purification, i.e. as payments for services rendered. The employers' organisations 
in the Netherlands still maintain that other forms of charges would be completely 
unacceptable  to  them.  This  may  be  precisely  where  the  effectiveness  of the 
instrument lies. Another reason for this resistance may be that charges without 
compensation impose a heavier burden on industry than on government. 
5. In conclusion 
This paper summarises the results of the studies into the implementation and 
effects of various policy instruments in Dutch environmental policy. The author 
was involved in a  large number of these as  a  researcher, project manager and 
supervisor.  The  overall  picture  is  not  very  positive.  The  dominating  policy 
instrument - i.e. licences - is  in practice bedevilled by implementation problems 
and, as  a  result, largely ineffective.  One could summarise the results of Dutch 
environmental policy so far in the following sentence. About half of the policy 
objectives formulated in - and with the insights of - the 70s have been achieved, 
but our current insights tell us we need to achieve objectives that reach twice as 
far.  In recent years, many people in  and outside the Netherlands have become 
convinced that a much more intensive environmental policy is necessary to bring 
the  objective  of a  sustainable  environment  closer.  But  whether  the  licencing 
system  - without  additional  measures  - will  permit  the  implementation  and 
enforcement of a much more intensive environmental policy is very much open 
to question. 
- 94  -The  communicative instruments studied in  this  paper worked well  enough hut 
can only play a supplementary, and hence limited, role. As a rule, the policy n1ix 
must - in addition to communicative instruments - include other instruments that 
do  have  the  power  to  change  the  consequences  of  the  various  behavioural 
alternatives for the target group. 
Financial  instruments  fall  into  two  categories:  first,  subsidies  and  related 
instruments which the target group applies for on its own initiative; and, second, 
charges and related instruments such as tax differentiation. The latter category 
has  made  the  most  visible  contribution  to  the  success  stories  within  Dutch 
environmental policy. 
Furthermore, it has become clear that no absolute staten1ents can be made about 
the feasibility  and effectiveness of policy  instruments. The effectiveness of an 
instrument  or  mix  depends  very  much  on  the  given  circumstances,  and  no 
instrument will  be effective  in  all  circumstances. It is  therefore essential that 
theories  on  the  feasibility  and  effectiveness  of  instruments  take  these 
circumstances into account.  Building on our experience with  research into the 
effectiveness of large parts of Dutch environmental policy, a contingency theory 
has been developed at the University of Twente. This contingency theory assesses 
the feasibility  and effectiveness of policy  instruments, taking into account the 
circumstances in which the instruments are applied (see appendix 2). It therefore 
enables us to make global predictions and statements about the feasibility and 
effectiveness  of the various  (combinations  of)  policy  instruments  in  different 
situations. 
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Twente and  chairman of the  Centre  for  clean  technology  and  environmental 
policy of this University. Alone or in collaboration with others, he was involved 
as a  rese~:.rcher, project manager or supervisor in various evaluation studies of 
parts of Dutch environmental policy, including: 
- the  expan~;an of the water purification capacity; 
- the  reL:uction  of  pollution  from  industrial  effluents  containing  orgamc 
substances and heavy metals; 
- the  reduction  of air  pollution  from  S02 and  NOx  by  industry  and  power 
stations; 
- the introduction of cleaner cars and unleaded petrol; 
- the reporting scheme and the licensing system of the Nuclear Power Act; 
- the compensation scheme under the Air Pollution Act; 
- the, evaluation of the Act on General Provisions for Environmental Protection; 
- the reduction of traffic noise; 
- the nuisance act enabling programmes (HUPs  ); 
- energy saving in industry; 
- environmental covenants as an instrument of product-oriented environmental 
policy;  -
- the environmental impact assessment; 
- the introduction of industrial environmental care (current research); 
- the  official evaluation of the Act on Environmentally Hazardous Substances 
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- the general regulations within the Nuisance Act (current research). 
Adress: Centre for  Clean Technology and Environmental Policy,  University of 
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Economic  instruments  for  an  environmental  energy-policy  in  the 
Eurcpea~con  text 
ir.  T.G.  Potma 
Director CE  Institute 
Delft 
~~umma  ry_ -~lf!_d  cone 1  us  ion~; 
The  co2emission level of  the industrialised countries  is extreemly 
high  compared  to  the  rest of  the  world.  A world situation of 
sustainability and  the  realisation of  the  available perspective of 
a  future  abundance  of clean energy  means  a  decrease of co
2emissions 
of  80%  in 2025  in  Europe.  This  decrease  and  the  future  perspective 
cannot  be  realised with propaganda  and  soft measures  but only  with 
a  strong market  incentive on  energy-efficiency and  co
2reduction. 
To  create such  a  required market-incentive  an  energy-tax  on  fuel, 
up  to  a  level of  the  expected  minimum  long  term price of f  15 
guilders per Gigajoule  for  clean energy,  is suggested.  To  eliminate 
market-disturbances  on  the  international borders  additional 
measures  are  required.  Some  measures  are described  and  intensive 
study  on  this problem  is  recommended,  together with  an  immediate 
start with  a  modest  energy-tax.  The  suggested harmonisations  on  a 
low  level energy-tax  and  low  motor-fuel-prices of October  1989 
plus  further delay  in  de  creation of a  strong market-incentive  on 
energy  and  environmental  efficiency,  should  be  regarded  as  the  type 
of policy  that will guide  Europe  to  the  future  stat~s of 
underdeveloped  country. 
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oriented  economic  __ pol  ic~ 
To  reaLize  n  sustainable economy  in  a  globally sustainable 
environment,  the priorities  in  the  economic  policy  have  to  be 
changed.  Such  a  change  is difficult.  Five separate steps  hnvc  to  be 
taken  in  this proccs of change.  Figure  1  illustrates  this  proces  of 
·the  five  steps or  fivP.  .switches. 
Figure  1 
Five steps to a sustainable economy 
Consensus on the following questions 
1.  Is there a real environmental problem? 
2.  Is there  agreement about the required 
policy-measures? 
3.  Are the consequences of the required 
rncnsuros Zlccoptorl? 
4.  Are the required measures in accordance 
with the economic priorities? 
5.  Do the required changes fit into our 
culture? 
At  this  moment  only  the  first switch  is more  or less  taken.  This 
can  be  demonstrated  for  example  by  the  international  exceptance of 
the  conclusions of  the  Dutch  report  "Concern  for  tomorrow''  j1j 
There  is not  much  difference between  the  individual  countries  in 
Europe  in  there  thinking about  energy-environment  and  economy, 
although  the status of plans  and  targets  may  differ for  the  moment. 
- 98  -2.  Required  scale of  co2
-redu~tion 
Between  the  required  emissionreduction  from  the  report  "Concern  for 
tomorrow"  and  the highest  reduction  target  from  the  side of  any 
government  in  Europe  is a  wide  gap. 
The  most  recently agreed  targets  from  the  latest environmental  plan 
in  Holland  - the so-called NMP-Plus  121  - menn  a  declining co2-
(~mi ~;sion nfter 1995  ~;t.arting  from  an  emissionnl  level  in  1995  whic~1_ 
is  the  same  as  the  level  in 1989.  This  target differs strongly  from 
the  target in  ''Concern  for  tomorrow",  where  a  reduction of 80%  is 
mentioned.  If this reductionlevel is reached  in  the  year 2025, 
there is still a  world-temperature Fise of 1,5·  to 4,5•  C  to  be 
expected in  the  year 2100.  To  realize a  reduction  80%  over  a  period 
of 35  years  means  a  yearly  reduction of 4.5%  to  begin  in 1990. 
According  to  the latest Dutch  governmentplan  the  co2emission will 
no  sooner start declining than  1995.  This  means  that  the  decline is 
posponed  for  another  five years. 
Figure  2 
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5  6 The  conclusion  is  that  the  required  emission-reductions  require  new 
nnd  future  oriented  types  of policy measures.  Figure  2  inch en tes 
the  unbalance  between  the different parts of  the  world  and  the 
extreemly  high  emission-level of  the  industrialised countries. 
3.  co2  reduction perspective 
On  a  long  term  basis  a  pollutionfree energy supply  on  the  1990 
level or higher is technically certainly possible  13.  4,  51.  Such  a 
type of energy  supply would  be  more  expensive  than  the existing 
practice of energy  supply,  but  would  not  be  more  expensive  than  two 
times  the existing pricelevel  for bulkdelivery of fuelrelated 
energy  13.  4,  5.1. 
If a  two  times  more  expensive energy is combined  with  a  possible 
two  times  more  efficient energy-use  151,  the prices of  the  energy-
related services  could  on  the  long  term  possibly be  about  the  same 
as  with  the polluting-energy system  that  we  have  now. 
The  required  long-ter~ future energy supply-system has  te be  based 
on  sun- or nuclear  power.  Sunpower is sure,  nuclear is not. 
Sunpower is clean,  nuclear probably not.  Delivery of sun-produced 
fuels  in desert-plants requires  huge  investments but  these huge 
investments  could easily oe  realised in  the  next  century.  The 
investmentlevel  is small  in respect  to  the  expected  total 
investmentlevel  in  the  future  and  not  impressive in  respect  to  the 
now-a-days  investmentlevel  for  the  existing total energy supply-
system. 
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Figure  3 gives  an  overview of  the  technical  methods  to  reduce  the 
co
2
emission.  A step by  step approach  towards  the  final  situation of 
a  clean  energy  production  around  the year  2100  is possible.  Figure 
4 gives  an  indication of long  term  energy  costs. 
- 101  -It is however  quite clear  that  the  transformation  to  a  different 
energy-supply  system  requires  new  policy  instruments.  The  arguments 
for strong and  new  policy instruments are,  on  the  one  hand  the 
available perspective  and  on  the other hand  the  very high  risks  and 
future  environmental  costs of  the  now-a-days  energy-supply-
practice. 
Figure 4.  Summary  of potential  and  minimum  estimates of  the  long 
term  costs of energy supply options  without co2-emissions 
(source:  4} 
option: 
1.  inland production of energy  from 
renewable  sources  (photovoltaic  + 
wind,  incl.  continental shelf) 
2.  production of hydrogen  from 
surpluses of 1. 
3.  production of solar heat  and  biogas 
4.  production of electricity from 
breeder reactors 
s.  production of hydrogen  from 
surpluses of 4. 
6.  import of liquid  fuels  from  biomass 
7.  import or hydrogen  from  solar energy 
in  (sub-}tropical  areas 
8.  hydrogen  produces  after removal  of 
C02  from  fossil  fuels  and  storage of 
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- 102  -4.  Required  instruments,  the  role of  financial  instruments 
Figure  5  Instruments of environmental policy 
main groups 
1. social (information, education, 
convenant,  ) 
2., fysical (permits and regulation) 
3. financiaiCharges, taxes, deposit-
refunds, tradeable permits  ) 
4.  institutional (public utilities,  ) 
Figure  5  gives  a  short list of different kinds  of policy 
instruments.  In  this list the  financial  instruments  are  very 
important because  the  use of energy  and  the supply of energy is 
very  much  price dependant.  On  the other hand  information  about 
efficient energy-use  is much  more  effective if there is a  market-
incentive  for  energy-conservation.  Also  regulation is price-
dependant  in its effect.  Without  a  strong market  incentive 
regulation is complicated  and  unattractive.  With  a  strong market-
incentive  regulation is in  many  situation not  required. 
Figure  6  Financial instruments for environmental 
policy 
main groups 
1. revenue-raising charges 
2. environmental incentive charges 
3.  deposit-refund systems 
4. tax credits 
5.  subsidies 
6. tradeable permits 
Figure  6  gives different  types  of  financial  instruments.  Hegulating 
instruments  have  a  direct effect on  the  market  incentive.  The 
regulating effect depends  on  the  height of  the  financial  charges. 
- 103  -With  the  height of  the  charges  (on  fuels,  electricity nnd  co2-
emission)  the  government-income  increases.  To  eliminate this effect 
the  extra government  income  can  be  returned  to  the  taxpayer  by 
mc<1ns  of  tax  reduction  on  labour or other products  and  activities 
which  have  a  relativ~ low  impact  on  the environment.  Governments 
have,  with  the existing methods  of tax-collecting,  already  a  very 
strong influence on  the market.  This  influence is for historical 
reasons  primarily stimulating the  increase of labour efficiency and 
not  the  increase of environment- or energy efficiency.  In  Holland 
the  total  taxburden  (which  is about  40%  of  the  BNP)  is for  75% 
collected by charges  on  labour.  A shift from  labour-tax  to  energy 
tax  therefore deserves  high priority and  can  have  an  considerable 
effect.  It is very  important  to  realise  that  this  type of  tax-
shifting does  not  increase  the  government  budget. 
5.  Long-term  energyPrice  as  a  basis  for short  term  tax  charges  on  fuel 
Tax  charges  on  fuel,  electricity and  co2emissions  create  a  required 
mnr'kct  incentive  for  the  increase of energy  efLicj t?ncy  and 
co2reduction.  Such  charges will  have  a  positive  and  strong 
influence on  the environmental  impact of many  activities which  are 
energy dependant  as  transport,  heavy steel and  chemical  industry, 
construction of houses,  agricultural activity etc. 
What  should  be  the height of  this  type  of charges?  The  CE  in Delft 
has  worked  out a  method  by  which  the height of  the  charges  are 
correlated  tot the  expected  long  term  energy  ~d co2  reduction 
costs  !61.  There  is a  lot of information available  about  the  long 
term  cost of emission  free  energy  151.  According  to  this 
information  the  long  term  price is about  15  Dutch  guilders  per 
Gigajoule  141.  The  CE  proposal  is  to  increase existing fuelprices 
(in  relation  to  the  co2  emission  of  the specific  fuels)  to  the 
indicated  long  term  cost-level.  This  would  mean  an  energy  tax 
according  to  the  table in figure  7. 
- 104  -Figure 7: 
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For  the calculation of  the  energy  tax  from  figure 7.  the  energy  tax 
for oil is set in such  a  way  that  the oilprice including tax  mounts 
up  to  the  long-term-costs  {LTC)  off 15,- per Gigajoule.  The  tax 
for coal  and  natural  gas  is relatively higher  and  lower in respect 
to  the higher  and  lower  C02  level after burning of  this  fuels. 
The  energy  tax  for H2  or non-fuel  energy is zero. 
In  figure 8  the  calculated prices are given  for  motor  fuels.  The 
first line of  figures  indicates  the  LTC-price,  the second  line 
gives prices in which  the  long  term  costs  and  all relevant specific 
social costs of motor  traffic are  taken  into account  171.  The  last 
line gives  the  proposed  harmonisation-prices  for  motor  fuel  of 
October  '89.  From  the list it is clear that  the suggested 
harmonisationlevels  are  in conflict with  the  required price levels. 
The  proposed harmonisationlevels will not create a  market  incentive 
for efficient energy-use  and  clean  transport. 
These  type of price-proposals  mean  that  the  technical possibilities 
are not developed  and  implemented  and  that  the  future.  minimum  cost 
level of f  15.- per Gigajoule  cannot be  save-guarded.  After  a 
relative short period of  too  low  fuel  prices  the environmental damage  has  to  be  reduced at high  costs  and  the  required  energy 
efficient high-tech will  not  be  available in  time.  So  the  lower  the 
short  time  fuel  price.  the  higher  the  future  energy  costs. 
Figure 8: 
Required fuel excise duties 
LTC on  including  proposed 
energy  all social  harmoni-
only  costs  zation 
leaded petrol  forbidden  >  337 
unleaded petrol  170  800  >  287 
diesel  170  800  195-205 
LPG  130  700  >  84,5 
heating gas-oil  160  160  47- 53 
heavy fuel oil  170  170  16- 18 
ECU/1 000 I  (kg} 
6.  Introduction problems 
The  suggested relatively high price increase of fuelprices  will 
create possible marketdisturbances  which  have  to be  mastered.  This 
problem  demands  a  lot of creativity and  study.  The  problem  does  not 
only apply  to energy but also  to other financial  measures  by  which 
"the  future  environmental  costs  can  be  build in into  the  existing 
market  price. 
The  main  problem  by  the  introduction of such  price-taxes  on  a 
national  scale is  the effect on  the  international  competition 
if  mr>nsut'es  an~  lnkcn  on  a  European  base.  but  also  in  this  case 
disturbance of the international  competition  between  Europe  and  the 
- 106  -Figure 9: 
Shift in taxation 
international competition 
size of the problem ? 
national policy to spare intern. companies 
1 - each company may choose for the 
shift in taxation or not (CE-scenario, 1982}-
2- maximum of total environmental charges 
( 1.7 °/o  sales value; Sweden) 
3.:.. higher VAT rates on fuel, lower VAT rates 
on labor. (CE-scenario, 1982) 
4- energy tax only on tarifs for households 
(CE-scenario 1982, Dutch Ministery for the 
Environment, 1990) 
harmonization in EC 
including import charges and export 
subsidies 
Figure 9  gives  some  possible measures  to eliminate possible 
disturbance of  the international competition  in case of energy-
taxes  on  an  national base. 
Up  till now  four possibilities are  worked  out.  Method  no.  1  means 
that individual  companies  can  make  a  choice  between:  a.  fuel  tax 
without  the relevant  reduction of labour-tax.  or:  b.  refusal  of  the 
energy  tax  in  combination with  the existing high  labour  tax-level. 
This  means  that some  energy  intensive industries which  depent  very 
much  on  export will exclude  themselves  from  the  energy  tax  but  the 
other industries will except  and  so  a  reduced  market  incentive  can 
still be created.  Effects of  the  method  were  already  calculated  in 
'82  181. 
- 107  -According  to  the  second  method,  the  energy  tax  will  be  npplied  as  a 
national  policy  instrument,  but  the  level  of  the  energy  tax will  be 
determined  every year  and  kept  sufficiently  low  to eliminate 
unacceptable marketconsequences.  This  method  was  recently worked 
out in Sweden  IBI. 
The  third method  was  also worked  out in  '82  191  and  means  that  the 
VAT  rates  on  fuel  are set at  a  higher level while  VAT  rates  on 
labour are at  the  same  moment  reduced  to create  n  blldget-neutrf!l-
effect. 
Method  no.  4 means  that  the energy-tax and  the related compensatory 
measures  are only  applied  in internal national  markets  within 
specific sectors  j6,  91. 
For  example  an energy-tax on  natural  gas  for heating of houses  in 
combination  with  a  fixed yearly donation per dwelling  .  Another 
example  could  be  an  energy-tax  for  the governmentsector  as  a  whole. 
It should be  underlined  that  the investigation of these 
possibilities has  hardly begun  and  that much  work  should  be  done  in 
this respect.  It is however  possible  to start introduction of some 
types  of energy-tax-measures  on  an  reduced scale on  short notice. 
As  has  already  been said,  it  j~  much  easier  :.o  counteract  market 
disturbances if these  kind of measures  are applied  on  a  European 
scale.  In  this  c~se the  energy  tax  could  be  applied  for  the 
European  Community  as  a  whole.  The  collected  tax-money  could  be 
redistributed over  the national  countries in relation  to  their 
national  BNP.  This  would  mean  that it becomes  profitable  to realise 
a  "cleaner"  BNP  within  the  European  border.  At  the  same  time it 
will be  necessary  to  have  an  exportrelease and  an  import  charge  on 
the  common  European  border.  These  export  and  import  measures 
however  could  be  restricted  to  a  limited number  of energy-intensive 
products  and  fuels.  The  borderproblem is in  this  case  expected  to 
be  very  much  reduced  by  the  fact  that energy-intensive 
bordertraffic between  Europe  and  the  rest of  the  world  is much  less 
- 108  -complicated  and  intense  than  the energy-intensive- bordertraffic  on 
the  internal  Europeru1  borders  between  the  individual  countries. 
As  far  as  overall  economic  consequences  of  the  proposed  energy-
taxes  are  concerned it is expected  that  the  tax-shift will  have  a 
moderate effect on  the  economy  as  a  whole,  but strong positive  and 
negative effects on  specific sectors  19.  101.  To  study  the 
consequences  and  possibilities of  the  required  environmental 
measures  in depth  an  extensive project was  recently  launched  in 
Holland  which  is called  the  "Integrationproject Environment  and 
Economy"  1111. 
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- 113  -It would  take  more  time  thun  is nvuilable  to  rehearse  thn 
catalogue of  actual  environmental  damage  caused  by  the  transport 
sector  in  Europe.  Fortunately  this  is  now  well  documented  and  the 
EC  Task  Force  report  of  late  1989,  the  ECMT  proceedings  of 
November  1989,  ttu-~  OECD  report  on Cities and  Transport  nnd  t tH~ 
publications  of  UPI  in Heidelberg and  ILS  in  Dortmund  pr·ovide  a 
very  full  account  of  the  extent of  the  problem. 
The  use  of  cai.·s  in cities and  lorries  for medium  to  longer 
distance  journeys  present particuarly serious  problems  for  the 
environmE?.lt  and  for  health.  It is  important  to note  that  the 
problems  are much  wider  than air or  noise pollution or,  indeed, 
the  contribution to global  warming  and  ozone  pollution of exhaust 
emissions. 
Transport  is an  important  cause of  loss of life and  serious  injury 
thro~gh road  traffic accidents.  Air  and  noise pollution 
particularly  in cities combine with stress and  fear  to  provide  the 
single  largest  source of subtractions  from quality of life.  The 
eftects on  human  health both physical  and  psychological  are  hardly 
understood  but are  becoming  clearer.  The  overall  economic  effects 
on  lost production and  inefficiences  in labour markets  are  a 
serious drain on  public  and  private  funds.  The  demands  made  of 
land  resources are  enormous  with most  European  countries  committed 
to  the  building of  new  transport  infrastructure  in  the  form  of 
high  speed  rail,  new  motorways  or  even  new  roads  in cities.  The 
case of  Lancaster  is typical  here which  has  a  plan and  a  land 
reservation  for  a  major  new  four  lane  highway  through  the  centre 
of an  "historic•  city.  Here  the  fiscal  and  economic  systems  in 
place  provide  every  incentive to  •solve•  transport  problems  by 
throwing  money  at  the  supply side of  the  equation 
The  emphasis  in what  follows  is to  explore  "ex-ante  ..  solutions as 
opposed  to  .. ex-post•  solutions.  It  is of course  easier  to attack 
the  problem of environmental  degradation  by  dealing with  the 
energy  consumption  and  emission :-'roductioP  of vehicles  rather  than 
by  seeking to  influence  the  societal  and  spatial  processes which 
generate  the  demand  or  .. need•  for  vehicles.  I  regard  carbon 
taxes,  additional  fuel  taxes  and  end-of-pipe monitoring 
technologies  as  ex-post  solutions which  necessarily accept  the 
:onditions which  influence demand  for  vehicular  travel.  I  want  to 
:3o  deeper  and  influence  the  processes which  generate  the  demand  in 
the  fit·st  place. 
This  approach  does  not  in any  way  diminish  the  importance  of 
ecological  taxes which  increase  the  cost of motoring.  The  work  of 
Arie  Bleijenberg  in Delft  (Bleijenberg,  1989)  and Dieter Teufel  in 
Heidelberg  (Teufel  et al,  1988)  is very  important  indeed  and  the 
case  for  a  significant  increase  in fuel  taxation as  part of 
harmonisation and  the  variabilisation of motoring  costs  is  proven 
beyond  doubt. 
- 114  -The  case  I  wish  to present  in this  paper  is  that  we  need  a  three 
part  strategy  to  bring about  environmental  improvements  by 
reducinn  thn  amount  of  trnffic.  TtH!  first  part  of  ttd!;  !dTitln~\Y 
is  the  adoption of  lhe  Bleijenberg/Teufel  approach  as  soon  us 
possible  and  as  part  of  the  harmonisation  process.  The  second 
part of  the  strategy  is  the  subject of  this  paper  and  deals with 
ex-ante  proposals.  The  third part of  the  strategy  is a  public 
health one  and  is not  dealt  \Vith  here.  It  forms  part  of  the  work 
of  the  environmental  epidemiology unit at  Lancaster  University 
(England)  and  takes as its starting point  the  principle  that  it is 
not acceptable  that we  should  be  able  to purchase  the  freedom  to 
inject recognised  poisons  into the  atmosphere. 
The  scope  for  fiscal  and  economic  incentives  in  the  transport 
sector. 
The  conceptual  base  of what  follows  is  that we  should  avoid 
metaphysical  debate  about  the  costs  and  benefits of  this or  that 
environmental  problem and  how  market  mechanisms  might  massage  the 
process  into submission.  Rather  we  should  set clear  targets which 
indicate where  we  would  like to  be  ten or  twenty  years  hence  and 
map  out  the areas of action which  are  open  to  intervention at  any 
level of political decision making.  Spurious monetary  values 
placed  on  environmental  problems  simply  shove  the  problem one  step 
further  down  the line and  one  step away  from  a  solution. 
At  the  centre of  this approach  is the  need  to  go  for  the  jugular 
in  the  various  processes  which  have  taken  society on  an  energy 
greedy  and  polluting  trajectory.  The  jugular  in  transport  is 
space  and  use  of space.  Transport  can only  function  because 
society allocates vast  amounts  of  space  to  the  needs  of vehicles. 
It is this  use  of space  which  erodes quality of life whether  in 
noise and  air pollution,  accidents,  poor  access  to facilities, 
poor  health,  fear  and  strnss. 
The  source  of most  problems  is vehicle  use  and  the  processes which 
spread  facilities  in  a  wasteful  use  of  space  to  increase  the  need 
to  travel  by  car  and  decrease  the  possibilities for  walking  and 
cycling  journeys.  A  tangible product  of  these processes  in  Europe 
is  the  use  of  space  for  car  parking.  Car  parking  takes  up 
valuable  space  in cities and  is a  prominent  feature  of out-of-town 
shopping centres,  new  leisure centres,  high-tech  science  parks, 
airports etc etc.  Car  parks  represent  the  actual  demand  made  by 
vehicles  on  the  remainder  of  transport  infrastructure:  a  car  purk 
accommodating  500  cars  has  a  quantifiable  impact  on  the 
environment  and  use  of  space. 
- 115  -~ ) 
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The  provision of car  parking  spaces at work  places  is  a  subsidy  to 
motoring.  These  spaces  should  be  reduced  by  planning  regulation, 
by  rental  charges  and  by  company  public  transport  schemes, 
particularly  in cities. 
Where  journey  to work  expenses  by  car  can  be  set against  tax  the 
system should  be  replaced  by  fiscal  incentives with  clear 
envirorunnetal  priorities so  ttlnt  corrunulers  who  use  public 
transport,  bicycle or  walking  as  modes  of  transport  are  rewarded 
with  a  lower  tax  bill.  Car  users  would  be  penalised.  The  current 
system used  in  Germany  is  a  direct  subsidy  to  car manufacturers. 
Any  system which  provides  fiscal  bias  in  favour  of  the  car  is 
benefitting the  car  industry  and  is working  against  the 
competition policy of the  EC.  This  is particularly so  in Britain 
and  in Germany. 
The  special  problem of  lorries 
The  single market  and  the associated deregulation of  lorries will 
bring about  a  70%  increase  of  tonne-km  on  the  roads  of Germany. 
(ILS,l990).  The  existing  level  of  damage  and  nuisance  brought 
about  the  lorry  is  not  acceptable  and  as  part of deliberate  EC 
strategy is set  to get  much  worse.  In  answer  to  a  parliamentary 
question  the  Transport  Co~nissioner has  said  that  he  does  not  know 
by  how  much  road  freight will  increase  in  Europe  to  the  year  2000. 
Lorries  have  prospered  in already deregulated countries  like  the 
UK  because  of spatial  concentration  in  the  economy,  new  kinds  of 
transport  demands,  motorways,  fiscal  bias  and  a  lax  approach  to 
monitoring and  punishing breaches  of the  law. 
The  use  of lorries is supported  and  indeed  encouraged  by  the 
enormous  gains  to  be  made  in  industrial  organisations  (and 
retailing)  by  global  sourcing,  production strategies which 
concentrate output  at  a  small  number  of sites and  logistics  to 
reduce  inventory.  This  externalisation of costs  throws  a  huge 
burden  on  the  transport  system  and  the  environment  and  there  is  no 
mechanism  currently  in use  which  can  adjust  the  size  of  the  burden 
in  response  to an  assessment  of  the  damage  caused. 
- 116  -Proposal  1:  use  of car  parking  spaces. 
All  car  parking  spaces  provided  in any  development  in  Europe 
should attract  a  "rental"  charge  as  a  fiscal  incentive  to  reduce 
the  demand  for  motorised  transport,  reduce  the  use  of  road  space 
and  hence  the  supply of  new  space  and  encourage  better public 
transport  links  and  links  into walking  and  cycling  fletworks.  The 
"rental•  would  need  to  be  set at  a  level  which  reflects  the worth 
of  a  space  to  a  developer.  A  minimum  would  be  10,000  DM  per  annum 
per  space.  The  objective  is  to  promote  developments  which  are  in 
keeping with  the  existing built  form  of an  urban area,  fully 
utilise public  transport  and  do  not  generate extra motorised 
trips. 
Proposal  2:  car  parking  in cities. 
The  mass  of  evidence  on  the  length of trips  by  car,  on  the  social 
distribution of access  to vehicles  and  on  the  damaging  effects of 
vehicles  in cities points  to  a  general  presumption against  car-
based  trips  into city centres.  The  fact  that  public  transport, 
particularly  trams,  perform very well  in cities makes  such  a 
presumption  feasible.  Trams,  walkers  and  cyclists are  extremely 
economic  in  their  use  of  space.  Cars  are not.  Cars  must  be  stored 
at both origin and  destinations  and  often at several  points 
inbetween.  This  heavy  use  of  space  should  be  discouraged.  It is 
in itself unpleasant,  it sterilises land,  and  it represents  a 
quantifiable measure  of  the  demands  which  vehicles  make  on 
infrastructure.  It is a  good  general  surrogate measure  for  the 
severity of  the  transport  problem. 
Car  parking  in cities should  be  charged at whatever  rate  reduces 
its severity  in a  direct relationship with public  transport 
charges  and  measures  to  improve  the attractiveness of  public 
transport.  Parking  rates  already  vary widely  in Europe.  Zurich 
provides  a  very  good  example of  progress  made  through  the 
operation of  a  high-parking  charge  policy.  Parking  charges  should 
be  set  by  operational  experience  in  the  success  they  have  on 
achieving  the  objectives set  and  not  by  precise calculations of 
damage  attributable  to  the  use  of  the  car. 
Proposal  3:  the  removal  of existing fiscal  and  economic 
incentives  in  favour  of  the  car  and  car  parking. 
The  problem of  the  company  car  in  the  UK  is well  documented.  It 
represents  a  subsidy  to  car  users of about  2  billion  pounds  per 
annum  and  is  a  direct  subsidy  to car manufacturers  and  the  users 
of environmentally  unfriendly modes  of  transport.  It should  be 
abolished without  delay.  The  whole  system of  payments  for  car 
based  journeys as  part of work  should also  be  dismantled.  Every 
recipient of an  "essential  car  user  allowance  ..  ,  car  loan or 
"essential mileage"  payment  is receiving support  for  car  use  which 
exceeds  actual  costs  incurred.  There  are alternatives  involving 
public  transport,  taxis and  cycling and  these  should  be  utilised. 
- 117  -Proposal  4:  lorries should  be  charged  for  thfd  r  journeys  on  a 
mi leage/km basis and  by  wei f-lht  (a  weiHht--di stance  tax  or  wrrr). 
The  level  should  be  set  by  experience  to  reduce  tonne-krn  by  n  pr·(!-
selected percentage  each  yeat·.  The  charge  would  t~educe  the 
advantages  of  spatial  concentration,  reduce  the attractiveness of 
distant  supplies and  increase  the attractiveness of  local 
suppliers.  A  tax  on distance attacks  the  basic  processes  which 
spread  facilities across  enormous  distances  and  thus  attacks  the 
lorry problem at  source. 
A  tax  on  distance normally  replaces  the  fuel  tax. 
This  kind of  tax  is already  in place  in  ten  states of  the  USA  and 
is  recommended  by  the American  Association of State Highway  and 
Transportation Officials  (Source:  AASHTO  Quarterly,  July  1984, 
Washington).  It has  been  in place  in Oregon  since  1948  and  New 
York  since  1951  and  is currently under  consideration  for  US-wide 
application  and  Federal  administration.  It is also  in place  in 
Sweden  where  distance  taxes were  increased  by  45%  in  1988.  Weight-
distance  taxes  in Oregon  due  for  implementation  on  1.1.90 are 
shown  in figure  1.  There  is a  full  discussion of  tax  levels  and 
the general  problem of  road  taxation  in  the  American  situation in 
Small,  Winston  and  Evans  (1989). 
Weight-distance  taxes  were  introducecl  in New  Zealand  in  1978  under 
the Road  Users  Charges  Act  {1977).  All  vehi:les over  3.5  tonnes 
are  required  to purchase  "distance  licences".  A 41  tonne  six axle 
articulated trailer would  pay  NZ  dollars  520  per  lOOOkm  or  52 
cents  per  km  (approximately  0.54  DM  per  km).  Each  vehicle  paying 
these  charges must  be  fitted with an approved distance measuring 
device  such as  a  •hubodometeru. 
The  USA  already  has  in  use  new  technology  to assist WDT:  Weigh  In 
Motion  (WIM),  Automatic  Vehicle  Identification  (AVI),  and 
Automotive  Vehicle Classification  (AVC).  WIM  technology  uses 
electronic weighing  units  that  can  weigh  trucks  as  they  pass. 
France  has  a  form  of  WDT  introduced  in  1968  as  does  Portugal  which 
introduced  its system  in  1963.  In  Portugal  the  tax  is doubled  for 
trucks operating on  routes  competitive with rail  services.  Ir1  the 
UK  Plowden  (1987)  has  advocated  the  use  of  WDT  as  a  means  of 
limiting  the  c~ccurrf~nce ot external  costs. 
The  suggest ion  for  c\  Europe-wide  WOT  ma<je  in  this  submission  to 
thE~  EP  is not  des igne<l  to  increase  cost-recovery,  nor  is it 
designed  to make  lorries  pay  for  the  damage  they  cause.  Both  of 
these  thinus  might  well  happen  as  a  consequence  of  WDT  but  the 
main  reason  is to  turn off  the  tap  on  a  process which  fuels  higher 
and  higher  levels of  lorry  use  and  imposes  a  spatial  logic  on 
society which  is intrinsically dan1aging  in  every  conceivable  way. 
- 118  -The  WDT  is more  clearly  linked  to  a  desired  change  in  tht~ 
underlying  processes  than  a  fuel  tax  could  be  and  carries 
advantages  for  local  economies  as  opposed  t) thn  internal 
economies  of  large  corporations.  It  is  bet--:er  than  a  fuel  tax  in 
allowing  firH~  tuning  on  VHhicle  types  whict1  it  is df3Sirablc  to 
influence  and  it  is morH  easily  linked  to other  policif~s  such  as 
equalisation  (see  pr·oposal  5),  speed  controls  and  social 
regulation observance. 
Is more  necessary? 
The  four  proposals  are worth  very  little without  some  Europe-wide 
mechanism  for  monitoring  performance  and  acting  on  results.  Any 
environmental  measure without  clear objectives over  a  clear  time 
scale with clear penalties and  incentives  is worthless. 
Proposal  5:  the  creation of  performance  measures  and  financial 
equalisation  schemes  in  Europe. 
Example  1: 
with car  parking it is possible  on  the  basis of work  already 
available to establish a  relationship between  environmental 
performance  and  number  of parking places per  1000  residents. 
Performance  on  this criterion would  be  monitored at  EC  level  and 
•over-suppliers•  would  incur  extra  financial  charges whilst 
"under-suppliers•  would  be  rewarded.  Thus  at national  level  there 
would  be  a  financial  incentive  to  improve  performance  which  would 
complement  the  individual  incentive which  applies at  the  level  of 
employer  or developer  to  reduce  parking places. 
Example  2: 
applying  the  same  principle  the  EC  could monitor  percentaH·~ of 
journeys  by  c;:1r  o·Jer  distances of  less  than  5l(m  (for  example).  On 
the  assumption  thdl  public  transport,  walking  and  cycling  can 
operate  very  successfully at  this  level  countries over  the  norm 
would  be  penalised  and  countries  performing well  would  be 
rewarded. 
Example  3: 
For  lorries the  nonn  could  be  tonne-knl  per  capita of  fr-eight  by 
road  or  distance  travelled  by  vehicles with  a  similar  financial 
equalisation procedure as  in examples  2  and  3. 
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All  financial  gain which  would  accrun  to  individual  countries  if 
proposal  5  were  implemented  should  be  disbur~ed in  a  woy  u1hi ch 
further  nccentuates  the  tendency  which  hns  been  ruwurd~1d.  Thus 
gains  from  car  parking  policies would  be  spent  on  measures  to 
improve  walking,  cycling  and  public  transport.  Guins  from 
performance  improvements  in per  capita  tonne-km  consumption  of 
road  freight  would  be  used  to  improve  combined  trnnsport,  goods 
distribution depots  in  urban  areas  and  physical  relocation of 
ubad-neighbour•  traffic generators  (  a  good  example  of which 
exists in Lancaster  (England)  where  a  very  badly  located 
industrial  estate  (Lune)  generates  traffic  through  residential 
areas  and  whilst  money  could  be  available  for  a  new  road,  none  is 
available  for  re-location). 
Note 
The  full  titles of  the  organisations  referred  to  by  initials are 
as  follows: 
UPI  is  the  Umwelt- unci  Prognose- Institut,  Handschuhsheimer 
Landstr.ll8a,  6900  Heidelberg,  FRG.· 
ILS  is  the  Institut  fur  Landes- und  Stadtentwicklungsforschung  des 
Landes  Nordrhein-Westfalen,  Konigswall  38-40,  4600  Dortmund  1. 
the material  referred  to  is produced  by  Aufgabenbereich  4 
( Verkehr). 
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Introduction 
During the last  few  decades  most EC countries  have experienced a  substantial increase 
in the intensity of agricultural production - particularly with respect  to  chemical inputs 
like  nitrogeneous  fertilizer  and  pesticides.  Pressure  from  economic  and  technological 
forces  has also resulted  in a  persistent trend towards specialization, at  the farm level as 
well as  regionally. 
In recent years there has been growing public and political concern over the adverse envi-
ronmental effects of these changes in agricultural practices. The major issues are the rising 
content of nitrate and pesticide residues in ground and surface water and the side effects 
of pesticides on flora and fauna.  Other areas of concern are soil erosion and the loss of 
habitats  and  amenity caused by modem farming. 
The principal  issues  selected for closer examination in this  report are the use of econo-
mic instruments to reduce the intensity of nitrogenous fertilizer and pesticides. If the use 
of fertilizer  and  pesticides  were  reduced  to  a  socially  acceptable  level  this  would  help 
solving not only the environmental problems but also the  swplus problems in European 
agriculture. 
Market Failure 
In economic  analysis  environmental  damage is  usually associated  with  the  existence of 
market failure - implying that the price mechanism does not provide (sufficient) incentives 
for fmns and households to economize with unpriced resources like environmental goods. 
Therefore, some form of public intervention is needed to ensure a socially acceptable use 
of common resources  like air,  water,  landscape  amenity, etc. 
By  levying taxes on  polluting activities, society can introduce a set of prices for the pri-
vate use of comn1on  resources  such  ac;  the  use of air and  water for  the discharge of wa-
- 124  -~  l 
stes. Thereby, the social costs of pollution can be  imposed on the polluters and cost-rnini-
mizing finns will cut hack on ernissions. Thus, assurning a cost-n1inimizing behaviour by 
all relevm1t  finns, a tax on pollution can achieve a preselected standard for envirorunental 
quality. 
Non-point sources of pollution, like nitrate leaching and pesticide application, cannot be 
monitored on a  widespread basis  at  realistic  costs.  Tills makes  the  use of an emission-
based pollution tax infeasible. Instead, the polluting inputs can be taxed, i.e.  nitrogenous 
fertilizers  and chemical sprays. 
?olicy  Failure 
Environmental problems created by agriculture cannot be ascribed to market failure alone. 
They are also associated  with policy failure. 
The ain1 of the Community's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is primarily to maintain 
fann incomes at a politically acceptable level. Tills has created major distortions in agri-
cultural price relations and contributed to increasing the combined problems of over-pro-
duction and over-intensification. 
Thus, during the last two decades  the intensity of nitrogenous fertilizer has increased by 
more than 50 per cent and the intensity of pesticide application has about doubled. In the 
same period yield in grain production has increased by one third leading to considerable 
surplus-production, budgetary tensions and trade conflicts with the traditional grain export-
ing countries. 
However,  it  must be emphasized that reductions  in crop prices will not suffice to  solve 
the  environmental problems in EC agriculture - mainly  because application of fertilizer 
and pesticides is  rather insensitive to changes in crop prices. Similarly, the land set-aside 
and  extensification programmes  will  affect  only a  limited  part of the  agricultural area. 
There  is  a  need,  therefore,  to  focus  attention  on policy  measures  that  could  achieve  a 
significant reduction in the overall intensity of agriculture and surplus-production as  well. 
In this context input taxes and/or quotas on nitrogenous fertilizer and pesticides would be 
a  useful  supplement/alternative  to  present  EC policies  aiming  mainly  at  reducing  crop 
prices and implementing supply management schemes. 
Policy  Measures  to  Reduce  Nitrogen  Intensity 
In the  following  the results of Danish studies  will be presented to  illustrate the  inlplica-
tions of using various economic policy instruments to achieve a reduction in the  intensity 
of nitrogenous  fertilizer. Table  I shows  the  impacts of the  following  policy measures: 
- Reduction in crop prices; 
- Tradeable quota on  nitrogen  in  conunercial fertilizer, 
- Tax/product charge on nitrogen  in conunercial fertilizer. 
The findings  are not limited to  Derunark.  Other European studies indicate that  they  will 
apply  to a large extent to  most EC countries  in northern and  central Europe. 
Crop Price Reduction 
As already mentioned, price cuts would have to  be very substantial to  significantly affect 
the overall intensity of crop production. 
Table I shows that to generate a 30-35 per cent reduction in optimum nitrogen rates, crop 
prices  would  have to  fall  by  about 50 per cent.  This would  result in land rents  (net re-
turns)  dropping below zero for most soils  - and  eventually force  these lands out of pro-
duction. Consequently, a balance between supply and demand for agricultural conunodities 
would  no  doubt  be reached long before output prices  would actually  have fallen  by 50 
per cent implying that most  agricultural land would still be  farmed  at a  higher nitrogen 
intensity than environmentally desirable. 
Table  I.  Economic  Impacts  of  Measures  to  Reduce  Nitrogen  Intensity  In  Denmark 
(Heavy Soli), 1988 Prices 
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Source:  Rude  and Dubgaard,  1989. 
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Thus, measures  that could achieve an  overall reduction  in nitrogen intensity would  be  an 
interesting  altemative/suppleinent  to  the  present  EC  policies  aiming  mainly  at  reducing 
output  by forcing  marginal  hu1d  out  of production. 
Taxation as a  Means of Reducing Nitrogen Intensity 
Economic  measures  of controlling  the  use  of nitrogenous  fertilizer  in Danish  agriculture  have 
been studied  using nitrogen  response  functions. 
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tax  on  nitrogen  in  commercial  fertilizers  to  achieve  a  25-30  per  cent  reduction  in  the  use  of 
inorganic  nitrogen. 
A 150 per cent increase in the nitrogen price would reduce land rent  by  up to one third on good 
soil while land rent would drop below zero on many poorer soils.  A tax reimbursement scheme 
would  therefore  have  to  be  implemented, if significant  producer  (landowner)  losses  should  be 
avoided. An administratively fairly simple scheme would be to  refund the revenue at  a flat  rate 
per hectare. If tax proceeds  are  reimbursed,  the  loss  incurred  by  farmers  would  be  reduced  to 
about  10  per cent of the present land  rent for most rotations on  good soil. 
Reimbursement would not affect the  incentives  to  decrease nitrogen  application rates, provided 
tax  proceeds  are  reimbursed  in  the  form  of lump-sum payments,  i.e.  payments independent of 
the  nitrogen tax paid by  the  individual farmer. 
The income  effects  of an  input  tax  could also  be  reduced  significantly  by  levying  the  tax  on 
marginal  quantities  of the  input only.  A marginal  tax on nitrogenous  fertilizer  could  be imple-
mented by allocating a tax-free amount (quota) of nitrogen to farmers and taxing additional nitro-
gen  purchased.  Depending  on the  size  of tax-free  allocations  this would  affect economic  beha-
viour in the same way  as  a nitrogen tax levied (by  the same rate) on the total amount of nitro-
gen purchased, but income effects would not be nearly as great (see Rude and Dubgaard, 1989). 
Quota Regulation of Nitrogen Application 
Alternatively, the use of nitrogen could be controlled by imposing a quota on nitrogen in 
chemical fertilizers. If a market was established for the rights to purchase inorganic nitro-
gen, an optimal distribution of available nitrogen could be found  by the market. This is 
an approach similar to distributing tradeable discharge pennits for point sources of pollu-
tion where cost effective monitoring of emissions is  possible. 
Quota  regulation  has  certain  advantages  compared  to  input  taxation.  First of all,  input 
quotas  would have much less effect on farm income than an input tax (as seen in table 
I) provided that  they are allocated to  farmers  free of  charge.  However, if tax proceeds 
are reimbursed,  the income effects  would  tend  to  be  the same in both alternatives  (see 
Rude and Dubgaard,  1989).  It  might be a  psychological advantage, though,  that  money 
would not have to  circulate through a  transfer system in the quota alternative. 
Yet, the predictability of the quantitative outcome of input quota regulation is  no doubt 
a more important advantage. If input quotas are used, regulatory authorities will not have 
to  make estimates of the  likely  response  by  fanners  to  changes  in price relations.  The 
total amount of inorganic nitrogen applied would be given in advance while the distribu-
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determined  by  the  market. 
The incentives to adjust cropping patterns to include more nitrogen fixing  legumes would 
be  the same in the quota and the  taxation alternatives. 
Taxation of Pesticides 
Pesticides are not a homogeneous group of products. Furthermore, there are considerable 
regional and armual variations in the need for pest control. Therefore, quantitative restric-
tions in the form quotas would probably be inefficient as a means of controlling pesticide 
application. The only manageable control policy would be the. use of economic measures 
in the form of a  tax or charge on pesticides. 
The effects in Denmark of taxing pesticides were estimated for a levy that would increase 
the average pesticide price by about 120 per cent. The estimated total effects of levying 
a  tax of. this magnitude would be  a reduction of pesticide application by 40-45 per cent 
(see Dubgaard,  1987). 
Land rent would be reduced by about  15  per cent (on good soil). However, the income 
effects of a pesticide tax could be neutralised to  a considerable extent by reimbursing the 
tax proceeds to agriculture - for example at a  flat rate per hectare. 
Subsidies to  Environmentally Beneficial Services 
From a social point of view most agricultural land serves multiple purposes. Besides per-
forming the function as a factor of production in agriculture it provides a number of non-
market social benefits, the most important being: Ecological benefits associated with the 
function  of agricultural  land  as  a  wildlife  habitat  and  a  source  of ground  and  surface 
water supply;  and visual-cultural benefits  comprising recreational and aesthetic services. 
Being largely external to the land owner these benefits are common property and the indi-
vidual  fanner has  little  or no  incentive  to  unprove or preserve  the  capacity of the  land 
to  produce such envirorunental services. 
Therefore, to  the extent that it is  socially advantageous, society should provide incen~ives 
for farmers to provide environmentally beneficial services - for example by supporting the 
preservation of tradional production systems, maintenance of valuable landscape features 
and  provision of recreational opportunities. Subsidies could also be  used  to create incen-
tives  to  implement  environmentally more favourable  production  methods  - for  exan1ple 
organic (chemical-free) practices. 
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It  is  difficult to  forecast  the effects on output from a  reduction of intensities  in  crop pro-
duction - inter alia because a significant increase in the price of nitrogenous fertilizer and 
pesticides  would make the  use  of these  inputs  more efficient  (and  less  polluting). 
Assuming for  example a  25-30 per cent  reduction  in  the  use of nitrogen  in  com1nercial 
fertilizer  and  a  40-50 per cent  reduction in pesticide application,  the  output  effects  can 
be  tentatively  estimated to  a  10-15 per cent fall  in total crop production. 
For the EC as  a  whole the  grain surplus is  about  15 per cent of total production. A  10-
15  per cent fall in EC crop production would therefore result in an appreciable alleviation 
of surplus  problems  - and  the  strain on EC  fmances  from  the  disposal  of agricultural 
surplus-production. 
The Cap Requires a  Common Environmental  Policy for EC  Agriculture 
The supranational character of the CAP enables a Member State to  transfer most of the 
marginal  costs  of its  own  contribution  to  agricultural  surplusses  to  the  other  Member 
States. A "free rider"  problem like this does no doubt influence Member States' environ-
mental policy for agriculture.  By  responding to  internal EC prices rather than world mar-
ket prices the costs of reducing the intensity of agricultural production will be overvalued 
by national policy makers. 
In  other  words,  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  the  individual  Member  States  will 
attach much importance to  savings on the EC budget when detenni:1ing  their own policy 
for agriculture. If anything,  the  negative  output effects  of reducing  intensity  will  rather 
be seen as  a disadvantage from  a national point of view. 
There  is  a  need,  therefore,  to  establish  a  common  input  pricing  policy  for  EC  agricul-
ture  using  charges  on nitrogen  and  pesticides,  especially,  to  ensure  that  the  intensity  of 
these  yield  increasing  and  environmentally  damaging  inputs  will  be  socially  acceptable 
fro1n  a Conununity  point of view. 
Farnu·rs'  llu:onH.•s  Need  11ot  he  Affected 
A, common input taxation policy  in  the EC would  1na.ke  it  possible  to  alleviate  the pres-
sure on crop prices because surplus problems would be reduced or eliminated. It  is  in1por-
tant  to  note in this context that  a compensatory increase in crop prices would not  neutra-
lize  the  effects  of pollution taxes  on  the  use  of nitrogen and  pesticides. 
- 129  -Thus,  let  us  assun1c  that  uitrogcn  usc  was  to  be  reduced  by  lor cxmnpk  :25  per ccut 
through a nitrogen tax. This  would reduce land rent by about  10 per cent on the average 
(provided  that  the  tax  revenue  was  returned  to  agriculture).  This  income  loss  could  be 
offset by increasing crop prices  by  about 5  per cent which in  tum would lead  to  an  in-
crease in nitrogen  use  by  (no  more)  than  1-2  per cent - implying that net  reductions  in 
nitrogen use  would remain close  to  the  targeted  25 per cent mentioned above. 
In fact grain prices would not have to be increased to compensate fanners for higher fer-
tilizer  prices.  By  removing  the  present  co-responsibility  levy  on grain,  the  grain  price 
obtained by  fanners  would increase  by  about  5 per cent. 
Conclusions 
In EC agriculture environmental problems and surplus problems are interrelated. There is 
a need, therefore,  to  implement a Common Environmental Policy for EC Agriculture to 
achieve environmental goals  as  well  as  a  reduction in surplus-production. 
The most efficient policy instruments  in  this  context are input  charges on fertilizer and 
pesticides or limitations in the  use of these inputs  through tradeable input quotas. 
Fann incomes would not have to  be dramatically affected by such a policy. The income 
effects of input charges could be neutralized to a large extent by reimbursing the revenue 
to agriculture and existing EC support schemes could be adjusted to compensate farmers 
for  the  remaining income loss. 
The support programmes of the CAP have stimulated surplus-production resulting in inter-
national trade conflicts. A transformation of existing support programmes into environmen-
tal incentives also alleviating surplus problems would make it easier to reach compromises 
in international  trade  negotiations. 
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"Wir  leben  in  einer  Phase  der  Geschichte  der  Nationen,  die  wie 
keine  zuvor  Bedarf  hat  nach  internationaler  Kooperation  und  \er-
antwortung",  so  hei!3t  es  im  Brundtland-Bericht  ("Our  Common 
Future"),  einem  globalen Aufruf  zur  Aktivierung  gemeinsamer 
Uberlebensinteressen  und  besonders  zur  Verminderung  der  Ressour-
cenverschwendung  und  der  Umweltverschmutzung.  "Das  Ausmar3  der  . 
Ressourcenverschwendung  in  den  Industrielandern  ist  weder  fur 
diese  noch  fUr  die  Welt  als  Ganzes  aufrechtzuerhalten.  Die  Um-
weltverschmutzung,  zunachst  nur  als  Problem  der  reichen  Lander 
und  als  Nebeneffekt  industriellen  Wachstums  verstanden,  ist  in-
zwischen  zu  einem  Uberlebensthema  fur  viele  Entwicklungslander 
geworden.  Viele  der  derzeitigen  Versuche  zur  Sicherung  und 
Steigerung des  Lebensstandards,  zur  Bedurfnisbefriedigung  und  zur 
Verwirklichung  menschlicher  Ambitionen  sind nicht durchzuhalten  -
weder  in  den  reichen  noch  in  den  armen  Landern". 
U  . S  i mo n i s  un d  E  . U  . v . We i z  s a c k  e r  s c h r e i ben  i n  i h  r e r  S t u die  ( 2 )  u  be r 
globale  Umweltprobleme  dazu  welter: 
"Die  weltweite  Umweltdiskussion  begann  mit  dem  Sichtbarwerden  der 
okologischen Effekte der  Okonomie.  Nun  beginnt  das  Bewur3twerden 
der  okonomischen Effekte  der  okologie.  Luft-,  Wasser-,  Boden- und 
Abfallprobleme  haben  erhebliche  Auswirkugnen  auf  die  Funktions-
fahigkeit  der  Okonomie.  Nachdem  die  Verschuldugnskrise  die  oko-
nomischen  Abhangigkeiten  der  Nationen  deutlich  sichtbar  gemacht 
hat,  macht  die  Umweltkrise  deren  okologische  Interdependenz  bewur3t
11
• 
Okologie  und  Okonomie  werden·  immer  intensiver verflochten-
lokal,  national  und  global  und  die  Erkenntnis  hieruber  nimmt 
rasch  zu.  Umweltprobleme  treten heute  in  den  armen  Landern  als 
Folgen  von  Uberbewirtschaftungen  genau  so  auf,  wie  in  den  reichen 
Landern  als  Folge  ihres  materiellen  Uberflusses.  Gleichzeitig 
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laGt  die  Verschuldenskrise  die  Umweltkrise  aber  als  unlosbar 
erscheinen;  zumindest  stehen  viele  Entwicklungslander  unter 
einem  enormen  okonomischen  Druck,  ihre  Ressourcenbasis  ubermaGig 
auszubeuten  und  ihre naturliche  Umwelt  zu  belast~n.  Auf  diese 
enge  Verknupfung  von  Wirtschaft  und  Umwelt  aber  sind  die 
nationalen  wie  die  internationalen Institutionen nicht  oder  nicht 
hinreichend  ausgerichtet.  Derzeit  ist es  so,  daG  die  Akteure, 
deren  Handeln  die  Umwelt  schadigt,  nur  schwer  in  die  Verantwortung 
einbezogen  werden  konnen,  und  im  konkreten  Konfliktfall mit  der 
Wirtschaft,  dem  Verkehr,  der  Landwirtschaft  und  dem  Militar 
bleibt  die  Umwelt  sowohl  national  als  auch  international  der 
Schwachere.  Und  damit  sind wir  beim  Thema:  Wirtschaftliche 
Instrumente  in  der  Abfallwirtschaftspolitik  in  Bezug  auf  Europa. 
2.0  Abfallprobleme 
Der  amer ikanische  Okonom  G. Roegen  formulierte  drasti sch:  "Die 
industrielle  Okonomie  verlangt  die  schnelle  Umformung  wertvoller 
Ressourcen  in  nutzlosen Abfall".  Unser  derzeitiges  Wirtschafts-
system  erzeugt  zwangslaufig  und  systematisch  Abfall.  Das  mitt-
lerweile  weltweit  beklagte  Mullproblem  ist das  konsequente  Er-
gebnis  unserer effektiven  Produktionsmaschinerie.  Wir  wissen 
nicht mehr,  was  wir  mit  dem  UberfluG  an  Gutern  machen  sollen.  Wir 
werfen  ihn  weg.  Unsere  Gesellschaft  hat  sich  zu  einer  reichen 
Wegwerfgesellschaft  entwickelt.  Die  Okonomie  der  Ressourcenbe-
wirtschaftung  unserer  Alten  ist  vergessen  und  gilt als  anti-
quiert.  Jeder  Vorstand  ist stolz  auf  seine  Produktionssteigerun-
gen  am  Ende  eines  Geschaftsjahres  und  doch  hat  er  in  erdgeschicht-
lichen  Zeitraumen  gedacht  nur  Abfall  produziert.  Bei  dieser  Be-
trachtunq~wei~~c  ist  zugegebenerweise  die  Bewertung  der  dazwischen-
liegenden  GQternutzung  unberOcksichtigt. 
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Ot;t)  n  1  n  ~ Die  moderne  dkonomie  kennt  zwar  die  Produktionsfaktoren  Arbelt, 
Kapital  und  Boden,  aber  sie  hat  bisher  trotz  vieler  Bemuhungen, 
noch  kein  adaquates  Mittel  zur  Internalisierung  von  Umweltkosten 
gefunden.  In  diesem  besonderen  Faile:  es  gibt keine  Antwort  auf 
die  Frage,  was  mit  einem  Produkt  nach  Nutzung  oder  Geberauch  z.u 
erfolgen hat.  Das  Produkt  wird  im  Hinblick  auf seinen  Nutzen  ent-
worfen  und  produziert.  Die  Antwort  auf die  Frage  was  nach  der 
Nutzung  kommt,  bleibt  meist  unbeantwortet. 
Diese  Frage  war  zwar  auch  Gegenstand  volkswirtschaftliche  Theorie-
bildung  (Physikratischer  Ansatz,  Property  Rights  Theory).  Sie  hat 
aber  keine  Umsetzung  in  die  Praxis  gefunden.  Fruher  erschienen 
die  Ressourcen  unerschopflich  und  man  konnte  von  ungesattigten 
Markten  ausgehen,  deren  stetiger  Bedarf die  neuen  Guterund 
Produkte  aufnimmt,  ohne  die  gebrauchten  zu  verdrangen.  Spater 
wiesen  u.a.  Meadows  und  Forrester auf  die  Begrenztheit  der 
Ressourcen  hin  und  die  Produktlebenszyklusanalyse  trug  der  zu-
nehmenden  Marktsattigung Rechnung. 
Bel  niedrigen Energie- und  Rohstoffpreisen  vergroGerte  sich  der 
Materialstrom  standig  und  seine  Geschwindigkeit  von  der  Rohstoff-
gewinnung  bis  zum  Verbraucher  beschleunigte  sich standig.  Die 
Gesellschaft  entwickelte  sich  von  einer  materiellen  Mangelgesell-
schaft  zur  UberfluG- und  Wegwerfgesellschaft.  Der  zunehmende  Ma-
terialstrom  findet  sich,  wenn  auch  verschlusselt,  im  steten 
Wachstum  der  Unternehmen  wieder.  Dabei  wird  nicht  verkannt,  daG 
das  heutige  Wachstum  des  SSP  in  unserem  Land  eng  mit  dem 
wachsenden  Dienstleistungssektor  zusammenhangt,  der  weitgehend 
vern  materiellen  Wachstum  entkoppelt  ist.  Trotzdem  gibt  es  bis 
heute  keine,  analog  zur  Geldwirtschaft  ausgebildete,  Energie- und 
Stoffbilanz  der  Unternehmen.  Auch  an  diesem  Mangel  zeigt  sich die 
geringe  Aufmerksamkeit,  die  der  Unternehmer  diesen  Gesichtspunkt 
beimiGt.  Der  sparsame  Umgang  mir  Rohstoffen  ist nur  wichtig 
soweit  er  sich in  Geld  ausdrucken  laGt.  Er  ist unwichtig  was 
seine  Eigenschaft  als  endliche Ressource  angeht. 
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Gemeinschaft  werden.  Wenn  man  den  Waren-,  Kapital- und  Personal-
austausch  f order t,  in  dem  man  national  e  Beschr ankun gen  und  Be-
grenzungen  aufhebt,  dann  wird  auch  die  Cahrakterisierung  des 
Abfallproblems  als StoffluGproblem  deutlicher.  Man  kann  sich mit 
den  Abfallen als  Phanomen  beschaftigen.  Man  kann  ihre  Sammlung, 
ihren  Transport  und  ihre  Entsorgung  be schreiben  und  regeln.  Dies 
ist aber  ungenUgend,  wenn  man  eine  zukUnftige  Wirtschaftspoliltik 
entwirft,  wie  es derzeit  geschieht,  deren  zwangslaufige  Folge  die 
Produktion  von  Abfall ist. Abfallprobleme  haben  danach  mindestens 
s6viel  mit  Ressourcenpolitik,  Technologieentwicklung,  Produkt-
marketing  u. a.  zu  tun,  als  mit  der  Frage,  wie  man  s ich  ihren  ent-
ledigt,  ohne  daO  kostspielige Spatfolgcn  zu  berijcksichtigen  sind. 
Diese  VerknGpfung  spiegelt  sich  in  der  derzeitiqen EG-Politik 
n i c h t  w  i e d e r .  Da  w  i r d  A  b fa 11 w  i r t s c h a f t s p  o  1  i t i k ,  n  a c h  me i n  e m 
Geschmack  vie!  zu  sehr als  Teil  der  Umweltpolitik  gesehen  und 
damit  Werden  grundsatzliche  okonomische  Zusammenhange  Ubersehen. 
Die  Beobachtungen,  daO  es  nichts gibt,  was  nicht  gleichzeitig 
Abfall  und  Rohstoff  ist,  gerat dabei  vollig  in Vergessenheit. 
Abfall  ist nicht naturwissenschftlich  zu  definieren,  sondern 
durch  die  Werte,  die  die  Besitzer  der  GUter  und  Produkte  damit 
verbinden.  FUr  uns  sind  Dinge  Abfall,  die  in  armen  Landern  oder 
Gesellschaften  noch  Rohstoff  sind.  Wer  will  da  sinnvolle  adminis-
trative  Grenzen  ziehen?  Die  Abfallwirtschaft ist die  andere  Seite 
einer  Medaille,  namlich  industrieller  Weltwirtschaft,  und  so  muG 
sie  auch  gehandhabt  werden. 
3.0 Ziele  der  Abfallwirtschaft 
Die  Abfallwirtschaft ist  durch  drei  Bereiche charakterisiert.  Der 
erste  Bereich  umfaGt  die  Beschaffung  der  Rohstoffe,  ihre 
Verarbeitung,  ihr  Marktwert,  die  Seltenheit  ihres  Vorkommens  bzw. 
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Rohstoffen  und  Gutern.  Wen  rijhrt  es,  wenn  die  Industrielander 
Metalle  in  Form  von  Halbzeug  und  f,~rtigprodukten,  Obst  in 
Konserven,  Fasern  in  Form  von  Zellstoff einfuhren  und  die  Export-
lander  mit  den  damit  verbundenen  Umweltproblemen  alleine lassen. 
Wer  wundert  sich eigentlich  ernsthaft daruber,  daG  z .B.  die 
standigen  Einfuhren  von  Futtermitteln zur  Viehzucht,  von  Metallen 
fur  hochwertige  Industrieguter,  von  Brennstoffen  zur  Energie-
gewinnung,  bei  den  Importlandern als Stoffsenke  wirken.  In  den 
Landern  reichern sich  Produktionsruckstande  in  Form  von  Stauben, 
Schlacken  und  Schlammen  an.  Ein  Teil  der  erzeugten  Produkte 
verbleibt  im  Lande  und  muG  als  Mull  entsorgt  werden. 
SchlieGlich  verteilen sich Steffe  diffus nach  den  Gesetzen. 
der  Entroplc  und  reichern  FluCsedlmente,  StraOcnbegleitgrUn, 
Klarschlamm  u.a.  mit  Schadstoffen  an.  Wen  ruhrt  es  an,  wenn  wir 
Transformatoren  mit  Hydraulikol  gefullt oder  Behaltnisse  mit 
Pestiziden  gefullt oder  Kuhlaggregate  mit  FCKW  exportieren, 
obwohl  wir  ganz  genau  wissen,  daG  die  Importlandern  uber  keine 
oder  keine  ausreichende  Infrastruktur verfugen,  urn  mit  diesen 
Geraten  und  ihren  Betriebsmitteln nach  dem  Gebrauch  des  Produkts 
fertigzuwerden?  Wurde  man  eine  Ruckna~me der  Produkte  durch  die 
Erzeuger  fordern,  wurde  weltweit  ein Sturm  der  Entrustung  aus-
brechen.  Man  wurde  Handelshemmnisse  erkennen  und  den  internatio-
nalen  Wettbewerbsdruck  zitieren,  urn  nachzuweisen,  wie  unsinnig 
diese  Forderung  ware.  Abfallwirtschaft  zu  betreiben  heiGt:  spar-
samer  wirtschaften,  eine  Forderung  die  nicht  unbestritten ist. 
So  aber  sind  wir  mittlerweile einig,  wie  verwerflich  der  Export 
von  Giftmull  in  Lander  der  Dritten  Welt  ist. 
Wir  brauchen  uns  dann  uber  die  Konsequenz  eines  weltweiten 
Handels  mit  Produkten,  die  alle Abfall  werden,  keine  unnotigen 
Gedanken  zu  machen. 
- 138  -
066  01  05 de r  En e r g  i e  .1 u f wan d  z u  i h r e r  G  e w  i n  n u n g .  De r  z  w  e i t e  3  e r e i c h  u m  fa  f3 t 
die  Tech n i k  de r  u  m  we l t f r e u n  d l i c h e n ,  1 a n g  z e i t s i c h e r ·; n  A  b 1 a g e r u  n  g . 
Damit  verknupft  sind die  Standortfragen,  der  Flachenbedarf,  die 
chemisch/physikalische  Vorbehandlung,  die  Uberwachung,  die  Kosten 
u  n  d  s c h  1 i e  131 i c h  d  i e  A  k z  e p t a n z  de r  8 e t e i 1 i g  t e n .  De r  d r i t t e  8 e r e i c h 
schlieBlich  liegt dazwischen.  Er  umfaGt  die  Konseqnzen  der 
Technologie  mit  der  Produkte  und  GUter  erzeugt  werden  und 
schlieGlich  die  Erzeugung  und  die  Verteilung der  Guter  selbst. 
Damit  lassen sich drei  Abfallarten unterscheiden.  Die  sogenannte 
produktionsspezifischen Abfalle.  Sie entstehen bei  der  Gewinnung, 
beim  AufschluG  von  Rohstoffen  und  der  Herstellung  der  Vorprodukte. 
Beispiel  dafUr  sind  Abfalle  aus  der  Kohlegewinnung,  Kohleverstro-
mung,  Zementindustrie,  Stahlindustrie,  NE  Verhuttung  u.a. 
Diese  Abfallmengen  gehen  tendentiell  zuruck,  weil  wir  diese  Vor-
produkte  zunehmend  importieren  und  die  eigentliche  Gewinnung  mit 
ihren Abfallen  in  die  Exportlander  ausgegliedert  haben.  Diese 
Strategie verlangt  aber  ausreichendes  Kapital  urn  die  Rohstoffe  zu 
kaufen  und  ausreichend  Lander  die  verkaufen  wollen.  Sie  macht  die 
Industrielander  weitgehend  abhangig  von  den  Rohstofflieferanten. 
Diese  Strategie  fuhrt  dazu,  daG  die  Importlander  sich  zu  "Stoff-
senken"  entwickeln,  mit  der  Folge,  daG  sich  dart  verstarkt  Schad-
s to f f e  de r  Urn we 1 t we 1 t  m  i t t e i 1 en .  U  n  d  s c h  1 i e G  1 i c h  f G  h r t  d i e s e 
Strategie  dazu,  daG  die  notige  Technologie  zum  Recycling  von 
Produkten  und  Gutern,  soweit  diese  Technologie  mit  der  der 
Gewinnung  und  Aufkonzentration  identisch ist,  nicht  vorhanden  ist 
und  nicht  entwickelt  wird.  Abfalle  mussen  also exportiert  werden, 
urn  sie  stofflich  verwerten  zu  konnen. 
AuG e rd em  g  e hen  d i e  p r o d u k t i on s s p e z i  f i s c h e n  A b f zi 11 e  z u r u  c k ,  we i 1 
zunehmend  bessere  Technologien,  geschlossene  Kreislaufe,  Ruck-
fuhrmaGnahmen  u.a.  eingesetzt  werden. 
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nicht  integrierten  UmweltschutzmaGnahmen  wie  filtern,  klaren etc. 
dazu  fuhren,  daG  Steffe  nicht  in der  Uwmelt  verteilt  werden, 
sondern  in  Form  von  Stauben,  Schlammen,  Filtermassen  u.a.  als 
Feststoffe  und  Abfalle  weiterzubehandeln sind. 
Man  konnte  behaupten:  Je  weiter  entwickelt  eine  Volkswirtschaft 
ist,  je  weiter  entwickelt  der  sekundare  und  tertiare  Bereich 
ist,  umso  geringer  werden  die  spezifischen  Produktionsruck-
stande. 
Anders  ist  dies  bei  den  Produkten  selbst.  Jedes  Produkt,  ob 
Frischhaltefolie,  Getrankebuchse,  TV,  Auto  oder  Gebaude  wird 
nach  einer  gewissen  Lebens- und  Nutzungsdauer  zu  Abfall.  Es  ist 
eine  Frage  des  Werkstoffes  und  der  Konstruktion,  ob  eine  stoff-
liche  Verwertung  m6glich  ist und  es  ist eine  Frage der  Okonomie, 
ob  den  Kosten  fur  Sammlung,  Transport  und  Dekonstruktion  der 
gebrauchten  Guter  und  Produkte,  ausreichende  Erloseaus  dem  Ver-
kauf  der  Altstoffe  gegenUberstehen.  Derzeit  kann  man  davon 
ausgehen,  daG  zwischen  30  und  50  %  der  eingesetzten  Materialien 
aus  verwerteten  Materialien  bestehen.  Dies  trifft bei 
Kunststoffen  nicht  zu. 
Sie  sind  der  Prototyp  fur  die  derzeitige Produktentwicklung.  Sie 
ist charakterisiert durch  anwendungsspezifische  Verbundwerk-
stoffe  und  Verbundkonstruktionen,  durch  zunehmende  Veredelung 
mittels chemischer  Hilfsstoffe  und  durch  Miniaturisierung.  Ver-
bundkunststoffe,  Glasfaser- und  Keramikwerkstoffe,  Hochleistungs-
Legierungen  u.a.  sind die  Werkstoffe  der  Zukunft.  Die  heute 
recycelten  Werkstoffe  wie  Papier,  Glas,  Stahl,  GuG,  Steine,  lie-
gel,  Holz  sind  dagegen  die  Werkstoffe  der  Vergangenheit.  Bei  den 
neuen  Werkstoffen  ist eine  stoffliche  Verwertung  meist  gar  nicht 
mehr  moglich.  Hier  werden  technisch?  Entwicklungen  ein 
politisches  Ziel,  namlich  stoffliches Recycling,  moglicherweise 
obsolet  machen. 
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Die  Verwertung  setzt  auOerdem  Markte  fur  die  ge wonnenen  Produkte 
voraus,  die  sich  bei  den  derzeitigen  niedrigen  Weltmarktpreisen 
fur  Primarrohstoffe  meist  nicht  ausbilden.  AuGerdem  spielen 
Grunde  der  Produktnormung  (Funktion  des  CEN),  der  Gewahrleistung, 
der  Betriebskonstanz  groGer  Produktionseinheiten,  der  Bequem-. 
lichkeiten  und  der  betriebswirtschaftliche  Okonomie  eine  groGe 
Rolle,  den  Einsatz  von  Sekundarrohstoffen nicht  auszuweiten. 
Die  Alternative  Strategie  zur  Verwertungsstrategie  ist die 
Strategie  der  Dauerhaftigkeit.  Durch  Modulbauweise,  langlebige 
und  reparaturfreundliche  Konstruktionen,  Mehrfachnutzung, 
Nutzungsstufen,  Simultationstechniken  laOt  sich  der  Rohstoff-
einsatz  mindern,  die  Produktionslebensdauer  verlangern,  ohne  daO 
damit  Abstriche  an  Produktionsnutzung  oder  der  Berucksichtigung 
wichtiger  Innovationen  gemacht  werden  mussen.  Allerdings  sei 
darauf  verwiesen,  daO  bei  dynamischer  Betrachtung sich  auch  zu 
weniger  Ressourcenverbrauch/Umweltbeeintrachtigung  fuhrende 
Innovationen schwieriger  umsetzen! 
Diese  Strategie vermindert  die  Guter- und  Produktmenge.  Die  Um-
satzruckgange  auf  der  Produktionsseite  mussen  kompensiert  werden 
durch  Beratungs-,  Pflege- und  Reparaturaufwand.  Die  Folge  ware 
eine  Umstrukturierung  gewisser  Produktionslinien. 
Und  schlieOlich gilt es die  Infrastrukturabfalle  zu  betrachten. 
Darunter  verstehen  wir  Abfalle  die  durch  das  Vorhalten  von  Infra-
strukturelementen  der  offentlichen  Hand  wie  StraOen,  Bahnen, 
Kanalen,  Krankenhausern,  Labors,  entstehen  und  deren  Entsorgungs-
kosten  haufig  keinem  Verursacher  zugerechnet  werden  konnen 
sondern  aus  allgemeine  Steuermitteln gedeckt  werden  mussen.  Als 
Beispiele  solcher  Abfalle  gelten:  StraOenkehrricht,  Kanal- und 
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Komposte  aus  unsortierten  hausmull,  Baggergut,  Hafen- und  See-
schlamme  u.a.  mehr.  Diese  Abfalle  nehmen  in  der  Tendenz  stark  zu. 
Haufig  sind  auch  sie  das  Ergebnios  verstarkter  Umweltbemuhungen. 
Sehr  unangenehm  ist dabei,  daG  es  sich haufig  urn  Stoffmengen 
handelt,  die  fruher  problemlos  recycelt  wurden  und  deren  zu-
nehmende  Schadstoffgehalte dies  heute  nicht  mehr  erlaubt. 
Urn  mit  all •  diesen  Abfallen  umzugehen,  gibt es mittlerweile  eine 
weitgehende  Ubereinstimmung  in  den  politischen  Zielen  und  den 
einzuschlagenden Strategien.  Auch  die  EG  hat  in  ihren  Dokumenten 
fur  den  Umweltschutz  diese  Zielhierarchie  nochmals  bekraftigt: 
- Abfallvermeidung 
- Abfallverwertung 
- Schadlose  Ablagerung. 
Wie  lassen sich mit  okonomischen  Anreizen  diese  Ziele  besser 
erreichen? 
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4.0  Okonomische  Instrumente 
4.1  Grundsatzliche  Anmerkungen 
Die  soziale  Marktwirtschaft  muG  durch  einen  okologischen 
Rahmen  zur  "okologisch  und  sozialen  Marktwirtscha ft" 
vervollstandigt  werden.  Welche  Instrumente  sind  geeignet, 
diesen  Rahmen  in quantitativer  Hinsicht  zu  definieren?  Zur 
Verfugung  stehen  ordnungsrechtliche  und  "marktwirtschaftliche", 
also  okonomische  Losungen.  In  bezug  auf die  Abfallpolitik  hat 
der  Gesetzgeber  sich  fur  staatliche  Verantwortung  fur  eine 
gesicherte  Entsorgung  entschieden  und  ein  System  der  Abfall-
entsorgung  gescha ffen,  das  d urch  die  Uberlassungspf licht 
der  Abfallbesitzer,  die  Entsorgungspflicht  fur ·affentlich-
rechtliche  Korperschaften  sowie  die  Anlagenbenutzungspflicht 
gekennzeichnet ist.  Trotz  dieses  eingefuhrten  Entsorgungssystems 
steigt das  Abfallvolumen. standig.  Daruber  hinaus ·uberfordert 
das  eingefuhite  System die  entsorgungspflichtigen  K6rperschaften 
dadurch,  da8  durch  das  staatliche  Entsorgungsmonopol  die 
privaten  Abfallbesitzer  zu  einer  im  wesentlichen  passiven  F~olle 
bei  der  Abfallentsorgung  gedrangt  werden.  Es  sollte  uber  e. ne 
neue  langfristige  Aufgabenverteilung  zwischen privater 
Produktion  und  offentliche  Entsorgung  nachgedacht  werden. 
"Die  Umweltokonomik  konfrontiert  die  ordnungsrechtliche  Strategie 
der  bisherigen  Umweltpolitik  mit  einer  marktwirtschaftlichen 
beziehungsweise  marktkonformen  Alternative.  An  die  Stelle  be-
hordlicher  Einzelzuteilung  zulassiger  Umweltnutzungen  zum  Null-
tarif  und  nach  dem  Windhundverfahren  setzt sie einen  preislichen 
Sanktionsmechanismus,  der  daruber  befindet,  inwieweit  zulassige 
Umweltnutzungen  im  Einzelfall  in  Anspruch  genommen  oder  unt.er-
1  a s s en  we r den .. "  ( Z  i tat :  Han s me y  e r IS c h  n  e ide  r ,  " Z  u  r  F or t e n t w  i c k 1 u  n g 
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Die  okonomischen  Instrumente  ubernehmen  bei  der  Verteilung  der 
verknappten  Nutzungspotentiale  auf die  Nutzungsinteressenten 
eine  wichtige  Informations-,  Selektionsund  Lenkungsfunktion,  in 
dem  sie  den  einzelnen  Nutzer  zur  Mengenanpassung  an  Preise  bzw. 
Kosten  zwingen.  Durch  marktwirtschaftliche  Instrumente  wird 
also  auf  der  Verursacherseite  idealiter  jeder  umweltbeanspruchen-
den  Nutzung,  jedem  Verursacher  von  Umweltqualitatsbeeintrachti-
gung  Preise  und  damit  Kosten  auferlegt,  und  man  kann  davon 
ausgehen,  dar3  diese  "Zahlungspflichten"  zum  Kriterium  fur  die 
individuellen  Anpassungsentscheidungen  werden. 
Okonomische  Instrumente  der  Mengen- und  Preissteuerung  kon-
nen  nur  dann  wirksam  ausgestal tet  werden,  wenn  ihnen  e ine  kon-
krete  Ziel- und  Programmplanung  zugrunde  gelegt  wird.  Gleich-
zeitig ist ein  umfassendes  Informations- und  Kontrollsystem er-
forderlich,  wenn  von  ihnen  hohe  Zielerreichungsbeitrage  erwar-
tet  werden.  Da  Umweltschutz  bisher offensichtlich  im  wesentli-
chen  als  Verwaltungsau fgabe  ent wickel t  und  prakt izi ert  wurde, 
sollte  fur  die  Zukunft  eine  a4fgaben- und  ergebnisorientierte 
Planung  mit  raumlichem,  medialen  oder  stofflichen  Bezug  und 
preislichen Sanktionsmechanismen  angestrebt  werden;  die  Festle-
gung  von  Vorsorge- und  Sanierungszielen sollte eine  vordring-
liche  umweltplanerische  Aufgabe  von  Bund,  Lander  und  Gemeinden 
sein.  Zu  den  Instrumenten  im  einzelnen und  ihren,  moglichen 
abfallwirtschaftpolitischen Einsatz: 
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Beispiele  moglicher  Mengenlosungen  sind  Zertifikdte  und  Kompen-
Kompensationslosungen.  Zertifikate gel ten  al->  das  "markt-
wirtschaftlichste"  Instrument,  da  sich unter  Modellbedingun.: 
gen  die  insgesamt  zulassigen  Restverschmutzungseinheiten 
festlegen  lassen  und  durch  die  von  staatlicher Seite  vorge-
nommene  Gesamtkontigentierung  sowie  ihre  Trans ferierbarkeit 
Marktpreise entstehen.  Zertifikate  haben  eine  wichtige,  das 
Wirtschaftsgeschehen  lenkende  Eigenschaft:  Sie  kosten  Geld, 
der  Umweltnutzer  bezahlt  den  vom  Markt  bestimmten  Preis  fur 
die  zulassige  Emission,  aber  das  Geld  bleibt  im  privaten 
Sektor.  In  der  konkreten  Abfallwirtschaftspolitik  ware  ihre 
Einsetzbarkeit  jedoch  relativ  gering,  weil  nach  der  bisheri-
gen,  ordnungsrechtlich  gepragten  umweltpolitischen  Grund-
strategie  technische  Mindeststandards  festgelegt,  diese  ad-
ministrativ  fortgeschrieben  und  die  zulassige Restverschmut-
zung  kostenfrei  toleriert  werden.  Aus  diesem  Grund  wird  bei 
der  Einfuhrung  von  Lizenzmodellen  in  einem  ordnungsrechtlich· 
gepragten  System  ein  hoher  Verwaltungs- und  Kontrollaufwand 
erwartet.  Da  ihre  Anwendungsmoglichkeit  nach  meiner 
Einschatzung  im  wesentlichen  bei  der  Minderung  groGraumiger 
Belastungen  (z.B.  durch  klimarelevante Spurengase)  und 
innerhalb  geschlossener  Systeme  (z.B.  Indirekteinleiter  im 
kommunalen  Abwasseranlagensystem)  gesehen  werden,  steht  ihre 
praktische  Handhabung  im  Rahmen  eines  Versuchs  ihrer  pragma-
tischen  Anwendung  und  Anbindung  an  das  Ordnungsrecht  noch 
aus.  Weniger  schwierig  scheint die  Ausgestaltung  von  Kompen-
sationslosungen  zu  sein,  da  diese  als  Bestandteil  des  ord-
nungsrechtlichen  Systems  zu  den  selben  oder  gunstigeren  Er-
gebnissen  bei  begrenzten  Emissionen  und  gleichzeitig gelok-
kertem  Einzelvollzug  der  allgemein  gultigen  Emission..;nc_ .:-~en 
C) I! 1  illlqen  kijrHJI'f1. 
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Gewasser- und  Immissionsschutz  gesehen  (Hansmeyer).  Neuer-
dings  wird  der  Einsatz  von  KompensationsmaOnahmen  in  der  Um-
weltzusammenarbeit  mit  der  DDR  diskutiert.  Hier  kommen  vor  · 
allem  Regelungen  im  Vorsorgebereich  (§  7  Abs.  3  Bundesimmis-
sionsschutz gesetz)  in  Betracht,  in  bezug  auf  die  Abfall wi rt-
schaftspolitik wurden  sich die  Bereiche  Vermeidung  und  Ver-
wertung  e inschl ieGlich  Schad sto ffent frachtung  fur  ge ziel tere 
Uberlegungen  anbieten. 
4o2  Abgaben  und  Steuern 
Beispiele  moglicher  Preislosungen sind  Umweltabgaben  und 
Okosteuern,  die  im  Prinzip  die  Preise  fur  Umweltnutzungen 
fixieren,  und  es  somit  den  Emittenten  uberlassen  bleibt,  zu 
entscheiden,  wieviel  sie angesichts  de$  Festpreises  je 
Schadstoffeinheit emittieren  wollen.  Preislosungen  gelten unter 
okologischen  Gesichtspunkten  als  nicht  unbedenklich:  Die 
Abgabensatze  mGGten  den  Knappheitspreisen  der  insgesamt 
zulassigen  Umweltnutzung  entsprechen.  Allerdings  ist niemand  in 
der  Lnge,  die  Abgabesatze  genau  zu  bestimmen,  die  die 
Einhaltung der  festgelegten  okologischen  Rahmenwerte 
garantieren  wurden.  Knapphei tspre ise  sind  ohne  Markte  n icht 
simulierbar.  AuGerdem  ist die  Anderung  der  Abgabensatze 
aufwendig  und  langwierig,  unabhangig  davon,  ob  sie als  Steuer, 
Gebuhren,  Beitrage  oder  Sonderabgaben  ausgestaltet  sind.  Zu  den 
die  Abgaben  kennzeichnenden  Elementen,  namlich 
- Koppelung  an  das  Ordnungsrecht  zur  Vollzugsunterstutzung, 
- Ausgestaltungsmoglichkeit  als  Lenkungsinstrument  (z.B. 
~urch  Verbesserung  der  Ressourcen)  bzw.  als  Finanzierungs-
instrument  (z.B.  zweckgebundene  Aufkommensverwendung), 
- Uhernahme  der  Vollzugs- und  Kontrollkosten  mindestens  an-
teilig durch  den  Verursacher 
ist viel  geschrieben  worden  (Hansmeyer,  Ewringmann,  Faber). 
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rung  von  Umweltabgaben  fast  unvermeidlich  der  Staatsanteil 
erhoht  .wird  und  dieses  zu  politischem  Zundstoff  we;:den  kann, 
da  wegen  der  Zweckbindung  der  Aufkommensverwendung  keine 
Steuerentlastung  an  anderer Stelle eingefuhrt  werden  kann. 
Diese  Aussage  ist nicht  unbestritten. 
Im  Rahmen  eines  Emissionsabgabenkonzeptes  ware  die  EinfUh-
rung  von  Abgaben  mit  dem  Ziel  einer  marktkonformen  Beein-
flussung  des  Abfallbereiches  eine  sinnvolle  und  konsequente 
Erganzung.  Sie  wurde  deponierungsbedurftige  Abfalle,  Zo8o  im 
Rahmen  einer  ausgestalteten  Deponieabgabe,  ebenso  mit  einer 
Abgabepflicht  - etwa  beim  Anlieferer  oder  auch  Deponiebe-
treiber  - belegen  wie  andere  Emissionsruckstande  aucho  Ent-
sche iden  d·  i st der  Ei genanr e iz,  be i  dem  mit  der  Abgabe  bela-
steten Emittenten  oder  Abfallbesitzer  durch  weitgehende  Ab-
fallvermeidung  die  Abgabelast  moglichst  ZU  senken  und  da-
durch  kostengunstiger  zu  produzieren. 
Die  EinfDh~ung  von  Produktabgaben  wird  von  ~konomen eher 
skeptisch beurteilt:  "Der  erwunschte  Effekt  hangt ...  aus-
schlieBlich  von  den  Uberwalzungsstrategien  und  -erfolgen 
sowi e  den  E last  izi t a  ten  auf  de m be tre  ffenden  Markt  ab ,  die 
von  der  Umweltpolitik  uber  eine  Produktabgabe  nicht  hinrei-
chend  gesteuert  werden  konnen.  Hinzu  kommt,  daG  selbst  bei 
Substitution  wegen  der  Unkenntnis  der  Umwelteigenschaften 
der  Substitutionsguter  der  Vorsorgeeffekt  fraglich  wird; 
diese  Gefahr  wird  urn  so  gr6Ger,  je selektiver  die  Produkt-
steuerbelastungen sind."  (Zitat:  Hansmeyer/Schneider,"Zur 
Fortentwicklung  der  Umweltpolitik  unter  marktsteuernden  As-
pekte  n" ,  s o  o. ) 0 
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Hohe  Entsorgungspreise  setzen  hohe  Entsorgungskosten  sowie  dit 
angemessene  Bewertung  der  Deponierisiken  und  der  Seltenheit  der 
Ressourcen  Deponie  voraus.  Nur  wenn  die  Entsorqunspreise  hoch. 
genug  sind,  stellen sie  eine  ausreichende  Stimulanz  fUr  Ver-
wertungsmaOnahmen  dar.  Die  Attraktivitat eines  Sekundarrohstof-
fes  miGt  sich  zunehmend  nicht  nur  an  den  Kosten  des  Primarroh-
stoffes  sondern  auch  an  den  Entsorgungskosten. 
Hohe  Entsorgungskosten  setzen  eine  angemessene  Technik  vorau~. 
Aus  Wettbewerbsgrunden  muG  diese  Technik  harmonisiert  sein.  C~r 
Entwurf  der  zukunftigen  Deponierichtlinie der  E~  zeigt  bereits 
den  Weg.  Die  Anforderungen  an  die  Qualitaten  des  abzulagernden 
Steffes  bestimmen  die  notige  Vorbehandlung  und  die  technische 
Ausgestaltung der  Deponie.  Die  Deponie  unbehandelter  Abfalle  mul3 
dabei  teurer sein,  wie  die  behandelter  Abfalle.  Es  bietet sich 
deshalb  an,  die  Grundwasserrisiken  der  Deponien  uber  eine  Zwangs-
haftpflicht  zu  versichern.  Weiter  ist eine Rucklage  aufzubauen 
aus  d er  Uber  Zei traume  von  Ober  50  Jahren  die  Kosten  fur  die  Ent-
gasung,  Sickerwasserklarung  und  Schlammbehandlung,  bauliche 
Unterhaltung  und  evtl.  Sanierungsmal3nahmen  finanziert  werden 
konnen.  Daz u  ist eine  Depon ieabgabe  z u  erheben  u m die·  Kosten  d er 
Sanierung  der  ~erzeitigen Altablagerungen  zu  finanzieren,  und  es 
ist zu  Uberlegen,  ob  eine  Deponiesteuer  das  angemessene  Instru-
ment  ist urn  die  Seltenheit  der  Ressourcen  Deponieflache  in  der 
Kostenrechnung  richtig  zu  bewerten.  Oder  anders  ausgedruckt,  die 
Vollkostenrechnung  im  Kommunalabgaberecht  fehlt  und  muBte  einge-
fuhrt  werden. 
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schriften,  zwischen  200,-- und  300,-- OM/ta  bzw.  70,-- OM  bis. 
100,-- DM/E,  a/E  liegen  muOte  davon  ausgegangen  werden,  dal3  die 
Deponiekosten  mindestens  400,-- OM  je  t  liegen.  Diese  Preise 
klingen  gemessen  an  den  derzeitigen  Preisen  von  2,-- OM  bis 
20,--DM  je  t  sehr  hoch.  Gemessen  an  den  Aufwendungen  fur  den 
Verbrauch  in der  EG  bezogen  auf  den  Einwohner  sind diese  "Ent-
sorgungskosten"  lacherlich  niedrig  und  indiskutJbe1.  Wenngleich 
ihre  Anhebung  heftigste politische  Auseinandersetzung  auf  kom-
~unaler Ebene  zur  Folge  haben  werden. 
Jei  Sonderabfa1len gelten die  g1eichen  Bedingungen,  a1lerdings 
muGten  die  absolute  Hohen  der  Kosten  urn  Faktoren  10  bis  100 
hoher  sein.  Die  Entsorgungstechnik  und  die  dafur  benotigten 
Preise  mGssen  zur  Produktions- und  Verteilungstechnik  in  einem 
angemesseneren  Verhaltnis  stehen. 
Die  Folgen  so  hoher  Entsorgungskosten  sind: 
- i11egale  Entsorgung  wird  zunehmen 
- Exporte  in Drittlander  werden  zunehmen 
- Abfall  zu  Wirtschaftsgut  zu  erklaren,  und  damit  den 
abfallrechtlichen  Bestimmungen  zu  entziehen,  wird  zunehmen 
- MaGnahmen  zur  Verminderung  und  Verwertung  werden  zunehmen. 
Man  mag  daran  erkennen,  daG  der  Einsatz  dieses  okonomische 
Instrumentes  nicht  wirkungsvo11  ist,  wenn  nicht gleichzeitig  die 
administrative  Uberwachung  verstarkt  wird.  Oas  Instrument  ware 
fur  den  Wettbewerb  neutral  und  verstarkt die  BemGhungen  urn  Ver-
wertung  und  Vermeidung. 
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Immer  wieder  gefordert,  okonomische  MaGnahmen  zu  ergreifen,  urn 
die  Preisschwankungen  beim  Verkauf  von  Altstoffen  zu  mindern  und 
ein  kostendeckendes  Niveau  fUr  den  Altstoffverkauf  zu  erzielen. 
Nur  so  lieGen  sich  die  Spannung  zwischen Entsorgungssicherheit 
und  Marktunsicherheit  Uberwinden.  Ich  warne  dringend  vor  solchen 
MaGnahmen,  denn  sie  fuhren  zwangslaufig  zu  weiteren,  in  der  EG 
hinreichend  bekrinltP.n  Bergen.  Kurzfristige  Preisschwankungen 
lassen sich  mit  vcrtraglichen  AusgleichsmaOnahmen  uberwinden.  Bei 
langfristigen  Preisverfall  mussen  die  Entsorgungsstrukturen 
angepaGt  werden. 
Oerzeit  beobachten  wir  aber  einen  anderen  Effekt.  Durch  die  hohen 
Gebuhren  in  der  Bundesrepublik  Deutschland  und  den  Zuzahlungen 
zur  Altstoffsammlung  aus  diesen  Gebuhreneinnahmen  als Strate-
gie  der  Abfallminderung,  werden  Altstoffe  relativ  preiswert.  Im 
Falle des  Exportes  fuhrt  es  in  den  Exportlandern  zur  Marktver-
drangung  dart  gesammelter  Rohstoffe.  Ein  Umstand  der  im  Rahmen 
der  europaischen Einigung  sicher noch  einer  Klarung  bedarf. 
4.5  Der  Ruckkauf 
Ein  relativ  wenig  diskutiertes  Instrument ist der  Aufkauf  von 
Abfallen.  Im  zusammenhang  mit  der  Festlegung  von  C~dmium haben 
wir  dieses  Instrument diskutiert.  Cadmium  ist haufig  mit  Zink-
erzen  vergesellschaftet  und  fallt bei  dessen  Gewinnung  als  Zwangs-
anfall  an.  Auf  der  Suche  nach  okonomischer  Verwertung  wurde 
dieses  girtige  Metall  in eienr  Vielzahl  von  Anwendungen  wie  Farbe, 
Korrosionsschutzmittel,  Batterien  usw.  in die  Umwelt  verteilt.  Es 
ware  sicher  eine preiswerte  UmweltschutzmaGnahme  gewesen  das  Cad-
mium  aufzukaufen  und  in  eine  Untertagedeponie  konzentriert  zu 
verbr ingen. 
Ein  anderer  denkbarer  Anwendungsanfall  ware  der  Rucklauf  von 
Brennstoffaufbereitsruckstanden  und  Tankballastwassern  in  See-
hafen.  Die  derzeit  stattfindende  mAngelhafte  Entsorgung  fuhrt 
immer  wieder  zu  Umweltstorungen.  So  geht  die  weitaus  gr513te  An-
zahl  der  an  01  sterbenden  Seevogel  an  Olruckstanden  aus  den 
Schiffsbetrieb  zu  grunde.  Bestunde  ein  solches  Ruckkaufsystem  in 
den  deutschen  Hafen,  bin  ich  sicher  daG  die  erzielbaren  Umwelt-
entlastungen  erheblich  waren. 
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Die  Wirksamkeit  von  okonomischen  Instrumenten,  besonders  in 
bezug  auf  Abfallverminderung,  Abfallvermeidung  und  Abfallver-
wertung  zu  bewerten,  fallt sehr· schwer,  wenn  bei  der  Betrach-
tung  der  gesellschaftliche  Kontext  z.B.  der  Bundesrepublik  ver-
lassen  wird,  deren  Ver- und  Entsorgung  durch  das  dezentrale 
Element  gepragt ist und  abfallwirtschaftlichen Initiativen  der 
Kommunalpolitik  mit  viel  Handlungsspielraum  uberlaGt.  Dies  ist 
bisher  z .B.  in  der  DDR- noch- nicht der.Fall,  die  zentrali-
stisch strukturiert  ist und  deren  zustandige  Behorden  bis  vor 
nicht  all  zu  langer  Zeit  einen  zweifelhaften  Tauschhandel  "Mull 
gegen  Devisen"  betrieben  haben.  Diese Schwierigkeiten  der  Be-
wertung  von  okonomischen  Instrumenten sind  im  internationalen 
Zusammenhang  noch  grol3er.  Hier  sind starke  wirtschaftliche,  vom 
Gesetzgeber  der  Bundesrepublik  kaum  beeinflu13barer  Krafte  am 
Werk.  Wenn  allein der  EG-Bereich  zu  betrachten ist,  wird  von 
Seiten  der  Hersteller von  umwelttechnischen  Gutern  ein  grol3es 
Marktvolumen  gesehen:  Der  Umweltmarkt  Boden  nach  einigen 
Schatzungen  hat  in der  europaischen  Gemeinschaft  bis  zum  Jahr 
2000  ein  Volumen  von  15  Milliarden  OM,  der  Umweltmarkt  Luft  ein 
Volumen  von  22  Milliarden  OM,  der  Umweltmarkt  Wasser  kommt  auf 
45  Milliarden  OM,  der  Umweltmarkt  Abfall  auf  50  Milliarden  OM. 
Die  Hersteller  und  Anbieter dieser benotigten 
Umweltschutzanlagen  konnen  in  den  nachsten  Jahren  mit 
erheblichen Nachfrageinpulsen  rechnen,  vor  allem  fur  die 
Modernisierung  und  den  Neubau  von  Klaranlagen,  fur  Kanalbau  und 
Kanalisation,  fur  Luftreinhaltemal3nahmen,  Altlastensanierung 
und  Abfallvermeidung,  Abfallverwertung sowie  Abfallentsorgung. 
Insofern  ist zu  begrul3en,  dal3  zur  Verringerung  schadlicher 
Emissionen alle verfugbaren  Krafte  gesammelt 
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nungsrechtlicher als  auch  okonomischer  Art  zuruckgegriffen  wer-
den  kann.  De r  EG-Umwel tkommi ssar  R  ipa  di  Me ana  bek raft  igt  e  in 
diesem  Sinne  Ende  Maidie  Absicht  der  Kommission,  neben  die. 
Einhaltung der  EG-Umweltgesetze  die  EinfUhrung  von  Umweltabga-
ben  sowie  Steuerlosungen  in  den  Mittelpunkt  der  kunftigen  Um-
weltpolitik  zu  stellen. 
5.0  Utopische  Instrumente 
5.1  Weltressourcensteuer 
Von  groGem  Interesse  ist auch  der  Vorschlag  von  Prof.  Simo-
nis, (9)  eine  "Welt-Ressourcen-Steuer"  einzufuhren.  Sie  soll 
dazu  beitragen,  eine  okologisch orientierte  Umstrukturier~ng 
von  Produktion  und  Handel  in  Gang  zu  setzen.  In diese 
Richtung  gehen  auch  Uberlegungen  der  Bundesregierung,  namlich 
einen  Tausch  von  Schulden  der  Entwicklungslander  gegen 
verstarkten  Umweltschutz  in  deren  Landern  zu  unterstutzen 
(debt-for-naturswaps);  konkret:  Die  Bundesregierung  ware 
bereit,  Brasilien einen  Tell  seiner Schulden  zu  erlassen,  wenn 
es  das  Tempo  der  Abholzung  des  Tropenwaldes  zumindest 
drosselte.  Worum  geht  es Prof.  Simonis?  "Mit  der  Einfuhrung 
einer  globalen Steuer  auf  die  Verwendung  fossiler  Energietrager 
beispielsweise und  nicht  - erneuerbarer mineralischer R ohstoffe 
wurde  eine  Verknupfung  zwischen  Ressourceneinsatz  und 
einsatzbedingten  Umweltschaden  hergestellt  (globales 
Verursacher-Prinzip)  und  ein Nettotransfer  von  Nord  nach  Sud 
bezweckt.  Auf  diesem  Wege  soll der  Teufelskreis  zwischen 
armutsbedingtem  Ressourcenraubbau  in  den  Entwicklungslandern 
und  reichtumsbedingter Energie- und  Rohstoffverschwendung  in 
den  Industrielandern qebrochen  werden  (Steuerlosung).  Eine 
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globale Ressourcensteuer  bietet  uber  die  damit  einhergehende 
Veranderung  der  relativen  Preise  der  Wirtschaft  (Erhohung  der 
Preise  der  fossilen  Energietrager  und  der  nicht  erneuerbaren 
Rohstoffe)  Anreize  und  Sanktionen  zugleich:  einerseits  Anreize 
zur  Entwicklung  effizienterer  Technologien  und  Produkte  und  zur 
Nutzung  erneuerbarer  Ressourcen,  andererseits  Sanktionen  gegen 
die  vorherrschende  energie- und  ressourcenintensive 
Produktionsstruktur  und  den  Ressourcenabbau.  Die  Steuer  kann, 
muG  aber  nicht,  von  einer  speziell  einzurichtenden  inter-
nationalen  Agentur  erhoben  und  budgetiert  werden.  Die  Steuer-
einnahmen  konnten  teilweise  dazu  dienen,  andere,  direkt  oder 
indirekt  umweltbelastende  Steuern  zu  ersetzen.  Mit  einer  globa-
len  Ressourcensteuer  wurde  also  sowohl  eine  Anderung  der  Struk-
tur  des  nationalen Steuersystems  bewirkt  als  auch  ein Netto-
Steuerzuwachs  fur  die  Entwicklungslander erzielt.  Ein  Teil  des 
Aufkommens  aus  der  Ressourcenbesteuerung  konnte  zum  Abbau  der 
Schuldenlast  der  Entwicklungslander  verwendet  werden.  Eine  spe-
zielle  Zweckbindung  eines  Teils  der  Mittel  fur  den  Umweltschutz 
bzw.  die  Forderung  umweltvertraglicher  Technologie  ware  denk~ 
bar,  erubrigt sich aber,  wenn  der  "okologische  Praventionsef-
fekt"  der  veranderten Steuerstruktur hinreichend  stark  ausge-
pragt  ist.  Urn  die  entstehenden  wirtschaftlichen Anpassungspro-
zesse  zu  erleichtern,  sollte  die  Steuer phasenweise  eingefuhrt 
werden".  (Zitat:  Auf  dem  Weg  zum  "Weltbudget"- Gedanken  zu 
einer  Welt-Ressourcen-Steuer,  Veroffentlichung  Wissenschafszen-
trum  Berlin).  Diese  Steuerlosung,  deren  Wirkungen  sehr stark  an 
die  seinerzeitigen Effekte  der  massiven  Erdolpreiserhohungen 
(rd.  40  $  pro  FaG)  durch  die  OPEC  Anfang  der  70er  Jahre  erin-
nern,  setzt  allerdings  die  Einhaltung  einer  Reihe  wichtiger  Ne-
benbedingungen  voraus:  "Der  Vorschlag  erfordert  vor  allem,  da!3 
es  hinreichend  Anreize  gibt,  ihn  zu  befolgen.  Fur  die  EntwiL:k-
lungslander  wurde  ein  besonderer  Anreiz  dar in  bestehen,  den 
derzeitigen Raubbau  an  Ressourcen  zu  beenden,  weil  hohere  Ent-
gelte  fur  Energie  und  Rohstoffe  und  langere  Nutzungszeiten  von 
Naturkapital  zu  gewinnen  waren.  Fur  die  Industrielander  wurden 
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rungen  beim  kurativen  Umweltschutz;  es  wurden  zudem  starke 
technische  Innovationseffekte  entstehen.  Fur  die  Umwelt  selbst 
ergaben  sich weltweit  sofort  spurbare  Entlastungseffekte.  It1s-
gesamt  konnte  eine  Welt-Ressourcen-Steuer  daher  ein Positi;-
Summen-Spiel  einleiten.  Vieles  hangt  allerdings  von  ihrer  kon-
kreten  Ausgestaltung  ab".  (Zitat:  s.o.).  Alles  in  allem  ist der 
Vorschlag  originell  und  regt  zu  weiterem  Nachdenken  an.  Seine 
Umsetzung  durfte unter  den  gegebenen  weltwirtschaftlichen  und 
auGenpolitischen  Rahmenbedingungen  groGte  Anstrengungen  erfor-
dern.  Allein die  Schaffung  einer  internationalen  und  mit  globa-
len  Kompetenzen  ausgestatteten  Weltsteuerbeh5rde  mutet  eher 
utopisch  an;  ganz  abgesehen  von  so  hoch  brisanten  Festlegungen 
wie  Hohe  und  Staffelung  der  Steuersatze,  Volumen  der  Besteu-
erung  insgesamt  und,  last  not  least,  deren  Verteilung  auf  die 
einzelnen  Lander  sowie  der  Bestrafung  von  Steuerhinterziehern. 
Andererseits sollte  Kleinmutigkeit  nicht  zu  fruh  dominieren, 
denn:  Wer  hatte  je  geglaubt~  daG  es  so  rasch  und  so  uberzeugend 
zum  "Montrealer  Protokoll  zum  Schutz  der  Ozonschicht"  kommen 
wurde  und  es  moglicherweise  schon  bald  eine  "Klimakonvention" 
zur  weltweiten  Reduzierung  des  Kohlendioxid  gibt? 
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Die  Belastung  der  naturlichen  Umwelt  durch  menschliches  Wirt-
schaften  konnte  mit  einer  ganzen  Palette von  KonzeptPn  reduziert 
werden,  welche  die  Lebensdauer  oder  die  Nutzurgsdauer  von  Pro-
dukten  erhohen,  ohne  dabei  WohlstandseinbuOen  entstehen  zu 
lassen. 
w.  R.  stahel,  vom  Buro  fur  Dauerhaftigkeit  in  Genf,  schlagt  vor, 
mit  der  Strategie  der  Dauerhaftigkeit  neue  Wege  der  nachhaltigen 
Nutzung  von  Gutern  zu  offnen.  Durch  eine  Verschiebung  von  der 
heutigen  kurzfristigen  Optimierung  von  Produktion  und  Verkauf  zu 
einer  Nutzungsoptimierung  uber  langere  Zeitraume  hinweg  konnen 
Produktionswachstum,  das  Rohstoffe  verzehrt,  und  wirtschaftli-
ches  Wachstum,  was  Reichtum  produziert voneinander  entkoppelt 
werden.  Dauerhaftigkeit  ist der  Kern  eines  ganzheitlichen  Pro-
duktmanagements  vom  Design  bis  zur  Entsorgung.  Mit  der  Dauerhaf-
tigkeitsstrategie  wird  die  traditionelle okonomische  Zieldefi-
nition,  ein  Produkt  sol~e "mit  moglichst  wenig  Rohstoffen  und 
Energie  einen  moglichst  hohen  Nutzen  schaffen",  urn  den  Faktor 
Zeit  erweitert. 
Insgesamt  wird  zukGnftig  die  Instandhaltequalitat  eines  Produkts 
ebenso  wichtig  wie  die  Produktqualitat.  Abfallvermeidung  ist 
billiger als Abfallbeseitigung. 
Neben  den  rohstoffsparenden  Effekten  lassen sich  bemerkenswerte 
Einsparungen  bei  den  Energieinvestitionen  machen,  weil  die  ur-
sprunglich  in das  Produkt  investierte Energie  weitgehend  erhalten 
bleibt. 
In  gesattigten  Markten,  wo  der  Kauf  neuer  Produkte  standig  das 
Wegwerfen  eines  vorhandenen  auslost,  erlaubt  die  Strategie der 
Dauerhaftigkeit  eine  erhebliche  Reduktion  der  Abfallmen~en.  mit 
all  den  Umweltbeeintrachtigung  in  Produktion,  Vertrieb  und  Ent-
sorgung.  In der  Porsche-Studie  fUr  ein Langzeitautomobil 
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allerdings  ohne  weiterreichende  Folgen.  Diese  Abfallm~nderun~ hat 
natGrlich  auch  positive  Effekte  auf  die  Rohstoffnutzung.  Es  ~ei 
nur  an  die  Studien  des  Club  of  Rome  oder  dem  Bericht  Umwelt  ~000 
an  den  amerikanischen  Prasidenten erinnert,  in  dem  auf 
die  starke  Inanspruchnahme  von  Rohstoffen  und  deren  Endlichkeit 
hingewiesen  wurde.  Mit  der  Strategie  der  Dauerhaftigkeit  wurde 
dieses  Problem  besonders  auch  im  Hinblick  auf  die  neuen  Erforder-
nisse  der  Entwicklung  der  osteuropaischen  Lander  losbar. 
Oer  im  Rahmen  der  Dauerhaftigkeitsstrategie geforderte  Verkauf 
von  Nutzen  anstelle  von  Gutern  erfordert die  Kostenoptimierung 
uber  die  gesamte  Produktlebensdauer  schon  bei  der  Herstellung. 
Eine  solche  Lebenszeitoptimierung  sollte erganzt  werden  durch 
"unbegrenzte"  Herstellerhaftunu.  Mit  dieser Strategie  verlagert 
sich der  Schwerpunkt  wirtschaftlichen  Interesses  von  der 
Herstellung  auf  das  "Flottenmanagement".  So  sieht die  danische 
Hohlglasindustrie  ihre  Zukunft  vor  allem  im  Verkauf  von 
Transportlogistik  und  Flaschensterilisation  und  nicht  mehr  in 
billigen  Produzieren  von  Einwegflaschen  mittels  Glasrecycling. 
Das  wesentliche  Argument  gegen  die  Langzeitstrategie ist die 
Geschwindigkeit  der  Innovation  in  den  jeweiligen  Produktbereich. 
Am  B~ispiel des  Energieverbrauchs  fur  Herstellung  und  Fahrlei-
stunq  oder  bei  der  Abgasentgiftung  beim  Auto  laGt  sich  dies 
leicht  nilchweisen.  Vertreter  der  Automobilindustrie  neigen  dar1er 
eher  zur  Verbesserung  der  Dauerhaltbarkeit  ihrer  Produkte,  d.h. 
sie  wollen  mit  einem  Minimum  an  Wartung  und  Reparatur  uber  die 
Lebenszeit  des  Autos  hinwegkommen.  Sicher  ist aber,  daG  die 
"geplante  Obsoleszens",  d.h.  die  bewuC3te  Verkurzung  der  Lebens-
dauer  von  Produkten  zwecks  Umsatzsteigerung  keine  offenen 
Befurworter  mehr  hat.  Die  geplante  Kurzlebigkeit  eines  Produktes 
i_t  ·-~in  Zeichen  fur  Fortschritt  mehr.  Faktisch  fullt  aber  das 
kurzlebige,  modische,  high-tec-Produkt  unserer  Abfallbehalter. 
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genannt. 
An  den  Zusammenhang  von  Umweltschutz  und  Arbeitszeitverkurzung 
wird  wahl  seltener gedacht;  allerdings  werden  durch 
Tarifabschlusse  langfristige  Entscheidungen  uber  die  Lebens~ 
bedingungen  der  Bevolkerung  getroffen.Eine verkurzte  Arbeitszeit 
bei  vollem  Lohnausgleich  hat  eine  erhebliche  Verteuerung  aller 
Dienstleistungen  und  somit  u.a.  auch  einen  EinfluG  auf  die 
Okolo.gie  zur  Folge:  Eine  hohe  Verdichtung der  Arbeitsleistung 
innerhalb  einer  relativ  kurzen  Arbeitszeit  kann  nur  bei 
- hoher  Entlohnung  und 
- hohem  Einsatz  an  Energie  und  Material 
durchgesetzt  werden.  Eine  starke  Verteuerung  der  Dienstleistung 
fur  hoch  qualifiziertes Personal  bedeutet,  daO  z.B.  Reparatur-
kosten,  aber  auch  Kosten  fur  die  arbeitsintensive  Wiederaufbe-
reitung  von  Reststoffen aller  Art  steigen.FUr  diese 
Dienstleistungen  mussen  also  vom  Verbraucher  hohere  Preise 
entrichtet  werden  als  fur  neue,  mit  gri:H3erer  Arbeitsproduktivitat 
erstellte  GUter.  Das  bedeutet  fur  den  gut  bezahlten  Konsumenten, 
daG  Kaufen  billiger  ist als  reparieren,  wegwerfen  billiger als 
verwerten.  Insofern  ist in  diesem  wirtschaftlichen  Zusammenhang 
auch  eine  Erklarung  fUr  das  Anwachsen  der  Abfallmengen  zu  finden. 
5.3  Produktverwertungsabgabe  und  Produktverantwortung 
Die  derzeitige  Okonomie  besitzt  keine  systematische  Antwort  auf 
die  Frage,  was  mit  einem  Produkt  nach  seiner  Nutzung  zu  geschehen 
hat.  Bislang  wird  es,  bei  mangelnder  Wertschatzung  des  Besitzers 
zu  Abfall  erklart und  mehr  oder  weniger  umweltschadlich  aufge-
hauft. 
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dem  Produzenten  zuruekzugeben,  bzw.  er  ware  VE  rpfliehtet,  es 
zuruekzunehmen?  Dieser  Ansatz  wurde  dem  Produlenten  eine  wichtige 
Rohstoffquelle  siehern.  Es  wurden  die  Abfallmengen  reduziert.  Und 
was  mir  ganz  wiehtig  erscheint,  das  Produktdesign  wurde  von  vern-
herein  an  einer  Folgenutzung  orientiert.  Die  heutigen  Produkte 
orientieren  sieh aussehlieGlich  am  anwendungsorientierten  Nutzen. 
Die  Trends  der  High  tee  in  Riehtung  auf  Verbundwerkstoffe,  Ver-
bundkonstruktion,  Miniaturisierung,  chemischer  Vergutung  laufen 
alle  in  der  Tendenz  einer  nachfolgenden  Verwertung  entgegen. 
Stoffliches  Recycling  ware  dann  zwar  ein politisches Ziel, 
praktiseh aber  nieht  mehr  realisierbar.  Naturlich  werden  auch 
zukunftig  nicht  alle  Produkte  und  Werkstoffe  high  tee  Produkte 
sein  und  die  Verwertung  von  Holz,  Glas,  papier,  Steine,  Ziegel 
wird  auch  zukunftig  von  groGer  Bedeutung sein.  Urn  aber  deutlich 
zu  machen  welcher  Ruckkoppelungseffekt  wichtig  erscheint  mir  die 
Ruckkoppelungseffekt  fur  den  "Designer"  des  Werkstoffes  oder 
Produktes  der  ihn  dazu  zwingt  sich  Gedanken  Gber  die  Entsorgung-
barkeit  zu  machen. 
Naturlich  konnte  man  sich die  Rucknahme  so  vorstellen,  daG  analog 
zur  Rentenversicherung  bei  Personen  eine  Produktabgabe  in eine 
Versicherung  bezahlt  wird,  aus  der  die  RuckfUhrungs- und  Zerle-
gungsmaGnahmen  bestritten  werden.  Die  Beitrage  waren  nach  der 
Recyclingfahigkeit  der  Produkte  staffelbar. 
Dieser  Vorschlag  wird  derzeit  bei  einzelnen  Firmen  und  Produkten 
bereits realisiert.  Die  RGcknahme  von  Elektrogeraten  oder  von 
Ruckstanden  aus  der  Verbrennung  von  Kohie  sind  geeignete 
Beispiele.  Auch  die  kurzlich  in  Betrieb  genommene 
"Zerlegestation"  von  VW  in  Lehr,  in  der  alte  Autos  systematiseh, 
vor  dem  Shreddern  zerlegt  werden,  urn  bessere  Altstoffausbeuten  zu 
erhalten getlt  in  uiese  Riehtung. 
Sicher  muGte  man  die  Anwendung  des  globalen  Grundsatzes  in  den 
konkreten  E inzel fallen  eingehend  uantersuchen.  Ieh  hal te die sen 
Ansatz  aber  langfristig  fur  den  einzig  zum  Ziel  fuhrenden. 
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